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Chapter 1
Introduction and overview
Involuntary unemployment is and has been one of the major policy
concerns in the European Union (EU). The variation in unemployment
rates across countries in the European Union is substantial, but the vari-
ation in unemployment rates between regions within countries is even
larger (OECD, 2005b). Moreover, though unemployment differences be-
tween countries in Europe have decreased markedly in the past decade,
regional unemployment differences within countries have remained sta-
ble. In some European countries regional unemployment differences
have even increased (OECD, 2005a).
Two factors that contribute to the persistence of regional unemploy-
ment within EU countries are obstacles to migration and regional inflex-
ibility of wages. In a recent study, the OECD (2005a) distinguishes sev-
eral barriers to migration due to housing policies such as unfavourable
tax incentives, social housing tenure, and transaction costs related to
buying and selling a house.
In Continental Europe wage-setting is highly centralised (OECD,
2004, Table 3.5). Wages typically are determined per sector at the
national level instead of by plant or at the regional level. Sectoral
wage bargaining processes result in nationwide wages per sector with
limited room for regional deviations. Consequently, the wage-setting
mechanism loses much of its equilibrating qualities.
The struggle against unemployment and regional unemployment dif-
ferences is important, but reaching an acceptable level of employment
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in relation to the potential labour force is an equally important issue.
At the Lisbon summit in 2000, EU leaders set themselves targets of
reaching an overall employment rate of 70%, and of 60% for women by
2010 (European Commission, 2000). Moreover, in our data set1 regional
disparities in the male and female participation rate within the member
states of the EU are, on average, 65% and 73% of those between the
member states of the EU, respectively. Reaching an acceptable level
of participation is urgent as the rapid ageing of Europe’s population
will test European budgets to the limit. Looming ahead is a big rise in
spending, not only on pensions, but also on health and long-term care.
The differences in both regional unemployment and regional par-
ticipation across countries are illustrated in figure 1.1 on page 6 and
figure 1.2 on page 7. Participation rates can be as high as 80% in Den-
mark and as low as 50% in Sicilia (Italy). The unemployment rate
ranges from 2.5% in Luxembourg to 32% in Andalusia (Spain).
1.1 Aim
Although regional participation rates and regional unemployment rates
vary widely both within and across EU countries, most international
studies use only national data. For that reason they are unable to
explain regional disparities within countries. Most regional studies, in
turn, are restricted to a single country, the result being that they cannot
do justice to the effect of different national institutions on unemploy-
ment rates and labour participation rates. Furthermore, regional studies
that do include multiple countries generally do not include national ex-
planatory variables other than country dummies, which also does not
clarify much either.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the influence of regional and
national variables on regional labour markets in a cross-country per-
spective from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We
want to answer the following three questions: (i) What is the effect of
regional and national variables on regional participation rates and re-
gional unemployment rates in the EU?; (ii) Is the effect of explanatory
variables on regional labour market outcomes the same for all countries,
1For details see appendix 4.A on page 87.
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or does it differ across countries?; (iii) As wage-setting is highly cen-
tralised in Continental Europe, what is the effect of national institutions
on regional labour markets under centralised wage bargaining?
We answer the first two questions by developing an econometric
model suited for analysing hierarchical data, where regions are lower
level units and countries are higher level units. We adopt a multilevel
model with random coefficients for the regional-level variables and fixed
coefficients for the national-level variables. We extend this model to
account for heteroskedasticity, serial dependence, spatial dependence,
and endogeneity. As a result, we are able to differentiate between the
effect of regional and national characteristics.
To answer the third question we develop a theoretical model of a
country with two regions where wage bargaining takes place at the na-
tional level. The two regions have different labour market characteris-
tics and individuals can migrate to the region with the more favourable
labour market characteristics if they find a job there. Employment,
unemployment, participation as well as migration are assumed to be
endogenous.
1.2 Outline
In chapter 2 we discuss problems arising when analysing hierarchical
data. We also give an overview of how multilevel models have been
used in the regional labour market literature to solve these problems.
Analysing regional participation and regional unemployment over time
poses some additional statistical problems that have to be dealt with,
such as heteroskedasticity, explanatory variables that are not strictly ex-
ogenous, spatial correlation, and correlation over time. Although each
of these additional problems have been addressed separately in the ex-
isting multilevel literature, the combination of these problems has not
been explored. For this reason, we develop an econometric model taking
into account that errors terms are heteroskedastic, observations may be
correlated over time and space, and that part of the explanatory vari-
ables are not strictly exogenous.
In chapter 3 we develop a theoretical framework for regional labour
participation. First, we discuss the differences between the participa-
tion decision and the hours of work decision and compare two possible
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interpretations of the regional participation rate. Next, we develop a
theoretical framework that identifies the key determinants of the indi-
vidual labour force decision and explain the aggregation from the micro
level to the regional level. Finally, we discuss interactions that are neg-
ligible at the individual level, but that do matter at the regional level.
For example, the participation decision of an individual is influenced
by the regional unemployment rate, but conversely, the participation
decision of an individual does not influence the regional unemployment
rate. By contrast, at the aggregate regional level, participation rates
are not only influenced by regional unemployment rates, but also the
other way around.
In chapter 4 we use the statistical model developed in chapter 2 and
the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3 to analyse regional
participation rates in the European Union. We include regional explana-
tory variables to account for the economic and demographic structure
of regions. In addition, we include national explanatory variables in
order to reckon with the effect of national labour market institutions
on regional participation. Our findings indicate that the hypotheses
that regional participation rates in the EU are determined by a com-
mon structure, and that labour force participation can be encouraged
by a common policy, must be rejected. Policy measures having large
effects in one country may have small, or even adverse effects in another
country.
In chapter 5 we derive a theoretical framework of regional unemploy-
ment, participation and migration in a country with centralised wage
bargaining. The theoretical framework consists of four stages covering
two regions and one sector within one country. Wages are determined
at the national level through wage negotiations between the employer
federation and the union. At the regional level individual firms de-
cide, given the wage level, how many workers they want to hire, while
working-age individuals determine whether they want to participate in
the labour market in their home region, in the other region, or not
at all. Firms are identical and produce for a national market, as the
transport costs of trade are zero. In the last stage the product market
clears. We use this framework to simulate the effect of moving costs
and unemployment benefits on regional unemployment, participation,
migration, and regional unemployment differentials. The theoretical lit-
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erature on regional labour markets under centralised wage bargaining
is rather sparse. Our contribution to this literature is the inclusion of
the participation behaviour of individuals in a model with both regional
unemployment and migration under centralised wage bargaining.
In chapter 6 we investigate the effect of regional and national vari-
ables and institutions on regional unemployment, using the statistical
model derived in chapter 2. We include regional explanatory variables to
account for the effect of the regional economic and demographic struc-
ture on regional unemployment. In addition, we include both national
institutions and interactions of national institutions as explanatory vari-
ables. We find that the effect of the regional variables on unemployment
varies widely across countries. Moreover, we find evidence of interac-
tion effects between labour market institutions. The effect of one labour
market institution on unemployment depends on the value of another
labour market institution. In chapter 7 we recapitulate our major find-
ings.


























































































































































































































































This thesis focuses on regional labour markets within Europe. Since re-
gions within countries are likely to be more similar than regions across
countries, regional labour markets within countries are not indepen-
dent of each other. An analysis of regional labour markets within Eu-
rope should not ignore this structure in which regions are embedded
within countries. This type of data is known in the literature as hier-
archically structured data. Other examples of hierarchically structured
data—where data in one cluster are more similar than data across clus-
ters—are:
• repeated observations on a subject over time;
• samples of subjects in different geographical, political, cultural or
administrative units;
• test results of students in different schools.
The lowest level in hierarchically clustered data contains level 1 units,
one level higher consists of level 2 units, the level above that holds level 3
units, and so forth. For example, in the case of regions within countries,
the regional level is called level 1 and the national level is called level 2.
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The main feature of hierarchical data is that observations are no
longer independent. Multilevel models take account of the hierarchical
structure of the data by assuming different relations for different clus-
ters. Furthermore, multilevel models can be used to assess the influence
of cluster level explanatory variables whilst controlling for differences in
lower level explanatory variables.
In this chapter we discuss issues associated with analysing hierar-
chical data in general and, more specifically, issues relative to analysing
hierarchical data on regional labour markets. Thus the aim of this chap-
ter is to develop an econometric model designed for analysing data on
regional labour markets over time in a cross-country perspective.
This chapter is set up as follows. Section 2.2 discusses problems
that may occur in handling hierarchically structured data in general
and indicates that multilevel modelling may solve (part of) these prob-
lems. Next, the basic two-level model is presented in section 2.3. In
section 2.4 some caveats of the use of multilevel models in general are
given. In section 2.5 four extensions of the basic multilevel model are
presented that are especially relevant for analysing regional labour mar-
kets in a cross-country perspective. These extensions are respectively
multilevel models with heterogeneous level 1 variance, longitudinal mul-
tilevel models, multilevel models with spatial correlation, and multilevel
models that account for endogeneity of some of the explanatory vari-
ables. Following on, in section 2.6, an overview is given of empirical ap-
plications of multilevel models in regional labour market research. For
the analyses in later chapters of this thesis we require a combination
of all four extensions of the basic multilevel model discussed in section
2.5. However, as such a model is not readily available, we develop an
econometric model with random regional-level and fixed national-level
coefficients, further taking into account that observations may be corre-
lated over time in space, that errors terms are heteroskedastic, and that
part of the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous in section
2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Objections to single level models
In the case of hierarchical data observations belonging to the same group
are generally not independent; their intra-class correlation is not equal
to zero. Therefore, single level models are not appropriate for analysing
hierarchical data as we explain below.
One technique used to analyse hierarchical data is to assign all group
level explanatory variables to the individual observations and perform
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression at the individual level. How-
ever, due to the intra-class dependency, the error terms of lower level
units that belong to the same group will be correlated. Consequently,
the assumption of independent observations is violated and the stan-
dard errors of conventional statistical tests are underestimated, leading
to spuriously “significant” results (Hox, 1995). Another objection to
OLS is the assumption that all regression coefficients are equal for all
groups, while the relation between two variables can vary in several
ways, as illustrated in figure 2.1.
In panel I of figure 2.1 the relation between x and y, represented
by a thick straight line, is the same for all observations. In panel II of
figure 2.1 the general relationship across all groups (the thick line) is the
same, but some groups have uniformly higher y values for all x levels
than other groups. In panel III the difference in the relation between
x and y between the groups increases in x. By contrast, in panel IV
there is a large difference for low x values, but this difference decreases
if x increases. In panels III and IV the relation between the intercepts
and slopes of the different groups is respectively, positive and negative,
whereas in panel V this relation in much more complex. Finally, in panel
VI there is no overall relationship between x and y across all groups,
but there is a relationship between x and y per separate group.
In sum, focussing on the overall relationship and ignoring the mul-
tilevel structure of the data gives a distorted representation of the real
relationships between two variables at the individual level.
Another technique for analysing hierarchical data is Analysis of Co-
variance (ANCOVA), a mathematical equivalent to the regression anal-
ysis, with dummies for the different groups which allows intercepts and
slopes to vary across groups. However, if there are many groups, AN-
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=  general relationship between x and y
















Figure 2.1: Varying relationships across groups.
Source: Adapted from Duncan et al. (1998, Figure 1).
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COVA results in numerous parameters to be estimated. Moreover, AN-
COVA cannot be used to assess which group-level variable explains dif-
ferences between the groups and how group level variables influence the
relation between individual level variables and the dependent variable
(Kreft & Leeuw, 1998).
A third technique for analysing hierarchical data is to aggregate all
individual level variables to the group level and carry out OLS at the
group level, for example, by doing regression over group means. A prob-
lem with this technique is that all within-group information variation is
lost. Furthermore, it is not possible to draw conclusions for individual
level units on the basis of aggregate regressions. Drawing conclusions
for individual units by using aggregate regressions is known as the eco-
logical fallacy (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). Although not the first author on
this topic, Robinson (1950) is often referred to because he brought this
fallacy to the attention of the wider public. Robinson showed that a
group level coefficient need not be equal to a corresponding individual
level coefficient,1 which he illustrated via an empirical example where
the individual level correlation between being a native American and
literacy was positive while the corresponding state level correlation was
negative. Looking at state level data only would therefore mistakenly
lead to the conclusion that foreign born Americans are more likely to
be literate than people born in the United States.
We can conclude by saying that a single-level model is not appropri-
ate in the case of hierarchical data with intra-class dependency unless
intraclass correlation is small and groups are large (see De Leeuw &
Kreft, 1995).
2.3 The basic multilevel model
Multilevel models are known by various names in the literature: hierar-
chical linear models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), multilevel statistical
1Robinson (1950) proved mathematically that the ecological correlation and the
individual correlation between two variables are usually unequal. He also showed
that the ecological correlation is larger in absolute terms if the within-areas individ-
ual correlation is not greater than the total individual correlation.
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models (Goldstein, 1995), and mixed models (Searle, Casella, & McCul-
loch, 1992).
Authors also differ in what they choose to label as a multilevel model.
Some authors do not regard a statistical model as a multilevel model
unless it contains an interaction effect, whereas other authors think that
a random intercept will suffice in order for a model to be a multilevel
model.
2.3.1 Description of the model
Multiple notations are used for describing multilevel models. Not only
does the notation differ per research area, but scientists also use various
notations within a research area.
The notational approach often used in educational and sociological
research is the hierarchical linear model notation in which a separate
equation is written for each level of the hierarchy. After that the equa-
tions are sometimes combined in a single model equation. This hier-
archical linear model notation can be found in Bryk and Raudenbush
(1992). The most popular specialised software packages used in the
educational field are Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) (Rauden-
bush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) and MLwiN 2 (Rasbash, Steele,
Browne, & Prosser, 2005).
Another notation used in biometric applications is a mixed model
notation, often in matrix form, see for example McLean, Sanders, and
Stroup (1991), and McCulloch and Searle (2001). The mixed model
notation uses a single equation in matrix form for both levels of the
hierarchy instead of writing a separate equation for each level. Mixed
models can be estimated with general statistical programs, such as SAS
PROC MIXED and S-Plus.
The multitude of notational conventions and especially the differ-
ence between the two approaches mentioned above sometimes causes
confusion. In response, several papers appeared in order to clarify the
differences and similarities between the two notations (Ferron, 1997;
2MLwiN is the new Windows version of MLn and its precursor ML3.
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Wang, 1997; Singer, 1998). The purpose of the last two papers is to
familiarise users of specialised multilevel computer packages with the
more general statistical computer package SAS PROC MIXED by ex-
plaining the statistical output of SAS PROC MIXED in a HLM and
MLwiN way. The paper of Ferron (1997) is a theoretical didactic article
in which the two notational systems, their differences and similarities
are shown.
We give the basic multilevel model in both notations below. This
basic multilevel model is a relatively simple version: a two-level linear
regression model with both fixed and random effects, but without cross-
level interaction effects.
Following the hierarchical linear model notation, the first level of the
model can be written as
yij = β0j + β1jx1ij + β2x2ij + e0ij, (2.1)
where i (1, . . . , n) refers to the level 1 unit and j (1, . . . ,m) to the level
2 unit. The variable yij is regressed on the intercept β0j and on the
explanatory variables x1ij and x2ij with residual e0ij, where E(e0ij) =
0 and var(e0ij) = σ
2
e0. The effect of variable x2ij (β2) is assumed to be
fixed across level 1 units. Both the intercept β0j and the coefficient of
x1ij are allowed to vary randomly across level 1 units, so the second
level of the model can be expressed as
β0j = β0 + u0j, (2.2a)
β1j = β1 + u1j, (2.2b)
where u0j and u1j are random variables with expectation and variance
E(u0j) = E(u1j) = 0, (2.3a)
var(u0j) = σ
2
u0, var(u1j) = σ
2
u1, cov(u0j, u1j) = σ
2
u01. (2.3b)
Note that the coefficients are allowed to vary randomly across level 2
units. In other words, the intercept and slope vary randomly across
level 2 units, but in general each level 2 unit does not have its own
estimated coefficients. An explanation of why this is the case is given
in section 2.4.
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Integrating the first and second level model yields the combined
model
yij = β0 + β1x1ij + β2x2ij + (u0j + u1jx1ij + e0ij). (2.4)
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In full-sample notation the combined model can be written as
y = Xβ + Zv + ε, (2.6)
with
E(v) = 0, (2.7a)
E(ε) = 0, (2.7b)













where β are the fixed effects and v and ε are random effects. G is the
variance-covariance matrix of v and R is the variance matrix of ε.3 Both
the level 1 and level 2 error terms are usually assumed to be normally
distributed. The vector y contains observations on the response variable,
while X and Z are design matrices containing explanatory variables.
Equations (2.6)-(2.8) reflect the mixed model notation.
2.3.2 Estimation of the model
The parameters to be estimated in (2.6) are: the fixed coefficients (β),
the variance-covariance matrix of the random coefficients (G), and the
variance of the error terms (R). If the variance-covariance matrix G and
the variance matrix R were known, the fixed coefficients could be esti-
mated with Generalized Least Squares (GLS), see Snijders and Bosker
(1999, Chapter 5). If the fixed coefficients were known, then the random
part of the model (2.8) could be estimated (Snijders & Bosker, 1999,
Chapter 5). Since neither of these parameters are known, a different
approach must be followed.
One approach would be to estimate the multilevel model by Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) or by Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML),
also known as Residual Maximum Likelihood. There are several proce-
dures which compute the ML estimates of the parameters of the mul-
tilevel model. An iterative two-stage procedure is Iterative Generalised
Least Squares (IGLS), see e.g., Goldstein (1986). The IGLS procedure
usually starts with an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the
fixed parameters, which is then used to estimate the random part of the
model. Next, the estimate of the random part of the model is used to
make an improved estimate of the fixed part, which in turn is used to
improve the estimate of the random part. The IGLS procedure alter-
nates between estimating the fixed and the random parts of the model
3Note that R is a variance matrix, with the variance of the level 1 standard errors
on the diagonal (the off-diagonal elements are zeros). G is a variance-covariance
matrix with the variance of the random coefficients on the diagonal. The off-diagonal
elements of G are the covariances of the random coefficients.
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until convergence is reached. Assuming normality, the parameter esti-
mates resulting from this procedure are maximum likelihood estimates.
For efficient computational details see Goldstein and Rasbash (1992).
Another procedure for computing ML estimates is based on Fisher
Scoring and is developed by Longford (1987). According to Goldstein,
Browne, and Rasbash (2002) the Fisher Scoring algorithm is formally
equivalent to IGLS (see also Rodr´ıguez and Goldman [1995] and Rau-
denbush and Bryk [2002, Chapter 14] for a more detailed comparison of
both procedures).
Finally, the ML estimates can be computed by the Expectation -
Maximisation (EM) procedure developed by Dempster, Laird, and Ru-
bin (1977) and Dempster, Rubin, and Tsutakawa (1981).
The ML estimator of the variance components does not correct for
the degrees of freedom lost due to the estimation of the fixed effects.
As a result, the estimates of the variance components are generally
too small. REML corrects for the uncertainty about the fixed effects
in estimating the variance components, which is especially useful if the
number of level 2 units (e.g. countries) is relatively small (cf. Hox, 2002,
Section 3.1.1.; McCulloch & Searle, 2001, Section 6.10; Bryk & Rauden-
bush, 1992, pp. 45-46). Goldstein (1989) shows how the IGLS procedure
can be changed into a Restricted Iterative Generalized Least Squares
(RIGLS) procedure. In the multivariate normal case this RIGLS pro-
cedure provides estimates equivalent to REML. Again, see Goldstein
and Rasbash (1992) for computational details. For an adjusted EM
procedure resulting in REML estimates, see Dempster et al. (1981).
Since REML estimation reckons with the sampling variation of the
fixed effects it seems preferable to an ML estimation. However, there
are also two arguments in favour of ML estimation. Firstly, ML com-
putations are generally easier than REML computations (Hox, 2002,
Section 3.1.1.). Secondly, an overall chi-squared test based on the like-
lihood function can be used to compare models that differ in the fixed
part. If REML estimation is used, this test can only be implemented to
assess the influence of a change in the random part of the model (Hox,
2002, Section 3.1.1.).
A more flexible but less standard method for mixed models is the
Generalized Linear Model (GLM). GLM can be used to estimate non-
linear multilevel models with non-normal data. For example, a GLM
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model for dichotomous data uses a logit function in combination with
a binomial distribution. The basic multilevel model can be viewed as a
special case of GLM. An introduction to GLM estimation for multilevel
models can be found in Hox (2002, Chapter 6) and an overview of
GLM is provided by Y. Lee and Nelder (1996). In order to handle
longitudinal data an extension to GLM is the Generalized Estimating
Equations (GEE) approach proposed by Zeger and Liang (1986) and
Liang and Zeger (1986).
Another estimation method for multilevel models is a Bayesian ap-
proach with complicated and computationally intensive Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms such as the Gibbs sampler (cf. Hox,
2002, Chapter 11).
Finally,Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation, which
is a non-iterative two-stage procedure, can be used to estimate a multi-
level model. FGLS estimates can be derived by restricting the number
of iterations in an IGLS estimation to one. An advantage of FGLS es-
timation is that it is computationally simple and rapid. Furthermore,
FGLS estimates are asymptotically equivalent to ML estimates. How-
ever, as simulation research has shown, disadvantages of FGLS are that
FGLS estimators are, in general, less efficient than ML estimators and
that the FGLS derived standard errors are biased downwards (cf. Hox,
2002, Chapter 3; Hox, 1998; Kreft, 1996).
2.3.3 Testing of assumptions
The basic multilevel model can be tested with respect to several aspects,
which can be grouped into three broad categories. Each category deals
with a different set of assumptions of the basic multilevel model.
One selection problem is whether a variable should be included in the
fixed or the random part of the model. This choice primarily depends
on the context of the data and the objective of the analysis. If the values
of a variable can be seen to be drawn from a probability distribution,
and the objective is to make general statements about phenomena for
a larger set of groups, this variable may be treated as random (Snijders
& Bosker, 1999, Chapter 4). If not, or if the aim is to make statements
about groups included in the analysis only, the variable may be treated
as fixed. Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 123) propose a t-ratio test de-
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veloped by Berkhof and Snijders to determine whether or not a variable
should have a random slope. The advantage of this test is that it does
not require ML and REML estimates; the estimation results from the
first iterative step of either IGLS, RIGLS or the Fisher scoring algorithm
are sufficient.
The second category contains tests which have to do with level 1
error terms. The basic multilevel model assumes normally distributed
level 1 error terms with constant variance. However, the level 1 er-
ror terms may very well not be normally distributed and may have a
complex variance structure. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, Chapter 9)
discuss two tests for homogeneity. The first test is valid if the data
is normal and the sample sizes per level 2 unit are 10 or more. The
test statistic is H = Σd2j , which has a chi-square distribution with J-1
degrees of freedom under the homogeneity hypothesis, where
dj =
ln(S2j )− [Σfj ln(S2j )/Σfj]
(2/fj)1/2
, (2.9)
with Sj is the estimated residual standard deviation in group j (=
1, ..., J) and fj is degrees of freedom associated with Sj. The second
test is a likelihood-ratio test in which the homogeneous variance model
is compared with a model with heterogeneous level 1 variance.
In the third category there are tests about the level 2 random co-
efficients. One test is whether the random coefficients follow a normal
distribution, for example, by using a normal probability plot (cf. Sni-
jders & Bosker, 1999, p. 133).
2.4 Caveats
Although multilevel analysis is a common way to handle hierarchical
data, there are a few points to keep in mind.
First, a multilevel model is not an obvious choice if the aim of the
study is to obtain separate estimates for each level 2 unit. Even though
it is possible to get estimates for each level 2 unit by using shrunken
estimators, the comparison of these estimates across level 2 units is
complicated by the fact that the estimates may be “shrunken” too far
(Kreft & Leeuw, 1998, p. 52; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992, pp. 76-82,
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128, 129).4 Usually the aim of multilevel studies is to understand the
relation between the dependent variable and level 1 and 2 variables for
a larger population, in that both the level 1 and the level 2 units are
assumed to be a random sample from a larger population. This leads
to the second point that one should ensure that the observed sample
corresponds to the population of real interest (Draper, 1995). If there is
reason to believe that certain higher level units are unique or that they
come from a different population, then they should not be regarded as
part of a random sample of level 2 units from the same population, and
should be treated as fixed effects instead (Duncan et al., 1998).
Another point is the minimum sample size of both the level 1 and
level 2 units needed for reliable estimates. We refer to Bryk and Rau-
denbush (1992, p. 203) to give an indication of the necessary sample
sizes. Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) argue that 60 individuals in each
of the 160 groups are needed to allow for a total of four random coef-
ficients at the group level. As mentioned by Draper (1995), maximum
likelihood estimation may lead to downwardly biased variance estimates
and to small confidence intervals in the case of a small number of level 2
units. Draper suggests the use of Bayesian methods to solve this prob-
lem. Snijders and Bosker (1993) derive optimal sample sizes for two
level models. However, the sample sizes were only optimized with re-
spect to the standard errors of the regression coefficients and abundant
a priori knowledge was needed.
Finally, we may not always require multilevel models in the event of
hierarchical data, for example, when there are large groups with small
intra-class correlation, as pointed out by De Leeuw and Kreft (1995).
2.5 Extensions
We have seen in section 2.3 that the basic multilevel model deals with
the case of hierarchical data in which observations belonging to the
same group are in general not independent. A special case of hierar-
4Technically the shrunken estimators of a group are the expectations of the (ran-
dom) coefficients given the parameter estimates and the data of all groups (Busing,
Meijer, & Van der Leeden, 2005, p. 4). Loosely speaking, the estimates of a specific
group are “shrunken” towards the mean of the estimates of all groups (Busing et
al., 2005, p. 4).
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chical data is space-time data, e.g. data on regions within countries at
different points in time. Using space-time data may give rise to addi-
tional problems. We will discuss four extensions of the basic multilevel
model that can cope with these problems.
The first extension is to allow for different level 1 variance across
level 2 units (e.g. the variance at the regional level may vary across
countries); see section 2.5.1.
The second extension deals with the time-component of the data.
Data on the same object (e.g. region) at different time periods may be
correlated; see section 2.5.2.
The third extension addresses the spatial component of the data.
Data of regions that are near to each other may be correlated; see
section 2.5.3.
The fourth extension has to do with endogeneity; see section 2.5.4.
Though not limited to space-time data, endogeneity is a problem that
frequently occurs in space-time data. If, for example, we were to ex-
plain regional unemployment by regional labour participation, the latter
variable is not strictly exogenous, the reason being that regional labour
participation not only influences regional unemployment, but regional
unemployment itself also affects regional labour participation.
Although these four problems and extensions have already been
studied individually, the combination has not. The purpose of this
chapter is to develop a model that deals with all four problems simul-
taneously. We return to this in section 2.7.5
2.5.1 Heterogeneous level 1 variance
If testing shows that the assumption of a homogeneous level 1 variance
must be rejected, the basic multilevel model can be extended with het-
erogeneous level 1 variance. In multilevel models level 1 variance can
be modelled in several ways.
A relatively simple structure for level 1 variance allows for a different
level 1 variance (σ2j ) for each level 2 group j. Suppose that we have
regions within countries. In this case the combined model in equation
5Other extensions of the basic multilevel model, not pursued here, are cross-
classified models, nonlinear models, and models with discrete response variables,
measurement errors, or latent variables. For these topics, see Goldstein (2003), Hox
(2002), Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), and Snijders and Bosker (1999).
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2.4 can be extended to
yij = β0 + β1x1ij + β2x2ij + (u0j + u1jx1ij + e1ijz1ij + e2ijz2ij), (2.10a)
z1ij = 1 for country 1, 0 for country 2, (2.10b)
z2ij = 0 for country 1, 1 for country 2, (2.10c)
with var(e1ij) = σ
2
e1, var(e2ij) = σ
2
e2, cov(e1ij, e2ij) = 0 (cf. Goldstein,
1995, Chapter 3).6
The level 1 variance can also be modelled as a linear function of a
continuous explanatory variable and as a function of the predicted value
of the dependent variable (cf. Goldstein, 2003, Chapter 3; Raudenbush
& Bryk, 2002, pp. 131-34).
2.5.2 Longitudinal data
An example of a multilevel model for a data set with repeated measures
of individual units (e.g. regions) is a two-level model where regions are
level 2 units and measurement points are level 1 units (cf. Goldstein,
2003, Chapter 5; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, Chapter 6).
The two-level model can be extended by specifying a polynomial in
the level 1 model in order to specify a growth curve for each individual.
This extension has been used in growth curve analysis of, for example,
rat growth (Van der Leeden, 1998).
In general it is assumed that the level 1 errors are uncorrelated.
However, if this assumption does not hold, an additional correlation
structure can be modelled. Goldstein, Healy, and Rasbash (1994) show
how to model autocorrelation in a multilevel model for both discrete
and continuous time. Measurements are made in the discrete time case
at the same set of equal intervals for all level 2 units, whereas in the
continuous time case time intervals may vary.
The models mentioned above can be extended to a data set with
repeated measures for individuals that are nested within regions by for-
mulating a three-level model. In such a model, regions are level 3 units,
6Goldstein (1995) uses a slightly different example of heteroskedasticity for sub-
groups of level 1 units. Goldstein (1995, Chapter 3) defines subgroups by the com-
mon characteristic gender. So in equation (2.10) z1ij is equal to 1 for males and
0 for females, and z2ij is equal to 0 for males and 1 for females. However, instead
of defining subgroups by a common characteristic, subgroups can just as easily be
formed according to the division in level units (see, e.g., Snijders & Bosker, 1999,
Chapter 8).
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individuals are level 2 units, and measurement points are level 1 units
(Yang & Goldstein, 1996). As Hox (2002) noted, however, a problem
of three-level models is that they can become complicated very fast.
Regression parameters of both the first and second level explanatory
variables can vary successively across level 2 and level 3 units. Further-
more, the number of parameters to be estimated is high, and level 3
sample sizes become relatively small (Hox, 2002, Section 2.4).
2.5.3 Spatial autocorrelation
The literature with respect to multilevel models with spatial autocorre-
lation is quite sparse.7 Two multilevel studies were found.
Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) describe a two-stage procedure
proposed by Steven Raudenbush in order to account for spatial corre-
lation. First they adjust the regional level measures of the dependent
variable for individual level effects of explanatory variables within re-
gions with the help of multilevel results. Then they use the adjusted
measures as dependent variables in a spatial analysis.
Langford, Leyland, Rasbash, and Goldstein (1999) use a non-linear
(Poisson) multilevel model with spatial autocorrelation in order to model
the geographical distribution of diseases. The spatial autocorrelation
structure is given by a random spatial effect for each region, which is
composed of a weighted sum of a set of independent random effects of
neighbouring areas.
2.5.4 Simultaneity
Recently some studies that deal with endogeneity in multilevel models
have become available. Rice, Jones, and Goldstein (1998) use condi-
tional iterative least squares to handle correlations between the level 2
random effects and the fixed explanatory variables.
Spencer and Fielding (2000) use a standard instrumental variable
(IV) approach to overcome the problem of level 1 random effects cor-
related with regressors. However, their chosen software did not have
an instrumental variables estimation option at that time, resulting in
the situation whereby the parameters and standard errors could not be
estimated at the same time. As an alternative, Spencer and Fielding
7See Elhorst (2003b) for an overview of spatial panel data models.
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(2000) use the following steps to estimate their model. First the fixed
effect parameters are estimated by instrumenting the endogenous vari-
ables. Next the standard errors are estimated in MLwiN by imposing
the restriction that the fixed parameters equal the estimates obtained
in the first step.
2.5.5 Conclusions
As we have seen in this section, several models have been developed to
deal with space, time and partly endogenous explanatory variables in
multilevel models. In section 2.7 we develop an econometric model that
reckons with the combination of these problems, but first we present
some empirical applications of multilevel modelling in the next section.
2.6 Empirical multilevel applications
in regional labour market research
In the last decade multilevel analysis has received a great deal of at-
tention in regional and urban economics. Multilevel analysis appeared
as a special theme in Environment and Planning A (1997), and as a
volume in the series Concepts and Techniques in Modern Geography
(Jones, 1991). We discuss below some empirical applications of multi-
level analysis in regional labour market research to give a flavour of how
multilevel analysis can be fruitfully used in this field.
The empirical applications reviewed in this section have two things
in common. First they all combine micro and regional data except for
the study of Gould and Fieldhouse (1997). Second the aim of most
studies is to ferret out the effect of regional level variables whilst taking
account of micro level variables.
We will proceed with a discussion of two-level studies with random
intercept models and then elaborate on two-level studies that include
both random intercepts and random slopes. Finally, we discuss three-
and four-level studies.
Random intercept multilevel models
Boyle and Shen (1997), Elman (1996), Kulu and Billari (2004), Mc-
Call (1998), as well as Ward and Dale (1992) analyse the influence of
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individual and regional variables in a multilevel model with a random
intercept.
Boyle and Shen (1997) and Kulu and Billari (2004) analyse internal
migration in successively, Estonia and Britain. The dependent variable
in Boyle and Shen’s study is migration distance of one year in-migrants.
In the full sample migrants living in public housing are less likely to
move long distances, whereas private renting migrants are more likely
to move long distances than owner-occupiers. The amount of public
housing in the target area does not seem to be of importance. In the
subsample of long distance movers, private renters are still more likely
to migrate over long distances, but there is no significant difference
in the distance moved by owner-occupiers and public-housing renters.
Furthermore, the higher the percentage of public housing in an area, the
less likely it is that in-migrants have moved long distances. All migrants
are less likely to move into areas where the reduction of public housing
has been the largest.
Using a logistic multilevel model, Kulu and Billari (2004) show that
both individual and regional variables influence the probability of migra-
tion. Moreover, the influence of regional variables varies across different
groups. Including three cross-level interactions, Kulu and Billari find
that: (i) The agricultural share in employment has a negative effect on
the migration probability of older people, while no effect is found for
younger people. Retired people seem to migrate from urban to rural
areas where living costs are lower; (ii) Unemployed and inactive people
are more mobile than employed individuals. Furthermore, migration
propensities are larger in regions with higher unemployment. However,
migration propensities of unemployed people decrease if the regional
unemployment rate increases. The probability of migration of inactive
people does not change due to different regional unemployment levels;
(iii) The migration intensity decreases faster for non-Estonians than
for Estonians as the regional share of ethnic minorities increases, which
implies increasing ethnic segregation.
Both Elman (1996) and Ward and Dale (1992) analyse participa-
tion behaviour. Using a logit model, Elman finds that both individual
and regional variables influence older male labour participation in the
United States in 1910. Elman runs two separate analyses, one for males
who are household heads and one for non-heads. After controlling for in-
dividual and regional level variables, some regional differences remain.
2.6 Empirical applications 27
Household heads have higher participation probabilities in urban re-
gions. Moreover, both heads and non-heads have lower participation
probabilities in central regions. Concerning regional level variables,
household head participation is positively related to the average size
of firms in a region and negatively related to a land improvement vari-
able. The participation of non-head males increases in firm productivity
measured at the regional level.
Ward and Dale (1992) estimate two logit models in order to inves-
tigate spatial variation in full-time and part-time labour participation
of females; they include area type as a level two variable. The proba-
bility that women work full-time is largest in manufacturing towns (i.e.
the reference area type) and smallest in resorts. The latter is probably
caused by the timing of the survey, since it was conducted before the
main holiday season. The probability that women work part-time is
lower in male employment areas, unemployment blackspots and resorts,
and higher in high-tech growth areas and established service centres
than in manufacturing towns.
McCall (1998) examines whether the spatial variation of male wages
is different from the spatial variation of female wages for two educa-
tional classes. It turns out that the influence of regional characteristics
on male and female wages is about the same, except for regional un-
employment. Regional unemployment has a positive effect on wages of
highly educated females and a negative effect on wages of low educated
females. By contrast, no significant effect of regional unemployment is
found for male wages, neither for high nor for low educated males.
Random coefficient multilevel models
Gould and Fieldhouse (1997) and Xie and Hannum (1996) include a
random intercept and also allow some coefficients to vary across regions.
Gould and Fieldhouse (1997) determine whether there is spatial vari-
ation in male unemployment whilst taking a large number of individual
characteristics into account. The influence of age-dummies is allowed
to vary across regions. Gould and Fieldhouse show that regional differ-
ences in regional unemployment still remain after controlling for many
individual level variables. However, they do not include higher level
variables to explain this variation.
Xie and Hannum (1996) combine individual and regional variables
in a multilevel analysis with both random coefficients and cross-level
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interactions to explain differences in earnings in China. They include
interactions between the individual level variables education, work ex-
perience, party membership, and gender, and the regional level variable
economic growth. Contrary to what they expect, they find that the
returns to education and work experience are lower in cities with higher
economic growth; this result can be explained by the lack of a true
labour market in China. The effects of party membership and gender
appear to be regionally invariant.
Three and four-level models
Bellmann and Blien (2001, 1996), and Blien (1996, 1995) examine the
effect of regional unemployment on wages after controlling for individ-
ual level variables. Bellmann and Blien (2001, 1996) use a three-level
model in which regions are level 3 units, firms are level 2 units, and
measurement points are level 1 units. By contrast, Blien (1996, 1995)
uses a three-level model in which individuals (level 1 units) are nested
in small regions (level 2 units), which in turn are nested in larger regions
(level 3 units). All four studies find that regional unemployment has a
negative influence on the wage rate after controlling for individual and
regional characteristics.
Schwanen, Dieleman, and Dijst (2004) examine the effect of the
metropolitan structure (i.e. monocentric versus polycentric) on com-
muting behaviour in two four-level models. Persons (level 1) belong to
households (level 2) and live in municipalities (level 3) that are located
in larger metropolitan areas (level 4).
The first is a binary logit model by Schwanen et al. (2004). The
dependent variable is whether or not people use a car to drive to work.
Besides explanatory variables at level 1-4 with fixed coefficients, the final
model contains random level 1, 3 and 4 intercepts. No significant effects
of metropolitan structure are found in the final model for the sample as a
whole. In other words, it does not matter whether a metropolitan area
is monocentric or polycentric. Schwanen et al. (2004), however, also
find that women living in polycentric metropolitan areas are less likely
to commute by car; this finding can be explained by a relatively large
supply of public transport and high congestion levels in some polycentric
regions.
Another model by Schwanen et al. (2004) is a multivariate multilevel
model. Both commuting distance and commuting time are dependent
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variables. Besides explanatory variables from all levels with fixed co-
efficients, the model includes level 1-4 random intercepts and one level
1 variable with a random coefficient. Both commuting distance and
commuting time are larger in polycentric metropolitan areas than in
monocentric areas, but the metropolitan structure explains only a small
part of the variation of individuals’ commute behaviour.
In sum, multilevel analysis can be used not only to examine whether
there are regional differences after considering individual characteris-
tics, but also to analyse which regional characteristics can explain these
differences. Moreover, the interaction effects between individual and re-
gional variables can be scrutinised with the help of multilevel analysis.
In the next section we develop a multilevel model especially tailored for
regional labour market analysis.
2.7 Econometric model8
In this section we develop a two-level econometric model with random
and fixed coefficients that accounts for observations to be correlated over
time and space, and distinguishes that part of the explanatory variables
are not exogenous. Lower level spatial units i (e.g. regions) are located
in higher level spatial units j (e.g. countries).
In this model the parameters with respect to the lower level variables
may vary from one level 2 unit j to another, while the parameters with




′Zjt + εijt, (2.11a)
βj = β + νj, (2.11b)
E(εijt) = 0, var(εijt) = σ
2
j , (2.11c)
E(νj) = 0, var(νj) = V, (2.11d)
where j = (1, . . . , N) refers to a level 2 unit, i refers to a level 1 unit
(= 1, . . . ,Mj with Mj the number of level 1 units in level 2 unit j),
and t (= 1, . . . , T ) refers to a given time period. Yijt is the dependent
variable in level 1 unit i of level 2 unit j at time t, Xijt is a vector
of explanatory variables measured in level 1 unit i of level 2 unit j at
time t, and Zjt is a vector of explanatory variables in level 1 unit i—but
8This section is based on Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007).
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only observed at the higher level of level 2 unit j at time t—since these
variables do not differ between level 1 units within a level 2 unit.9 εijt is
a heteroskedastic disturbance term with variance σ2j , which is assumed
to be different for different level 2 units. βj represents a vector of random
response parameters and α a vector of fixed response parameters in the
regression equation. The βj applying to a particular level 2 unit is the
outcome of a random process with common-mean-coefficient β vector
and covariance matrix V . When the vectors β and βj (j = 1, . . . , N)
are of size K, V is of size K ×K.
Two problems that frequently occur when using space-time data are
serial dependence between the observations on each spatial unit over
time, and spatial dependence between the observations on the spatial
units at each point in time. Both problems have received considerable
attention, successively in the time-series and spatial cross-section econo-
metrics literature, but not so much in combination (Elhorst, 2003b).
To deal with serial dependence, the dependent variable Yijt will be
regressed on its serial lagged value Yijt−1.
We account for spatial correlation among the unobserved determi-
nants of Yijt across level 1 units by including spatial dependence in the
error term. Another option for reckoning with spatial dependence is
to include Yijt lagged in space as an explanatory variable. However, as
long as Yijt in other regions does not directly influence Yijt in the own
region, this option is less appropriate.10
The best-known model that addresses spatial dependence starts with
a first-order spatial autoregressive process generating the error terms,
εjt = δjWjεjt+ujt, where the error terms εjt and ujt are written in vector
form for each cross-section of level 1 units in level 2 unit j at time t,
ujt ∼ N(0, σ2IMj) (Anselin, 1988). Wj (j = 1, . . . , N) is a Mj ×Mj
non-negative matrix with zeros on the diagonal describing the spatial
arrangement of level 1 units in level 2 unit j. δj is called the spatial
autocorrelation coefficient and is assumed to be fixed but different for
9For reasons to be explained later, endogenous explanatory variables will also be
classified among Zjt, even when they are observable at the lower level.
10An example of a dependent variable for which including a spatially lagged de-
pendent variable as explanatory variable is appropriate is innovation. Including
innovation of neighbouring regions as explanatory variable makes sense, because
innovation in one region directly influences innovation in the neighbouring region
through spill-over effects.
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different level 2 units. Consequently, the covariance matrix of the error
terms in equation (2.11c) changes to
E(εjt) = 0, var(εjt) = σ
2
j [(IMj − δjWj)′(IMj − δjWj)]−1 = σ2jΩj. (2.11c′)
One or more of the explanatory variables might be endogenous. In
that case endogeneity requires instrumental variable methods such as
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
Kelejian (1974) was the first to point out that the assumption of a
random element in the coefficients of endogenous explanatory variables
raises intractable difficulties at the level of identification and estimation
(see also Balestra & Negassi, 1992). For this reason coefficients of en-
dogenous variables are assumed to be fixed and part of Z, even though
they vary across level 1 units within level 2 units.11 This also applies
to Yijt−1. This variable should be treated as an endogenous explana-
tory variable, since it is correlated with the random error terms νj; for
further details see appendix 2.A.
AlthoughFrees (2004) discusses heteroskedasticity, serial dependence,
spatial dependence, endogenous explanatory variables, as well as dif-
ferent combinations, this thesis is among the first to consider all four
problems within one framework. For a better understanding of the esti-
mation method described below, the reader may wish to consult Frees’s
book, especially his description of the mixed linear model and the GLS
estimation method (pp. 92-96).
Let us assume that the data are first sorted by level 2 units, and
then for each level 2 unit first by time and then by level 1 units. Thus
the first M1 observations represent all level 1 units in level 2 unit 1 at
time t = 1, the second M1 observations all level 1 units in level 2 unit 1
at time t = 2, and so on. Let Yjt, Xjt and Zjt denote the observations
and εjt the error terms of a cross-section of level 1 units stacked within
a particular level 2 unit at a particular point in time, and let Yj, Xj and
Zj denote all the observations and εj all the error terms stacked within
11If these variables are observed at the lower level, the explanatory variables Z in
(2.11a) should formally not only be indexed by the subscripts j and t, but also by
the subscript i. We omitted this detail to avoid confusion with previous descriptions
of similar models in the literature.
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= Xβ + Zα+ diag(X1, . . . , XN)× ν + ε. (2.12a)
The composite disturbance term diag(X1, . . . , XN)× ν+ ε has a covari-
ance matrix Φ that is block-diagonal, with the jth diagonal block given
by




j (Ωj ⊗ IT ), (2.12b)
where it is further taken into account that εjt follows a spatial autore-
gressive process (2.11c′). If Z were not to include a lagged dependent
variable and/or endogenous explanatory variables, the ML estimator
of the response parameters would be equivalent to the GLS estimator
(Lindstrom & Bates, 1988) and, using Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997,


















where the inverse of Φj is (Frees, 2004, p. 95)
Φ−1j =
















j ⊗ IT )
σ2j
, (2.14a)
Ω−1j = (IMj − δjWj)′(IMj − δjWj). (2.14b)
To determine the GLS estimator computationally, we use the following
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(IMj − δjWj)Sjt applied to the variables X,
Z and Y . The matrix inverted at the right-hand side of (2.15) is the
covariance matrix of the GLS estimator.
We confront two obstacles when applying this GLS procedure. First,
the estimator contains unknown parameters that must also be esti-
mated: δj, σ
2
j and the elements of V . Importantly, an asymptotically
efficient feasible GLS estimator of the response parameters does not
require that we have the ML estimator of these unknown parameters,
only a consistent one (Greene, 2003). This is important, since ML es-
timation of these parameters, although possible, is laborious (Elhorst,
2003b). Second, if Z includes a lagged dependent variable and/or en-
dogenous explanatory variables, the GLS estimator loses its property
of being unbiased. To obtain a feasible GLS estimator we combine
standard procedures of estimating a model with random coefficients,
heteroskedasticity, spatial autocorrelation, and instrumental variables
into one framework.
To deal with random coefficients we follow Swamy (1970). Swamy’s
estimation procedure consists of three steps: (i) Estimate the model
assuming that all response parameters are fixed and that the coefficients
of the X variables are different for different level 2 units. This can be
carried out by regressing Y on diag(X1, . . . , XN) and Z. We use the
mnemonic F to refer to these estimates; (ii) Estimate V by (see also
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(iii) Estimate the common-mean coefficient vector β and the other re-
sponse coefficient parameters α, given Vˆ , using (2.15).
To deal with heteroskedasticity and spatial error autocorrelation step
(i) of Swamy’s procedure should also include the estimation of σ2j and
δj (j = 1, . . . , N), step (ii) remains unchanged, while step (iii) should
be conducted not only given Vˆ , but also given Ωˆj = Ω(σˆ
2
j , δˆj). The
extension of step (i) can be done along an iterative two-stage procedure
taken from Ord (1975) and Anselin (1988):
(Stage 1) Given the estimates of the response parameters αˆF and βˆF ,






jtejt/MjT and estimate each δj, given
αˆF , βˆF and σˆ2j , by maximising the (concentrated) log-likelihood func-
tion −MjT
2
ln(2piσˆ2j ) + T
∑Mj
i=1 ln(1 − δjωij) − 12σ2j
∑T
t=1 ejt′ejt, where ωit
denote the characteristic roots of the spatial weight matrix Wj of level
2 unit j;
(Stage 2) Re-estimate the response parameters αF and βFj , given the
estimates of σˆ2j and δˆj. This two-stage procedure within Swamy’s esti-
mation procedure must be repeated until convergence occurs.
To deal with endogeneity, we follow Bowden and Turkington (1984,
Chapter 3) and Amemiya (1985, pp. 240-241). They have pointed out
that the GLS analog instrumental variables estimator of b in a linear
model Y = Sb + ε, with E(εε′) = σ2Φ and one or more endogenous S
variables, equals
b = (Sˆ ′Φ−1Sˆ)−1Sˆ ′Φ−1Y , with Sˆ = P (P ′Φ−1P )−1PΦ−1S, (2.17)
where P denotes a matrix of instrumental variables (including the ex-
ogenous variables from S). This method is used for both step (i) and
step (iii) of Swamy’s procedure. In step (i), b = (βF
′




[diag(X1, . . . , XN)Z] and Φ = σ
2
jΩj, while in step (iii), b = (β
′, α′)′,
S = [XZ] and Φ is block diagonal, with the inverse of the jth diagonal
block given by (2.14). In both steps we first carry out the second part of
(2.17) for the lagged dependent variable and/or each of the endogenous
explanatory variables among Z, and then determine the feasible GLS
analog instrumental variables estimator of b in the first part of (2.17)
by replacing these variables with their predicted values. To obtain the
residuals and statistics based on the residuals, such as R2, we use the
original values of the lagged dependent variable and the endogenous ex-
planatory variables, a standard procedure when applying IV estimators.
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2.8 Conclusion and further research
Multilevel models are a valuable tool in analysing hierarchical data for
both statistical and conceptual reasons. However, as mentioned in sec-
tion 2.4, multilevel analysis is not suitable for all hierarchical data sets.
Furthermore, multilevel analysis is a quite demanding technique with
regard to the sample size at the various levels.
The use of multilevel models in regional labour market research has
become increasingly widespread in the last decade and standard multi-
level software is becoming ever more flexible. However, some important
statistical applications are not yet included in the standard software.
For this reason we have developed an econometric model with random
and fixed coefficients, keeping in mind that observations may be corre-
lated over time and space, and that part of the explanatory variables are
not exogenous. We use this model in chapters 4 and 6 to estimate mod-
els of successively regional participation and regional unemployment.
Some issues for further investigation with regard to multilevel models
are the designing of tests for complex multilevel models and the com-
parison of different algorithms that may be used to estimate multilevel
models.
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2.A Lagged dependent variable and
random coefficients12
That the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a panel model with
a random intercept renders the random effect GLS estimator biased and
inconsistent is common knowledge (see, e.g., Greene, 1997, pp. 640-641).
This problem can be illustrated with a simple model:
yn, t = γyn, t−1 + αn + εn, t, (A.1)
where index n= (1,...,N) represents level 2 unit n. The random intercept
αn differs across level 2 units and has a zero expectation, E(αn) = 0.
The following can be derived:
yn, t−1 = γyn, t−2 + αn + εn, t−1, (A.2)
yn, t−1αn = γyn, t−2αn + α2n + εn, t−1αn, (A.3)
E(yn, t−1αn) = γE(yn, t−2αn) + E(α2n) + E(εn, t−1αn). (A.4)
Assuming stationarity (|γ| < 1) :
E(yn, t−1αn) = γE(yn, t−1αn) + E(α2n) + E(εn, t−1αn)
= γE(yn, t−1αn) + σ2α,
(A.5)
E(yn, t−1αn) = σ2α/(1− γ) 6= 0. (A.6)
(A.5) shows that a non-zero correlation exists between the dependent
variable and the composite disturbance term, resulting in an inconsis-
tent random effect GLS estimator.
The influence of a lagged dependent variable in a random coefficient
model is less well established, but can nevertheless be shown with a
simple random coefficient model:
yn, t = γyn, t−1 + (β + vn)xn, t + εn, t, (A.7)
where the random coefficient βn = β + νn differs across level 2 units
with a common mean β for all level 2 units and a random part νn that
12I would like to thank Tom Wansbeek for his help on the derivations in this
appendix.
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differs for each level 2 unit with zero expectation E(νn) = 0. Analogous
to (A.2) - (A.4), the following can be derived:
yn, t−1 = γyn, t−2 + βxn, t−1 + (εn, t−1 + νnxn, t−1), (A.8)
yn, t−1νn = γyn, t−2νn + βxn, t−1νn
+ (εn, t−1νn + ν2nxn, t−1),
(A.9)
E(yn, t−1νn) = γE(yn, t−2νn) + βE(xn, t−1νn)
+ E(εn, t−1νn + ν2nxn, t−1).
(A.10)
Assuming stationarity (|γ| < 1) :
E(yn, t−1νn) = γE(yn, t−1νn) + βE(xn, t−1νn)
+ E(εn, t−1νn + ν2nxn, t−1),
(A.11)
= γE(yn, t−1νn) + σ2νE(xn, t−1), (A.12)
E(yn, t−1νn) = σ2νE(xn, t−1)/(1− γ) 6= 0. (A.13)
In other words, including a lagged dependent variable leads to a corre-
lation between the dependent variable and the composite disturbance
term, and also to an inconsistent estimator (see A.13). One solution to





The labour economics literature contains a multitude of theoretical mod-
els explaining labour supply. Labour supply models may differ with re-
spect to the unit of analysis (individual, family), their structure (static,
dynamic) and their context (e.g. neoclassical, search).
The static neoclassical model of individual behaviour is the theoret-
ical starting point of this chapter, which we use to show the difference
between the labour force participation decision and the hours of work
decision. A setback of this standard model is that it is very cumbersome
to incorporate the influence of unemployment in order to explain labour
participation. Although negligible at the individual level, the interac-
tion between unemployment and labour force participation is important
at the regional level.
A common denominator of most theoretical models is that a person
will participate if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. The theo-
retical framework in this chapter uses this common denominator as a
starting point and then integrates aspects of other models into a unified
framework of individual labour force participation. The next step is to
aggregate this microeconomic framework across individuals to obtain
an explanatory model of regional participation rates.
The chapter is set up as follows. In section 3.2 some issues specific
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to modelling labour supply in terms of participation instead of hours
of work are addressed. The differences between hours of work and par-
ticipation are illustrated by using several basic models. The theoretical
framework of individual labour force participation is formulated in sec-
tion 3.3.1, while in section 3.3.3 the labour force participation framework
is aggregated in order to explain regional participation rates. Interac-
tions specific to regional participation, e.g. the interaction between
regional participation and unemployment, are discussed in section 3.4.
Finally, concluding remarks are presented in section 3.5.
3.2 Participation versus hours of work
While for the most part the same variables have been shown to influ-
ence both the participation decision and the hours of work decision,
the effects of these variables may be rather different for these decisions
(cf. Lewis, 1972). Moreover, the participation decision depends on the
levels of utility associated with participating and non-participating. In
contrast, the optimum number of hours of work is determined by the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. In sec-
tion 3.2.1 the basic static labour supply model is used to illustrate this.
In section 3.2.2 the relation between labour supply and unemployment
is discussed, and two possible views on the regional participation rate
are presented in the context of a static model and a life-cycle model in
section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Participation and hours of work in the static
neoclassical model
In the static neoclassical core model an individual is supposed to max-
imise his utility by choosing a particular consumption-leisure combina-
tion. Consumption is financed by working in the market at a certain
wage at the expense of leisure time. We will use this model to illustrate
the difference between the hours of work decision and the participation
decision.
In the core model an individual maximises his utility function (U)
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U = U(x, l|O, ε), (3.1)
s.t. px = wh+ y, (3.2)
and T = h+ l, (3.3)
where
x = consumption of commodities,
l = leisure,
h = hours of work,
T = total available time,
w = wage rate,
O = observable personal characteristics,
ε = individual “tastes” unobservable to the researcher,
p = fixed price of the bundle of commodities x,
y = non-wage income.
The utility function is real valued, continuous and quasi-concave,1 with
a positive partial derivative with respect to both x and l. A graphical
illustration of a solution of the maximisation problem is shown in figure
3.1. At the interior optimum A the indifference curve is tangent to
the budget constraint and the individual offers h∗ hours of labour and
consumes x∗ commodities. Furthermore, the negative of the real wage







The reduced form equations for leisure and hours of work can be derived





and since T = l + h,
1The assumption of a quasi-concave utility function is needed to satisfy the
second-order conditions for a constrained maximum.
















, y|O, ε) if h > 0
(cf. Pencavel, 1986, p. 28).
If real wages rise, the number of hours of work may either increase
(figure 3.2, graph I) or decrease (figure 3.2, graph II). The latter occurs
if the positive substitution effect (the movement along the old utility
curve U from point A to point B) is outweighed by the negative income
effect (the movement from point B on utility curve U to point C on curve
U’). This phenomenon results in a backward bending supply curve (cf.
Killingsworth, 1983, pp. 12-13). The influence of a wage increase on the
labour force participation decision in this model, conversely, can only be
zero or positive. The increase in real wages (figure 3.2) does not change
the participation status of the individual. In fact, his real wage has
to fall substantially before he withdraws from the labour market (figure
3.3, graph II). Alternatively, a large increase in non-wage income (figure
3.3, graph I) or a stronger preference for leisure (figure 3.3, graph III)
will induce him to refrain from participating.
At this point it is useful to introduce a concept that is closely linked
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Figure 3.2: The effect of a real wage increase on hours of work.
to the participation decision, the reservation wage. The reservation
wage is the highest wage at which a person will not participate in the
labour market. In figure 3.3 the reservation wage is equal to the highest
real wage at which a person remains in the corner solution point A’.
In sum, a wage change or a change in another variable alters a per-
son’s participation status if two conditions are met: (i) Obviously, the
variable has to change in the right direction; and (ii) the change in the
variable is sufficiently large to make a difference. The size of the neces-
sary adjustment depends on the distance between the current position
of the individual and his corner solution. The closer the real market
wage is to the reservation wage (w/p)r of an individual (see part I fig-
ure 3.4), the less a variable has to change in order to alter a person’s
participation status. In contrast, if the real market wage (w/p) is far
below an individual’s reservation wage (see part II and III of figure
3.4) variables have to change more dramatically to induce a change in
participation status. In other words, the real market wage (see part
II, figure 3.4) has to increase substantially, or the individual’s prefer-
ences (see part III, figure 3.4) have to change drastically to affect the
participation decision.

























Figure 3.3: Individual labour supply: corner solutions.
3.2.2 Hours of work, participation and
unemployment
The effect of a variable on hours of work may differ from the effect on
the participation decision, as discussed in the previous section. This
is also true for labour market conditions, such as the unemployment
rate, which is commonly used as a proxy for labour market tightness.
Attention is paid below to the effect of unemployment on labour supply
in terms of hours of work in a static neoclassical model of individual
labour supply. Afterwards, two possible effects of unemployment on
labour participation are discussed.
Unemployment and hours of work
The effect of unemployment on hours of work is indeterminate for a
single person household taking decisions in a static context. Despite
several attempts, no satisfactory integration of unemployment and hours
of work in the core neoclassical model has yet been accomplished.
Hartley and Revankar (1974) try to incorporate uncertainty due to
the existence of unemployment in the neoclassical individual labour sup-































Figure 3.4: Reservation wage versus real market wage.
ply model. The employment status of an individual in their model is
given by a binary random variable, and the probability of being em-
ployed depends negatively on the unemployment rate. A person receives
unemployment insurance payments if he is unemployed. If a person is
employed, his earnings depend on a known wage rate and the number
of hours worked. Due to the randomness of unemployment, consump-
tion and leisure are random variables too. An individual maximises
his utility, which depends on the expected values of consumption and
leisure, since the utility function is assumed to be without certainty bias
(i.e. people are risk neutral). The expected values of consumption and
leisure are conditional on the hours of labour supplied.
In the Hartley and Revankar model real wages and the probabil-
ity of unemployment appear to have a positive effect on labour supply,
whereas real unemployment compensation and real non-wage income
have a negative impact. The positive effect of the probability of unem-
ployment can be illuminated by decomposing the effect of the probabil-
ity of unemployment on planned labour supply into an income and a
substitution effect. The substitution effect is positive: in order to pre-
serve the same level of utility an individual has to increase his labour
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supply if the probability of becoming unemployed increases. The in-
come effect can be either positive or negative. If leisure is a normal
good and, by implication, work is inferior, the income effect is negative.
Hartley and Revankar (1974) postulate that as long as the larger sub-
stitution effect is not offset by the smaller income effect, the probability
of unemployment will have a positive effect on planned labour supply.
Sjoquist (1976) criticises the Hartley and Revankar (1974) approach
by showing that maximising the utility of expected values is equiva-
lent to the maximisation of expected utility. Expected utility equals
utility when being unemployed times its probability plus utility when
being employed times its probability. Obviously, utility when being
unemployed is independent of hours of labour supplied. Moreover, Sjo-
quist demonstrates that individuals choose the same number of hours
independent of the probability of unemployment. In other words, the
number of hours an individual wants to work to maximise his utility
does not depend on the probability of being employed. The effect of
the probability of unemployment on labour supply in terms of hours of
work is therefore zero.
On the other hand, Sjoquist makes the somewhat dubious alterna-
tive assumption that hours of planned labour supply are considered as
working hours by the individual even if he becomes unemployed, while
the individual will not receive any payment for ‘working hours’ if he is
unemployed. As a result of this alternative assumption, planned labour
supply decreases if the probability of becoming unemployed increases.
Obviously the alternative assumption by Sjoquist (1976) is not very ap-
pealing. That hours of planned labour supply are considered as working
hours by the individual even if he becomes unemployed is not a realis-
tic assumption. An individual will probably spend fewer hours on job
search the moment he becomes unemployed than he would spend on
working while having a job.
Yaniv (1979) proposes another alternative, which consists of an in-
surance against unemployment provided by an employment agency. The
individual declares his planned labour supply to the employment agency.
If he becomes unemployed he will receive an insurance payment pro-
portional to his loss of earnings. Under this assumption an individual
will increase his planned labour supply if the probability of becoming
unemployed increases, because in this way he insures himself against
unemployment.
Depending on the chosen assumption, individual labour supply de-
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creases (Sjoquist, 1976) or increases (Yaniv, 1979) if unemployment
increases in a static individual labour supply model under uncertainty.
The assumptions made by Yaniv, however, are more plausible than those
made by Sjoquist.
Unemployment and labour participation in a family context
The positive effect of an increase in unemployment on labour participa-
tion has been labelled the “added worker effect” (cf. Isserman, Taylor,
Gerking, & Schubert, 1986, p. 557; and Killingsworth, 1983, p. 16). This
effect only exists in a model where the family is the decision unit.
In a static neoclassical family utility/family budget constraint model
a household with two family members, say a man (m) and a woman
(w), maximises a joint family utility function Uf subject to a linear
budget constraint (cf. Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986; and Bosworth,
Dawkins, & Stromback, 1996)
Max
x,lm,lw
Uf = Uf (x, lm, lw|Om, Ow, εm, εw), (3.5)
s.t. px = wmhm + wwhw + yf , (3.6)
and Ti = hi + li,with i = m,w, (3.7)
where
Uf = family utility function,
x = family consumption of commodities,
hi = hours of work of family member i,
Oi = observable personal characteristics of family member i,
εi = (unobservable) individual “tastes” of family member i,
wi = wage rate of family member i,
p = fixed price of the bundle of commodities x,
yf = family non-wage income,
li = leisure of family member i.
The utility function is defined as real-valued, continuous and quasi-
concave with positive partial derivatives with respect to x and li. In ad-
dition to a person’s own wage and the price of the composite commodity,
a person’s labour supply in this model also depends upon the wage rate
of the other family member. Note that the family utility/family bud-
get constraint model reduces to the basic neoclassical individual labour
participation model if a family consists of one person.
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A graphical illustration of the solution of the utility maximisation
problem in (3.5)-(3.7) is given in figure 3.5, where
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wmhm   + yf
max









Figure 3.5: Family labour supply for a two-person household (revision
of MacRea & Yezer, 1976, Figure 4).2
In the graphical example of figure 3.5 the family indifference surface
is tangent to the budget surface at the optimum point A. In this partic-
ular optimum the man works h∗m hours, while the woman stays at home;
this is because the leisure of the woman is valued relatively more than
the leisure of the man and because the male wage (wm) is assumed to
be higher than the female wage (ww) in this figure. If the man becomes
unemployed, the only feasible solutions remaining are those in the plane
parallel to the Lw-axis, where hm = 0. Suppose both the man and the
woman are looking for work, and the woman finds a job but the man
does not. At the new optimum point B the woman works h∗w hours,
2MacRea and Yezer (1976) show a figure with one indifference surface and one
budget surface, in which at the optimum both persons in the household are working.
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while the man does not work. So in a family model the unemployment
of one family member may lead to the participation of the other mem-
ber to uphold family income. Note, however, that due to the restraint
on feasible solutions, family utility has fallen from Uf to U
’
f .
Not only actual unemployment, but also the risk that the bread-
winner becomes unemployed may lead to the participation of the other
spouse. The risk of becoming unemployed is higher in a high unemploy-
ment region than in a low unemployment region, which implies that a
positive sign of the coefficient of unemployment in a regional analysis
of participation rates may be attributed to the “added worker” effect.
Unemployment and labour participation in a search context
An increase in regional unemployment may also reduce labour partici-
pation, because individuals may become discouraged from entering the
labour market and engaging in job search, the so-called “discouraged
worker effect” (Isserman et al., 1986, p. 557).
Most (empirical) search models do not study the decision whether
or not an individual participates in the labour market.3 Usually the
size of the labour force is assumed to be fixed. People are then either
employed or unemployed and actively searching for a job.4
Assuming a fixed labour force, however, is not very appealing, be-
cause the participation decision is an integral part of a theoretical search
model. In fact, the participation decision determines whether to search
at all, and can be seen as the first step in such a model (McKenna,
1985, p. 29). McKenna (1985, pp. 18-30) shows how the participation
decision can be modelled in a basic sequential search model. A person
participates if his expected return on search using an optimal reserva-
tion wage5 exceeds the benefits he receives when he is not participating.
The expected return on search and thereby the probability that an in-
dividual participates decreases if search costs increase (see McKenna,
1985, p. 30). Therefore, if deteriorating labour market conditions (i.e.
3An exception is the paper by Berg (1990) in which the transition from unem-
ployment into non-participation is included in a search model.
4Tripier (2003) is one of few authors to include endogenous participation in an
equilibrium search model. He studies the effect of business cycles on employment,
unemployment and non-participation.
5The optimal reservation wage is that which makes an individual indifferent
between accepting an offer equal to the reservation wage and continuing search
(McKenna, 1985, p. 24).
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higher unemployment) cause search costs to rise, expected return on
search falls as does participation.
3.2.3 Two interpretations of the regional
participation rate
A subject closely related to the distinction between the hours worked
and participation is how the regional participation rate is conceived. In
the static one-period neoclassical framework the interpretation of the
participation rate is straightforward. The participation rate represents
the percentage of people willing to work at the current wage rate (see,
in particular, Ben-Porath, 1973).
The situation becomes a little more complex in a multiperiod dy-
namic or life-cycle model. Here the timing of labour force participation
comes into play. The second interpretation of the regional participation
rate originates from an influential paper by Mincer (1962). The core of
Mincer’s model is presented below in his words (p. 68):
In a broad view, the quantity of labour supplied to the
market by a wife is the fraction of her married life during
which she participates in the labour force. Abstracting from
the temporal distribution of labour force activities over a
woman’s life, this fraction could be translated into a proba-
bility of being in the labour force in a given period of time
for an individual, hence into a labour force rate for a large
group of women.
Some authors adopt Mincer’s paper as a framework for estimating in-
come and substitution effects of wage changes on hours of work using
regional labour participation rates instead of data on hours of work (cf.
Ashenfelter & Heckman, 1974). Loosely speaking, they interpret the
labour participation rate as the proportion of time an individual wants
to devote to market work instead of the proportion of individuals who
want to participate in the labour market. According to this interpreta-
tion, the coefficients from participation rate regressions represent income
and substitution effects of wages on hours of work (cf. Ashenfelter &
Heckman, 1974).
This interpretation, however, is only valid under two quite strict
assumptions (Heckman, 1978; Pencavel, 1986, p. 35). Suppose an indi-
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vidual determines his lifetime labour supply as a fraction of total time
by maximising lifetime utility subject to a budget and time constraint.
Since the time period is a person’s lifetime, the budget constraint vari-
ables are defined in terms of their permanent values. The labour par-
ticipation rate at a point in time represents the proportion of time de-
voted to market work under the following three assumptions: (i) Apart
from transitory factors the timing of participation over the life-cycle is
random. This assumption is necessary in Ben-Porath’s (1973) interpre-
tation of Mincer’s framework. However, following Heckman (1978), it is
sufficient to assume that either the economic environment is stationary,
or that it is possible to control for cyclical and cohorts effects. (ii) Every
person in the population works at some point in his life (i.e. there are
no corner solutions). (iii) A person works either full-time or not all.6
According to the first static one-period interpretation, the appro-
priate variables for explaining the regional participation rate are those
that relate to participation in microeconomic models. In contrast, fol-
lowing the second interpretation, variables that explain hours of work
in microeconomic models should be used to explain the labour partic-
ipation rate. In the second interpretation unemployment is voluntary,
whereas in the first unemployment is involuntary. Most studies on re-
gional labour participation rates seem to prefer the first interpretation
in which participation rates represent the percentage of people willing
to work (Elhorst, 1993).7
3.3 Theoretical framework
At the micro level the decision to participate in the labour market can
be considered as a dichotomous random variable that takes the value
of 1 if the decision is positive, and 0 if it is negative. If we start from
data observed in spatial units (regions) instead of individual data, the
observed variable consists of a proportion Lj of a group of individuals
belonging to the working-age population in region r (r = 1, ..., R) who
decide to participate.
6Heckman (1978) shows how alternative sets of assumptions lead to different
interpretations of regional participation rates in a Mincer (1962) framework.
7For an overview of empirical studies on regional participation rates, see Elhorst
(1996).
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In section 3.3.1 we present a theoretical framework to identify the key
determinants of the individual labour force decision. In section 3.3.2 we
discuss how labour participation varies across groups. In section 3.3.3
we explain the transition from the group level to the regional level.
3.3.1 The decision at the micro level
A person is said to participate in the labour market if he is employed
or if he is unemployed but available for work and actively seeking a
job; this definition implies that both employed and unemployed people
participate. People who do not participate are inactive.
A person is assumed to participate in the labour market at time t if
the utility level (V ) due to a positive participation decision exceeds the
utility level due to a negative decision. These utility levels depend on
whether the person is employed, unemployed or inactive at time t− 1.
We assume that people foresee the effect of present decisions on future
pensions.
First, suppose the person is employed at time t− 1. If he is able to
keep that job at time t, he receives an hourly wage (w) for the number
of hours being supplied (h). In addition, he acquires pension claims and
has to pay income tax and social security contributions (τ), or relatively
more so than a person without a job.
The concept that captures the effect of the participation decisions
on future pensions is known as the pension wealth accrual (p).8 If the
person is dismissed he receives unemployment benefits (u), provided
that he searches for a job while being unemployed. If a person searches
for a job he incurs search costs (s). The probability that someone is
dismissed depends on labour market conditions (l). If labour market
conditions are unfavourable (e.g. high unemployment) this probability,
Pd(l), increases. If the person resigns voluntarily and becomes inactive,
he receives social benefits (b); it is assumed that b is smaller than u.
In sum, a person employed at time t − 1 will participate at time t
as long as
V {[1− Pd(l)](w · h− τ + p) + Pd(l)(u− s)} > V {b}. (3.8)
8Following Blo¨ndel and Scarpetta (1999), the pension wealth accrual is defined
as the change in the present discounted value of pension income after retirement,
adjusted for the probability of survival, minus the present discounted value of pension
contributions until retirement by the postponement of retirement by one year.
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Note that V should be interpreted as an indirect utility function of the
person’s expected income level.
Second, suppose a person is unemployed at time t−1. If he were able
to find a job at time t, he would obtain the benefits of being employed
(w · h and p), as well as encounter the disadvantages (τ). A person
seeking a job incurs search costs (s) and the probability of finding a
job depends again on labour market conditions (l). If labour market
conditions are unfavourable (e.g. high unemployment) this probability,
(Pf (l)), decreases. Finally, if the person voluntarily withdraws from
the labour market and becomes inactive, or when the unemployment
benefits are due to expire, he receives social benefits (b).9
A person unemployed at time t− 1 will participate at time t as long
as
V {Pf (l)(w · h− τ + p) + [1− Pf (l)]u− s} > V {b}. (3.9)
Third, a person inactive at time t− 1 will participate at time t if
V {Pf (l)(w · h− τ + p) + [1− Pf (l)]b− s} > V {b}. (3.10)
The difference with a person unemployed at time t− 1 is that he is not
entitled to unemployment benefits (u), even when he is looking for a
job.
Summarising and using the framework (3.8)-(3.10) above, it follows
that the participation decision is positively related to:
1. the wage rate w;
2. the level of unemployment benefits u;
3. the pension wealth accrual p;
4. being employed or unemployed at time t− 1;
5. favourable labour market conditions l.
Being employed instead of inactive at t− 1 has a positive effect on par-
ticipation at time t, because it raises the probability of being employed
at t and lowers the expected search cost. Being unemployed instead of
9In reality it is also possible that someone receiving social benefits is actively
seeking a job, while someone receiving unemployment benefits is not.
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inactive at t − 1 has a positive effect on participation at time t, as it
raises the probability of obtaining unemployment benefits u from zero
to 1− Pf (l).
Favourable labour market conditions positively affect the participa-
tion decision by raising the probability of finding a job for a person
unemployed or inactive and searching for a job.
The probability that the expected benefits of participation are larger
than the expected benefits of non-participation is negatively influenced
by:
1. the level of benefits b;
2. search costs s;
3. the income tax and social security contributions τ .
The participation decision is influenced by an individual’s observable
characteristics and preferences. We can group individuals according to
their characteristics so that the participation behaviour of individuals
within a group is more alike than the participation behaviour of indi-
viduals across groups. In the next section we will discuss four ways
to classify individuals, and in section 3.3.3 we will aggregate individual
participation rates per group.
3.3.2 Variation of individuals across groups
The components of (3.8)-(3.10) vary for different groups. The partici-
pation behaviour of individuals varies according to gender, education,
age, and whether or not they have children, as we discuss below.
Sex
The relation between participation and the variables discussed above
(e.g. w, u, and l) most likely differs between men and women. For
this reason research on labour participation usually makes a distinction
between males and females (see, for example, the overviews by Elhorst,
1996; Pencavel, 1986; and Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986). A woman
may have different “tastes.” If, for some reason those different “tastes”
mean that she prefers leisure relatively more than a man, her utility of
participating in the labour market is lower.
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Education
Higher educated people may have a higher probability of finding a job
Pf and lower search cost s, because higher educated people are likely to
conduct more efficient searches. Moreover, higher educated people may
receive higher wages; this implies that education may have a positive
effect on the decision to participate.
Conversely, higher educated people may have higher reservation wa-
ges because they are more demanding.
Children
Having children and especially having young children may influence a
person’s preferences. People may value leisure more because they want
to take care of their children; consequently, having children may decrease
the willingness to participate.
An alternative line of reasoning with a similar outcome utilises a so-
called home production model. Becker’s (1965) home production model
is an extension of the neoclassical family utility/family budget model.
In home production models family utility depends on the consumption
of ‘basic commodities.’10 The family obtains commodities by combining
market goods with home production time. A prepared meal is an exam-
ple of a commodity that is prepared by combining the inputs home time
and market goods (i.e. the ingredients). Different commodities require
different amounts of home production time and market goods. Market
goods are bought with money from either non-wage income or earnings
from market work. Thus apart from time in the market and leisure time,
an additional use for time is introduced: home production time. Pro-
ductivity in home production can vary across family members. Home
production models explicitly allow for corner solutions. According to
the home production model, having children may negatively influence
labour market participation of the spouse who has a relative advantage
in home production and a relative low wage (cf. Cigno, 1990). Incor-
porating joint production11 in a home production model and assuming
10Home production models can also be used for the analysis of labour supply in
single person households, although some extensions of it are not applicable to a
single person case.
11An example of jointness of production is when taking care of a child (home
production) generates psychic income (satisfaction) above that of market work.
56 Labour participation: Theoretical framework
that raising a child generates positive utility above working in the mar-
ket, strengthens the negative effect of having children on female labour
participation.12
In contrast, having children may increase the utility of participat-
ing, because raising children may lead to an “additional income” re-
quirement. See, for example, Bauman, Fischer, and Schubert (1988,
p. 1095), who suggest that an increase in the average family size might
lead to both an “additional income” requirement and a “stay at home”
effect.
Age
The age of an individual has an important influence on the components
of (3.8)-(3.10), as age influences the timing of participation. For exam-
ple, in life-cycle models with exogenous wage rates, life-time utility is
maximised subject to a life-time budget constraint (cf. Pencavel, 1986;
Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986; and Killingsworth, 1983). Three fac-
tors then become important in the timing of labour supply: (1) The
efficiency effect states that an individual tends to work more when his
wage is relatively high, e.g. at later ages. (2) A high interest rate
induces an individual to work more now and save the extra income.
The extra income and the accumulated interest enable an individual to
work less at a later date. (3) The time preference effect refers to the
fact that individuals value present leisure more than future leisure and
this induces them to work less now and more later.
In life-cycle models with endogenous wage rates an individual can
influence his future wages by investing in human capital. ‘Learning by
doing’ or entering in full-time education increases human capital, the
individual’s productivity, and eventually the individual’s wage. Again,
the efficiency effect, the interest rate, and the time preference effect
are important in the timing of labour supply (cf. Killingsworth, 1983).
Entering in full-time education early in life may result in lower partici-
pation rates for young adults.
Furthermore, later in life pension wealth accrual decreases, thus low-
ering the expected benefits of participating. The drop in pension wealth
accrual is especially large at the earliest entitlement age at which pen-
sions become available. If an individual continues to work after this
12For home production models that allow for joint production, see Graham and
Green (1984) and Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003).
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entitlement age, they forgo pensions and continue to pay pension con-
tributions, with little or no increase in ultimate pensions after retirement
(Blo¨ndel & Scarpetta, 1997).13 Lower participation of older individuals
can also be explained by using a life-cycle model. For a formal life-cycle
model of retirement behaviour, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1986).
The expected net benefits of participating tend to increase from a
relatively low level early in life, decrease when people become middle-
aged, and drop when people reach their pension retirement age.
As we have illustrated in this section, different groups display different
participation patterns. In the next section we show how the participa-
tion behaviour of different groups can be aggregated to obtain regional
participation rates.
3.3.3 Aggregating individual decisions per group
The transition from the micro level to the meso level for homogeneous
groups is discussed in Pencavel (1986). We will extend his study by ad-
dressing the problem of heterogeneous population groups. Pencavel uses
the concept of reservation wage, the individual’s implicit value of time
when on the margin between participating in the labour market and not
participating. This reservation wage, w˜, can be derived from (3.8)-(3.10)
and depends on observable explanatory variables (X = w, p, u, l, τ, s, b)
and unobservable explanatory variables (ε).
Suppose individuals of a particular population group (g) have iden-
tical observable explanatory variables Xg, but different unobserved ex-
planatory variables ε. Wages (w) might vary between population groups
and between regions, but (like the other variables in Xg) they do not
vary within population groups within regions, i.e. w = wg. Conse-
quently, differences in reservation wages are caused by different values
of the unobserved explanatory variables ε only.
Let f g(w˜g) be the density function describing the distribution of
reservation wages across individuals of group g, and F g(w˜g) the cumu-
lative distribution function corresponding to the density function. This
cumulative distribution function F g(w˜g) is interpreted as giving for any
value of wg the probability of the event w˜g ≤ wg, that is, the proportion
13Due to early retirement systems the drop in pension wealth accrual is much
earlier than at age 65; in many cases the drop lies between ages 55 and 60 (Blo¨ndel
& Scarpetta, 1997).
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of individuals who offer positive hours of work to the labour market
since the market wage rate exceeds their reservation wage. The labour
force participation rate Lg of group g is then the cumulative distribution
of w˜g evaluated at w˜g = wg, given Xg and a set of fixed but unknown
parameters βg,
Lg(wg, Xg, βg) = F g(wg|Xg, βg), (3.11)
where the dependence of the labour participation rate of population
group g has been made explicit on wg and Xg.
Since different groups of people within each region have different
observable explanatory variables wg and Xg, the total labour force par-
ticipation rate is determined by the sum of the group-specific cumulative
density functions F g(wg)(g = 1, . . . , G) weighted by the share of each





agF g(wg|Xg, βg). (3.12)
From this equation it follows that there are two ways to deal with the
problem of heterogeneous population groups. One way is to consider
as many population groups as necessary to obtain within-group ho-
mogeneity and then estimate a separate regression equation for each
population group. The other, more prevalent way is to consider a lim-
ited number of regression equations for broad population groups and
correct for the composition effect of groups having different observable
explanatory variables X (see Fair & Dominguez, 1991). In an overview
paper surveying 17 empirical studies on regional participation rates, El-
horst (1996) found that four studies consider the overall population of
working age and 10 studies distinguish between males and females. The
latter distinction is also adopted in this thesis, since there is consid-
erable evidence that the marginal reactions of men and women with
respect to the explanatory variables X are significantly different from
each other. A further distinction is not considered.14 The implication is
that differences between different age groups for both men and women
have to be captured by demographic composition variables.
14Only two studies disaggregate the population of working age into different sex
and age groups, while one study considers different educational groups.
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The analysis of regional participation differs from the analysis of indi-
vidual participation because of the aggregation issues mentioned above.
Moreover, at the regional level some additional interactions play a role,
as we will discuss in the next section.
3.4 Regional participation in a wider
perspective
A subject closely related to the aggregation from the micro level to the
regional level is the interaction between regional labour participation
and other regional variables, such as the regional unemployment rate.
In addition, both regional labour force participation rates and other
regional variables are influenced by national labour market institutions.
A simplified representation of the regional labour market is presented in













Figure 3.6: Regional labour market.
force participation (box 3) are the unemployment benefit system and
the pension system. An increase in unemployment benefits increases the
benefits of participation in the labour market and raises participation
rates, as shown in section 3.3.1. By way of contrast, low (or negative)
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pension wealth accrual makes participation in the labour market less
attractive and lowers participation rates, as we have seen in sections
3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
A national institution that influences wages (box 2) is the wage
bargaining system. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that decentralised
wage bargaining (i.e. at the plant level) and centralised wage bargaining
(i.e. at the national level) leads to lower wages than wage bargaining at
the sectoral level. Higher wages in turn lead to lower employment and
higher unemployment. We will discuss the influence of wage bargaining
in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6. National institutions also influence
the demand for labour (box 4). As an example, higher taxes on labour
could lower the demand for labour.
In individual labour force participation models unemployment may
influence participation, but the participation decision of one individual
does not influence regional unemployment. In contrast, at a regional
level unemployment (box 2) and participation (box 3) are mutually de-
pendent. On the one hand, high unemployment may decrease regional
participation through the “discouraged worker effect.” On the other
hand, an increase of the number of people looking for a job may lead
to higher unemployment. Contrary to the analysis of individual partic-
ipation, the analysis of regional participation rates has to deal with the
endogeneity of regional unemployment.
Regional studies attend to the reciprocal dependency between re-
gional participation and unemployment in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, Fleisher and Rhodes (1976) estimate a simultaneous model using
2SLS, while Nord (1989) estimates a simultaneous model using 3SLS.
Another example of a simultaneous model is the top-down interregional
projection model REGAMBEV in which unemployment is a balancing
factor (Kwaak, 1985).
Another reciprocal relation is that between labour market outcomes
(box 2) and the demand for labour (box 4). As an example, higher
wages may raise the demand for the output of firms. Moreover, if the
demand for labour increases (for example, due to a positive demand
shock), both wages and employment may increase.
Finally, size and composition of the population (box 5) influences
labour demand (box 4) and labour supply (box 3). The larger the share
of prime-aged individuals in the population, the larger the labour force
participation rate (see also section 3.3). Furthermore, an increase in the
size of the population raises the demand for the output of firms, which in
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turn may raise the demand for labour. The interaction between the re-
gional population and its structure, and the regional economic structure
and the regional labour market is modelled in so-called demo-economic
models (see e.g., Oosterhaven & Dewhurst, 1990 and Oosterhaven &
Folmer, 1985). Demo-economic models are used to make a projection
of output, employment, unemployment, and the population of a region.
3.5 Summary and conclusions
Analysing participation decisions is quite different from analysing hours
of work decisions. First, at the individual level participation is a binary
decision variable, while hours of work is a continuous decision variable.
Second, the participation decision depends on the comparison of util-
ity levels, while the hours of work decision involves marginal utilities.
Therefore, it is not surprising that even though many of the explana-
tory variables are the same, their influence on hours of work may differ
from their influence on labour participation in terms of both sign and
magnitude (cf. Lewis, 1972).
Studying regional labour participation rates instead of individual
participation decisions raises some further interesting issues. First, some
variables that explain labour participation may be endogenous at the re-
gional level, and as a result a correction for endogeneity has to be made.
Second, due to the aggregation of a micro level theoretical framework to
the regional level, several composition variables have to be included. If,
for example, the government’s objective is to raise regional participation
rates, it is not sufficient to concentrate on the outcomes of micro models,
because meso behaviour is not equal to the sum of micro behaviour.
Analysing regional participation rates of multiple countries having
different labour market institutions may deliver additional insights, as






In addition to the struggle against unemployment, the broader aim of
reaching an acceptable level of employment in relation to the potential
labour force is becoming increasingly important. At the Lisbon sum-
mit in 2000, EU leaders set themselves targets of reaching an overall
employment rate of 70%, and of 60% for women by 2010 (European
Commission, 2000). Reaching an acceptable level of participation is
urgent as the rapid ageing of Europe’s population will test European
budgets to the limit. Looming ahead is a substantial rise in spending,
not only on pensions, but also on health and long-term care.
In view of the Lisbon targets there is an ongoing discussion about
the instruments that should be implemented to raise the labour force
participation rate in the EU as shown in the annual Employment in
Europe reports of the European Commission. The focus of this chapter
is to find an integral explanation for the evolution of labour force par-
ticipation rates at both the national and the regional level of the EU
member states, and to evaluate the relative importance of macroeco-
nomic vis-a`-vis regional economic forces. Such an integral explanation
is difficult to attain, but essential in order to arrive at more balanced
policy proposals.
∗This chapter is based on Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007), which is awarded the
Martin Beckmann Prize for best paper of 2007 in Papers in Regional Science.
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Most international studies are limited to national data. For that
reason they cannot do justice to regional disparities within countries,
even though they may be substantial (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). The
data set to be discussed and analysed here indicates that regional dis-
parities in male and female participation rates within member states
of the EU are, on average, 65% and 73% of those between member
states of the EU, respectively. Consequently, an analysis of the issue
of labour force participation from a regional perspective may provide a
more comprehensive understanding of the actual forces behind labour
force participation than would a straight analysis based on national data
only.
Most regional studies in turn are restricted to a single country. These
studies have therefore encountered the problem that the effect of certain
explanatory variables can only be determined with the help of data from
several countries. The focus on regional-level variables tends to deflect
attention from the embeddedness of labour force participation in the
national institutional framework by treating the region as an indepen-
dent entity. By using the econometric model developed in chapter 2, we
are able to model the two components simultaneously and differentiate
between the effects of regional and national characteristics.
Regional data also have two advantages over micro data.1 First,
micro data sets usually cover only one country, whereas the regional
data set used in this chapter covers 13 countries. Second, the individual
labour force decision often entails local variables, i.e. variables that are
measured at a higher level than the individual. Examples are the local
unemployment rate and the local industry mix. It is reasonable to ex-
pect that individuals sharing observable characteristics also share unob-
servable ones. This complication, known as cross-section correlation of
the error terms, has the effect that the standard errors of the coefficient
estimates of the shared observable characteristics will be downwardly
biased (Moulton, 1990). One remedy is to use aggregate data, i.e. to
average over individuals across regions in each year, and to estimate the
regression equation using these region-by-year cell means (Card, 1995).
Assuming no correlation in the unobserved determinants of labour force
behaviour across regions—an assumption that is still rather restrictive
and therefore subject to discussion later in this chapter—the residuals
of this equation are uncorrelated across observations, and conventional
standard error formulas are valid.
1The greatest disadvantage is of course the loss of data variation at the individual
level.
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In section 4.2 we show how the variables derived from the theo-
retic framework in chapter 3 are operationalised and implemented. In
section 4.3 we delineate the econometric model in which the variable
to be explained is the labour force participation rate at regional level
with both regional-level and national-level variables as explanatory vari-
ables. Because we are interested in the regional distribution of the de-
cision to participate in the labour market within countries as well as
among them, we employ a mixed model with random coefficients for
the regional-level variables and fixed coefficients for the national-level
variables. Additionally, the common problems of space-time data, serial
dependence, spatial dependence, and heteroskedasticity are accounted
for. The data are presented in section 4.4. In section 4.5 we present
and discuss the results of our empirical analysis, and in section 4.6 we
give our conclusions.
4.2 Explanatory variables
The theoretical framework set out in chapter 3 invites the use of regres-
sion analysis to evaluate the empirical reliability of the wage rate w, the
income tax and social security contributions τ , labour market conditions
l, search costs s, the pension wealth accrual p, unemployment benefits
u, social benefits b, demographic composition variables, and the labour
market status at t− 1. Further explanation of how these variables have
been implemented is germane to the analysis.
The most widely used indicator of the wage rate (w) is gross aver-
age earnings over a certain time period (week, month and year). In this
study we use average hourly earnings of manual and non-manual workers
in manufacturing. These data are taken from the Labour Costs Surveys
of Eurostat conducted at the NUTS1 level and converted to the NUTS2
level and to 1990 Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)—with the assis-
tance of Purchasing Power Parities and Consumer Price Indices (also
developed by Eurostat). The PPS is an artificial common reference
currency unit used to compare purchasing power across countries. The
PPS is constructed such that, for the EU as a whole, 1 PPS is equal
to 1 EURO (ECU).2 The use of net instead of gross wages captures
the effect of income taxation and employer and employee social security
contributions τ . National income tax and social security contribution
rates used to adjust gross average hourly earnings have been taken from
the OECD.
2ECU = European Currency Unit.
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The (regional) unemployment rate is one of the most widely used
indicators for measuring an area’s labour market conditions l. Thirty-
two years ago Fleisher and Rhodes (1976) argued that a single model
of labour force participation might lead to biased estimates because the
participation rate and unemployment rate in regional labour markets
are determined simultaneously. For this reason, the regional unem-
ployment rate is treated as an endogenous variable. As instrumental
variables we use the exogenous variables that explain the regional par-
ticipation rate at time t − 1, the predicted (male or female) partici-
pation rate at regional level based on national participation rates for
five different age groups (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64) at time
t− 1, and eight additional variables typically used in studies explaining
the regional unemployment: demographic variables, the tax wedge, the
change in inflation, and the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining
in combination with union density. Note that we do not use the regional
unemployment rate at time t − 1. If the regional unemployment rate
at time t is correlated with the random level 2 error term, so will the
regional unemployment rate at time t− 1, a result which illustrates its
inappropriate use as an instrument.
Another characteristic that determines an area’s labour market con-
ditions (l) is the sectoral structure of employment. The sectoral compo-
sition of employment was first introduced by Bowen and Finegan (1969)
and was meant to measure structural differences between metropolitan
areas in the relative abundance of those jobs commonly held by females.
Nowadays, the share of part-time work in total employment is also of
importance, since part-time work permits women to combine work out-
side the household with their (perceived) obligations within the house-
hold. Our industry mix variable measures the predicted ratio of female
employment to total employment within a region, the prediction being
based on (1) the ratio of female employment to total employment within
the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors at the national level;
each sector being further divided into full-time and part-time labour,
and (2) the distribution of total employment among these industries
and among full- and part-time labour within each region. The industry
mix reflects the extent to which the regional distribution of employ-
ment among industries and full-time and part-time labour is favourable
to women.
In other words, national employment can be cross-classified accord-
ing to industry and type of labour (part-time or full-time). The higher
the regional employment in cross-classification categories in which wo-
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men are over-represented at the national level, the higher the industry
mix variable.
At a given age (x), the expected old-age pension wealth (W ) for a










where P (a)i is the level of pension available at age i when retiring at age
a, d is the expected age of death at age a, C is the pension contribution
rate during employment, and ρ is the discount rate. Retirement incen-
tives are then derived as changes in pension wealth (p), which result
from postponing retirement by one year, p = W (x, a+1)−W (x, a) (see
Blo¨ndel and Scarpetta, 1999 for a detailed description). A positive pen-
sion accrual rate is an incentive for the employed to continue working. In
contrast, if the pension accrual rate is zero or negative there is no penalty
in terms of lower old-age pensions for withdrawing from the labour mar-
ket. In addition to pension schemes, older workers retiring before the
entitlement age for old-age pensions can often draw on other types of
public income support: disability benefits, unemployment-related bene-
fits and special early retirement benefits. All these schemes differ across
countries. Blo¨ndel and Scarpetta (1999) also calculated the wealth ac-
crual of these schemes for different OECD countries over time. In this
study we use weighted averages from Blo¨ndel and Scarpetta (1999) de-
pendent on number of recipients of different types of benefits.
The generosity of the unemployment benefit system (u) depends on
duration, replacement ratio, household situation, and the conditions for
receiving a benefit. The full complexity of the unemployment benefit
system in this study is approximated by the benefit replacement rate,
which is a summary index derived from the OECD. This index rep-
resents the average ratio between the unemployment benefit and the
median wage over five years for two earnings levels and three family
situations; the index partially overcomes the simplification involved in
representing the unemployment compensation system by a crude re-
placement rate and/or by a measure of duration.
For several reasons the better educated are better off than the lower
educated: (i) they possess skills more often in demand in an economy
with continued technological progress, (ii) they are likely to conduct
more efficient searches, (iii) they are less prone to layoffs and so exhibit
more stable patterns of employment, and (iv) higher earnings enables
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individuals to make individual arrangements for paid help related to
housework and child care. One problem is that education is positively
correlated with other explanatory variables. Table 4.1 reports the cor-
relation coefficients between the variables considered in this chapter.
According to this table, the better educated receive higher wages and
enjoy better social benefits. As these variables do not cover education
in all its dimensions, especially differences in search costs, the educa-
tional attainment of the population is nonetheless included, defined as
the percentage of people aged 25-59 having higher education (Eurostat
has made these data available).
The percentage share of the population aged under 15 (POP<15) is
included to account for demographic composition effects ; this variable
has the advantage that it is also a proxy for having young children.
As we have seen in section 3.3.1, being employed or unemployed at
time t−1 has a positive influence on labour participation at time t. The
labour market status in the previous period is measured by the labour
force participation rate at t− 1. This variable is treated as an endoge-
nous variable. As instrumental variables we use the exogenous variables
that explain the labour participation at time t − 1 and the additional
variables in the first-stage regression of the regional unemployment rate.
As an additional instrumental variable we use the predicted (male or
female) participation rate at regional level, based on national participa-
tion rates for five different age groups (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and
55-64). Note that its setup resembles that of the industry mix variable,
and that it is highly correlated with the observed (male or female) par-
ticipation rate. The correlation coefficient between the observed and
this predicted participation rate at time t− 1 amounts to 0.84 for men
and 0.83 for women. Such a high correlation can be explained by the
fact that this instrument not only covers the impact of observed but
also of unobserved national-level variables, such as cultural and reli-
gious differences between countries. Note that this instrument for the
participation rate at time t − 1 would be improper as an explanatory
variable in the regression equation of the participation rate at time t.
As we have observed, national-level variables are already part of the
regression equation; the inclusion of this variable would disturb the re-
lationship we want to examine. Nevertheless, we will test whether this
variable has the ability to explain any variation in the (fe)male partici-
pation rate.
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4.3 Econometric model
In the previous section we have identified different explanatory variables
of the regional participation rate. Some of these variables may vary
between countries, while others may also vary between regions within
countries. The former may be denoted as national-level variables and
the latter as regional-level variables.
Important national variables are pension and social security sys-
tem variables. Whereas American literature on regional participation
rates pays much attention to the effect of differences in the availability
and generosity of both systems between US states, these variables are
missing in much of the European literature, since they do not differ to
any great extent between regions within European countries. Moreover,
this literature tends to be limited to differences between regional par-
ticipation rates within one country (Elhorst, 1996). From a European
standpoint, only the integration of both macroeconomic and regional
economic research on labour force participation enables the evaluation
of labour market institutional variables on the one hand, and typical
regional economic explanatory variables on the other.
Such an integration, however, is not straightforward. Regions are
so-called level 1 units grouped within countries that are level 2 units.
According to Goldstein (2003, pp. 1-2), the existence of such groupings
should not be ignored in the empirical analysis.
While most macroeconomic studies focus on how national charac-
teristics affect the decision to work, we view the possibility that this
decision may deviate from the national average due to local circum-
stances. In this respect it is noteworthy that regional disparities in
the male and female participation rates within EU member states are
on average 65% and 73%, respectively, of those between EU member
states.3
Similarly, while most regional studies based on European data focus
on how regional characteristics affect the decision to work, we view the
decision as embedded in country-level institutional peculiarities, since
even among the fairly homogeneous group of EU member countries (dur-
3A map with regional male and female participation rates for the year 1997 is
shown in figures 4.1-4.2, an exception are the data from the UK, which are taken
from 1993. The highest male participation rate is 88% in East Anglia (UK) and the
lowest rate is 66% in Calabria (Italy). The highest female participation rate is 74%
in Denmark and the lowest rate is 29% in Calabria (Italy).
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ing the period 1983-1997), institutions do differ. As a consequence,
working at a single level, estimating a macroeconomic equation based
on macro data or a regional economic equation based on regional data,
is likely to lead to a distorted representation of reality. A single-level
model assumes that the data do not follow a hierarchical structure, and
that all relevant variation is at one scale.
A modelling strategy which does not allow for these national insti-
tutions effectively assumes that regional populations are independent of
one another. This is evidently not a safe assumption because these na-
tional institutions influence the participation rate at the regional level.
For example, the participation rate in one region may be considered
independent of that of a region in another country. However, the par-
ticipation rates of two regions within one country cannot be assumed
to be independent within the same country, as both regions share the
same institutional framework. Proceeding with a standard regression
analysis under the false assumption of independent observations leads
to standard errors for the estimates that are too small, thus giving false
impressions about the importance of explanatory variables.
We adopt the econometric model delineated in section 2.7 in order to
model the hierarchical structure of regions (level 1 units) within coun-
tries (level 2 units). In this model the parameters with respect to the
regional-level variables may vary from one country to another, while the





′Zct + εrct, (4.2a)
βc=β + νc, (4.2b)
E(εrct)=0, var(εrct)=σ
2
c [(IRc− δcWc)′(IRc− δcWc)]−1=σ2cΩc, (4.2c)
E(νc)=0, var(νc) = V, (4.2d)
where c = (1, . . . , N) refers to a level 2 unit (country), r refers to a level
1 unit (region) (= 1, . . . , Rc with Rc the number of regions in country c),
and t (= 1, . . . , T ) refers to a given time period. Lrct is the participation
rate in region r of country c at time t, Xrct is a vector of explanatory
variables measured in region r of country c at time t, and Zct is a vector
of explanatory variables in region r but only observed at the national
level of country c at time t, since these variables do not differ between
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regions within a country.4 εrct is a heteroskedastic disturbance term with
variance σ2c [(IRc−δcWc)′(IRc−δcWc)]−1, where σ2c is different for different
countries c andWc (c = 1, . . . , N) is a Rc×Rc non-negative matrix with
zeros on the diagonal describing the spatial arrangement of the regions
in country c. δc is called the spatial autocorrelation coefficient and is
assumed to be fixed but different for different countries. To allow for
heteroskedasticity, σ2c is allowed to differ across countries.
Note that not only people from the same region, but also people
from different regions may share the same unobservable characteristics.
In other words, there is correlation among the unobserved determinants
of participation rates across regions. This is illustrated in figures 4.1-
4.2, which show that high or low values of male and female participation
rates at a particular region tend to be surrounded by regions with similar
values, provided that these regions are located in the same country. The
clustering of regional observations within countries might be explained
by unobserved sub-national variables, such as differences in unionisa-
tion, culture, religion, and the role and composition of households from
within individuals operate. Since we already account for observable
characteristics shared by people from different regions at the national
level through the national-level variables (pension and social security
system variables), we will only correct for any remaining spatial depen-
dence among the observations in the error term, and therefore will not
add a spatially lagged dependent variable to the model. Elhorst (2001)
investigated the regional labour force participation rate in France, Ger-
many and the UK over the period 1983-1993 as a function of the re-
gional unemployment rate to illustrate empirical properties of dynamic
models in space and time; he found that this asymmetric approach of
serial dependence in the regression function, on the one hand, and spa-
tial dependence in the error term specification, on the other hand, was
appropriate for the data.
βc represents a vector of random response parameters and α a vector
of fixed response parameters in the regression equation. The βc apply-
ing to a particular country is the outcome of a random process with
common-mean-coefficient β vector and covariance matrix V . When the
vectors β and βc (c = 1, . . . , N) are of size K, V is of size K ×K.
Variables with random coefficients are the wage rate, the industry
mix, education, and the population under age 15. Due to the lack of
4Remember that endogenous explanatory variables will also be classified among
Zct, even when they are observable at the regional level.
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variability in the national variables, we were not able to include a ran-
dom intercept. Variables with fixed coefficients are the unemployment
rate, pension wealth accrual, unemployment benefits, and the lagged
participation rate. The unemployment rate and the lagged participa-
tion rate are treated as endogenous explanatory variables. In addition,
time-specific effects are added to the model in order to prevent that ei-
ther linear or cyclical trends along the observations over time might bias
the actual cross-section relation between regions within countries and
between countries that we examine. Finally, since regions vary in size,
the observations are weighted by the size of the male/female population
of working age in each region.
4.4 Data
Our primary data source for the empirical analysis is Eurostat’s regional
database. We have used the regional division of Eurostat on the NUTS2
level, with the exception of the UK, since Eurostat only provides NUTS
1 data for the UK. The data set covers the period 1983-1997. The
total number of observations is 1825 divided over 157 regions across 13
countries. The data set is not complete, mainly because some countries
became EU member states after 1983, and in some regions Eurostat
began data registration after 1983. Data registration in the former East
Germany started in 1991. Due to large differences in the data, East and
West Germany are treated as two different level 2 units. The regional
division is shown in figures 4.1-4.2, while a more elaborate description
of the data can be found in appendix 4.A.
The variables to be explained are the labour force participation
rates of men and women, i.e. the number of employed and unemployed
males/females divided by the male/female population, both aged 15-64.
Table 4.2 allows for the comparison of the national participation rates
for men and women. We can observe that the differences between men
and women and between countries fell over the period 1985-1997. Male
participation rates fell, on average by 3.8 percentage points, whereas
female participation rates increased (except in Germany) on average
by 7.3 percentage points. Table 4.2 also reports the range of the stan-
dard deviation over the observation period of regional participation rates
across countries. The standard deviation between countries, reported
in the last row of table 4.2, ranges between 3.9 and 4.6 for males and
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between 9.4 and 11.5 for females. The standard deviation between re-
gions within countries ranges from between 1.3 and 2.3 in Portugal, to
between 2.4 and 3.4 in Greece for males, and from between 2.3 and 3.4
in Belgium, to between 6.5 and 10.8 in Portugal for females.
Table 4.2: Mean and standard deviation range of regional labour force
participation rates of men and women across the EU and over time.
Country






Belgium 77.7 73.9 [1.5-3.1] 46.8 54.1 [2.3-3.4]
Denmark 89.2 84.9 - 75.8 73.8 -
Germany 84.9 81.1 [1.9-2.7] 54.1 53.3 [5.6-7.1]
Greece 82.5 78.2 [2.4-3.4] 41.5 46.4 [5.5-7.6]
Spain 80.5 76.1 [1.8-3.0] 34.1 47.5 [3.6-5.0]
France 77.9 75.3 [1.7-3.0] 57.0 61.2 [3.8-6.1]
Ireland 87.8 81.5 - 41.4 52.6 -
Italy 77.1 73.9 [1.4-2.7] 38.2 44.3 [5.5-8.1]
Luxembourg 79.7 76.4 - 41.9 47.5 -
Netherlands 83.3 82.5 [1.8-2.9] 45.5 61.9 [2.7-4.6]
Austria 86.5 79.5 [2.0-2.3] 54.2 62.4 [3.4-3.5]
Portugal 89.9 83.7 [1.3-2.3] 57.9 65.5 [6.5-10.8]
UK 87.7 84.1 [2.6-3.0] 61.9 67.7 [3.0-4.1]
EU 82.6 78.8 [3.9-4.6] 51.2 58.5 [9.4-11.5]
* Source: European Commission (2000).
** Minimum and maximum value of the standard deviations of the male and
female regional labour force participation rates in the observation period of
our sample.
4.5 Results
The estimation results are recorded in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The coeffi-
cients of the variables unemployment rate, industry mix, unemployment
benefits, education, POP<15, and pension wealth accrual, measured in
percentages, present the shift in the participation rate measured on the
interval 0-100% when these variables rise by one percentage point. The
coefficient of the wage rate shows the shift in the participation rate when
this variable rises by 1%. The coefficient estimates in the first column
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reflect short-term effects. Long-term effects can be obtained from the
short-term estimated coefficients by multiplying the latter by 1/(1− τˆ),
where τˆ is the coefficient estimate of lagged labour force participation.
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable equals 0.860 for men
and 0.932 for women and in both cases is highly significant, indicating
that labour force participation is habit-persistent. The last column re-
ports the standard deviation of the variables with random coefficients
based on the V estimate.5 In addition to the results recorded in ta-
bles 4.3 and 4.4, we found evidence of spatial autocorrelation and of
variety in the autocorrelation coefficients across countries. The spatial
weight matrices used in the estimations are based on travel times for
passenger traffic between regions within countries.6 The average spatial
autocorrelation coefficient found in the participation rate equation of
men equals 0.453 and of women 0.306. The R-squared is 0.912 for the
male and 0.967 for the female participation rate equation; both are high
for a regression model based on 1825 observations.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also report the results of four diagnostics to test
whether the model is correctly specified. In addition to our decision
to regress the participation rate on its serial lagged value in order to
address serial dependence among the observations over time, we also
tested for any additional serial dependence in the error terms, using
Breusch and Godfrey’s Lagrange Multiplier test. This test augments the
matrix of explanatory variables by an additional column containing the
serial lagged residuals. If no fit is found the hypothesis of any additional
serial dependence is rejected. Given that the test statistic is chi-squared
distributed with one degree of freedom, this appears to be the case,
though only at 1 percent significance for the female participation rate
equation.
For testing the heteroskedasticity assumption of the model, we de-
part from the hypothesis H0 : σ
2
1 = · · · = σ2N = σ2. The corresponding
Lagrange Multiplier test is chi-squared distributed with N−1 degrees of
freedom.7 The hypothesis must be strongly rejected, both for men and
women, indicating that our choice to generalize the standard two-level
model with a homoskedastic error term to a model with a heteroskedas-
tic error term was correct.
5This is the square root of the diagonal elements of the matrix V.
6Source: Institut fu¨r Raumplanung (Schu¨rmann & Talaat, 2000).
7The restriction is that the variance of all countries are equal to each other, and
not to a specific value. Since we treated East and West Germany as two different
level 2 units, N − 1 is equal to 13.
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Table 4.3: Dependent variable: Male participation rate.
Short T Long T
S.D.
term value term value
Lagged part. rate 0.860 51.63 - -
Wage rate 0.005 1.91 0.0031 1.90 0.481
Unemp. rate -0.005 -0.47 -0.034 -0.46
Industry mix
Pens. w. accrual 0.027 5.80 0.196 3.89
Unempl. benefits -0.014 -4.44 -0.098 -3.42
Education 0.033 10.68 0.238 5.98 0.291




serial χ2(1) = 1.92 Not rejected
autocorrelation
Homoskedasticity χ2(13) = 200.42 Rejected
Correctly
specified and χ2(12) = 17.64 Not rejected
valid instruments
No time effects χ2(14) = 48.86 Rejected
Notes: Countries included in the analysis (observation period and number
of regions within parentheses) are Austria (1995-1997, 9), Belgium (1983-
1997, 9), Denmark (1983-1997, 1), France (1983-1997, 22), West Germany
(1983-1997, 29), East Germany (1991-1997, 5), Greece (1988-1997, 13), Ire-
land (1983-1997, 1), Italy (1983-1997, 20), Luxembourg (1983-1997, 1), the
Netherlands (1983, 1985, 1987-1997, 12), Portugal (1986-1997, 7), Spain
(1986-1997, 17), and the UK (1983-1993, 11). Total number of observa-
tions is 1825, taking into account the effect of the lagged participation rate.
‘Unemployment’ and ‘lagged participation rate’ are treated as endogenous
explanatory variables. Coefficient estimates are corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity, spatial autocorrelation and time-specific effects. Results of specifica-
tion tests at 5 percent significance, unless otherwise stated.
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Table 4.4: Dependent variable: Female participation rate.
Short T Long T
S.D.
term value term value
Lagged part. rate 0.932 135.19 - -
Wage rate 0.001 0.36 0.022 0.36 0.662
Unemp. rate -0.006 -0.70 -0.082 -0.67
Industry mix 0.052 5.43 0.763 3.71 0.550
Pens. w. accrual 0.032 9.00 0.474 5.46
Unempl. benefits 0.004 1.99 0.053 1.88
Education 0.020 4.13 0.290 3.56 0.548




serial χ2(1) = 5.13 Not rejected
autocorrelation
Homoskedasticity χ2(13) = 650.48 Rejected
Correctly
specified and χ2(12) = 5.00 Not rejected
valid instruments
No time effects χ2(14) = 417.80 Rejected
Notes: Countries included in the analysis (observation period and number
of regions within parentheses) are Austria (1995-1997, 9), Belgium (1983-
1997, 9), Denmark (1983-1997, 1), France (1983-1997, 22), West Germany
(1983-1997, 29), East Germany (1991-1997, 5), Greece (1988-1997, 13), Ire-
land (1983-1997, 1), Italy (1983-1997, 20), Luxembourg (1983-1997, 1), the
Netherlands (1983, 1985, 1987-1997, 12), Portugal (1986-1997, 7), Spain
(1986-1997, 17), and the UK (1983-1993, 11). Total number of observa-
tions is 1825, taking into account the effect of the lagged participation rate.
‘Unemployment’ and ‘lagged participation rate’ are treated as endogenous
explanatory variables. Coefficient estimates are corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity, spatial autocorrelation and time-specific effects. Results of specifica-
tion tests at 5 percent significance, unless otherwise stated.
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The third diagnostic is meant to test the joint hypothesis that the
instruments are valid and that the model is correctly specified. To eval-
uate this, the instruments that do not lie in X and Z should have no
ability to explain any variation in the (fe)male participation rate. This
test is taken from Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 232-37) and
has a chi-squared distribution. The degrees of freedom are equal to the
number of instruments that do not lie in X and Z, which in our case is
12. For both the male and female participation rate equation, we find
that the joint hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Finally, we tested whether it is necessary to account for time-specific
effects by departing from the hypothesis that they can be replaced by
one intercept for the whole observation period. As expected, this hy-
pothesis must be rejected for both the male and female participation
rate equation.
Given that the fit of the two equations is satisfactory, that these
equations are correctly specified and that 6 out of 8 coefficients in the
male participation rate equation, and 7 out of 9 coefficients in the fe-
male participation rate equation are statistically significant, one of the
most striking results is the considerable heterogeneity of the coefficients
across countries. As can be seen from tables 4.3-4.4, the standard de-
viation of the variables with random coefficients tends to exceed the
coefficient estimate of these variables. Importantly, the issue of param-
eter heterogeneity is not addressed in much of the earlier literature on
labour force participation. Authors have typically pooled participation
rate data, thus imposing a common econometric structure on the units
of observation (Elhorst, 1996). Pooling is appropriate if participation
rates are determined in the same manner in all areas, such as regional
studies restricted to one single country. If, on the other hand, partici-
pation rates are not determined in the same manner across areas, then
pooling is inappropriate. Our results indicate that the hypothesis that
regional participation rates in different EU countries are determined by
a common structure must be strongly rejected. The implication is that
a common policy to encourage labour force participation in the EU is
impracticable. Policy measures that have large effects in one country
may have small or even adverse effects in another country.
The wage rate has a positive but small and insignificant effect on
the male and female participation rates, both in the short-term and the
long-term. The elasticities are smaller than those reported by Pencavel
(1986) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), who reviewed the exten-
sive Anglo-Saxon literature on male and female labour supply, respec-
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tively. For males Pencavel registered elasticities which fall in the range
of 0.2 to 0.4, and for females Killingsworth and Heckman registered
elasticities which fall in the range 0.05 to 0.25. The main explanation
for this result is the overlap between the wage rate and the educational
attainment of the population (see the correlation coefficient of 0.22 in
table 4.1). Therefore, we have carried out some sensitivity analyses
with respect to the education variable. Were we to eliminate the edu-
cation variable, then the long-term effect of the wage rate in the male
participation rate equation would change to 0.43, and were we to mea-
sure education by the percentage of people aged 25-59 with secondary
and higher education instead of only those with higher education, then
the long-term effect of the wage rate in the female participation rate
equation would change to 0.21. Although these elasticities are closer
to those reported by Pencavel (1986) and Killingsworth and Heckman
(1986), the corresponding regressions have been rejected because the
applied diagnostics pointed out that they are not correctly specified.8
For this reason, they are also not reported. These sensitivity analyses
demonstrate that the education variable is of crucial importance, but
that its inclusion and its specification leads to some underestimation of
the wage elasticity.
As the wage rate is composed of the gross wage rate and the income
tax rate in different countries, we are also able to simulate the effect of
a 1 percentage point decrease in the income tax rate. Even if we were to
take the elasticities of 0.43 and 0.21 for granted, this policy instrument
raises the participation rate of men by only 0.06 percentage points and
of women by only 0.03 percentage points in the long-term.9 This implies
that an income tax policy is hardly effective, while government budget
restrictions may concurrently obstruct the application of this policy
instrument.
The regional unemployment rate has a negative but insignificant ef-
fect on the male and female participation rates. In general it is hypoth-
esized that a negative sign implies a net discouragement effect over the
additional worker effect, and vice versa. The negative sign corresponds
8Another indication that these regressions are not correctly specified is that the
long-term effect of the wage rate in the female participation rate equation in the
former case, and in the male participation rate equation in the latter case, changes
sign.
9The average gross and net wage rates in the sample amount to PPS 15.01 and
9.56 per hour, respectively. A 1 percent decrease in the income tax rate thus leads
to an increase in the net wage of PPS 0.15 per hour.
82 Participation: Empirical analysis
to previous empirical studies. The difference is that our coefficients are
smaller and not statistically significant. The main explanation is that
we treated unemployment as an endogenous variable and determined its
impact by controlling for macro-level variables and time-specific effects,
whereas most previous empirical studies in this field have not (Elhorst,
1996). Were the time-specific effects to be eliminated, then the net ef-
fect would change to a significant number of -0.25 percent in the long
term for men as well as women. If the unemployment rate were to
decline by 5 percentage points, as in the European Commission’s pro-
jection over 1999-2010 (European Commission, 2000), this would mean
that the participation rate of both men and women would increase by
1.25 percentage points, bringing the targets of reaching an overall em-
ployment rate of 70%, and 60% for women in 2010 much closer. The
time-specific effects, however, demonstrate that this is merely a business
cycle effect rather than a structural effect.
The educational attainment of the population has a positive and
significant effect on both the male and female participation rates. The
upward effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the population aged 25-
59 with higher education amounts to 0.24 for men and 0.29 for women
in the long-term. It is noteworthy that the fixed and country-specific co-
efficients on which these overall measures are based, are mainly positive
in countries where educational attainment of the population is relative
high, namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria,
and the UK. In addition, if education is measured by the percentage of
people aged 25-59 with secondary and higher education instead of only
those with higher education, the upward effect on the female participa-
tion rate disappears. In that case, the long-term effect changes to 0.039.
We recall that this equation has been rejected because it appeared to
be incorrectly specified. This finding is nonetheless important since it is
in line with the OECD (1994, p. 127), which has pointed out that little
evidence exists to support an across-the-board increase in educational
attainment, and that there is apparently a dividing line at upper sec-
ondary education below which labour market opportunities are worse
than above it.
The female participation rate is positively related to the extent to
which the regional distribution of employment among industries and
full- and part-time labour is favourable towomen. Althoughthe common-
mean-coefficient is significant, the fixed and country-specific coefficients
on which this overall measure is based, appeared to be positive and
significant mainly for Western European countries, except Greece and
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Portugal. Over the period 1985-1997, the EU experienced a fall in the
share of employment in agriculture from 8.3% to 5%, in manufacturing
from 34.4% to 29.6%, and an increase in the share of employment in ser-
vices from 57.3% to 65.4%. Part-time employment of women increased
from 28.1% to 32.5%. Using the industry mix variable, simulations indi-
cate that both the sectoral shift in employment and the shift from full-
to part-time employment explain approximately 4 percentage points of
the increase in the female participation rate over this period.
The population aged under 15 appears to have a negative and sig-
nificant effect on the male and female participation rates. For women
this effect appears to be much more important than for men, although
there are differences between countries. In many countries the popu-
lation aged under 15 decreased over the period 1983-1997, notably in
Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal; these are also countries where the
fixed and country-specific coefficients appear to be significant. It re-
flects the declining birth rate and partly explains the increase in the
female participation rate observed in a number of countries (table 4.2).
A one percent decrease in the size of this population group explains a
1.37 percentage point increase in the female participation rate in the
long term.
The pension wealth accrual rate of non-employment benefit systems
is positively signed and significant for both men and women. The es-
timation results suggest that a reduction in the pension wealth accrual
rate by 1 percentage point would lead to a 0.20% increase in the male
participation rate and a 0.47% increase in the female participation rate
over the long-term. Such a reduction can be realised by changing the
basic parameters determining the pension wealth accrual rate of non-
employment benefit systems: pension replacement rate, pension contri-
bution rate, the standard age of retirement, and the availability, generos-
ity and entitlement conditions of alternative, early retirement systems.
By decomposing the formula of the pension wealth accrual rate in (4.1),
simulations indicate that the approximate long-term effects of different
measures on the male and female participation rates are as follows: a 1
percentage point decrease in the replacement ratio has an upward effect
of +0.5 percentage points, a 1 percentage point increase in the pension
contribution rate has an upward effect of +0.2 percentage points, and a
one-year increase in the standard age of retirement has an upward effect
of +1.1 percentage points.
Unemployment-related benefits appear to have a negative and signif-
icant effect on the male participation rate and a positive but insignifi-
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cant effect on the female participation rate. According to our theoretical
framework in chapter 3, people are encouraged to take jobs and to collect
unemployment-related benefits (u) when they are dismissed and become
unemployed, but they are discouraged by social benefits for which they
are eligible when inactive (b). The former effect explains the positive
sign found for women. Due to data limitations, we have not been able
to construct a variable to measure the generosity of jobless benefit sys-
tems in different countries (other than for unemployment). But note
that countries with generous unemployment benefit systems also tend
to have generous benefit systems for inactive people. This correlation
between unemployment-related and other jobless benefits explains the
negative sign found for men. The coefficient estimate suggests that
a reduction of unemployment-related benefits by 10 percentage points
would lead to a 1 percentage point increase in the male participation
rate in the long-term.
Finally, we establish the relative contribution of regional versus national
variables to the explanation of the male and female labour participation
rates in order to determine whether or not it is important to include both
sets of variables. We apply the average absolute contribution method
of Broersma and Oosterhaven (2008, Table 6) to obtain the shares in
table 4.5 using the following four steps.
First, we calculate the average absolute deviation from the mean for
each explanatory variable. Second, we multiply these average absolute
deviations by the value of the estimated coefficients. Third, we deter-
mine the absolute contribution of each variable by taking the absolute
value of the products of the second step. Fourth, we determine the share
of each variable by dividing the individual contribution by the sum of
the contributions.
Table 4.5 shows that the relative contribution of regional variables
is larger for women than for men. The ratio of the regional versus the
national contribution is 38:62 for the male participation rate and 60:40
for the female participation rate.
There are two causes for this difference. First, two variables that
are especially important for the explanation of the female labour par-
ticipation rate are at the regional level: population aged under 15 and
the industry mix. Second, the contribution of the national level vari-
able unemployment benefit replacement rate to the explanation of the
participation rate is smaller for women than for men.
Note that there are two problems associated with the average ab-
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solute contribution method. First, this method does not account for
differences in the significance level of the estimated coefficients. Sec-
ond, this method does not correct for correlations between explanatory
variables. If variables are correlated, their joint contribution may be
smaller than the sum of their individual contributions.
Table 4.5: Average absolute contribution.
Male participation Female participation
Explanatory variable share share
POP<15 5% 24%
Wage rate 5% 1%
Unemp. rate 3% 3%
Education 25% 11%
Industry mix 21%
Pens. w. accrual 42% 36%




Bearing these remarks in mind, the results in table 4.5 indicate that
it is important to include both regional and national variables to analyse
participation rates. Previous studies on participation excluded either
national or regional variables and have therefore omitted an important
part of the explanatory variables.
4.6 Conclusions
The model developed in this chapter is a mixed model of random coeffi-
cients for regional-level variables and fixed coefficients for national-level
variables. It has deepened our understanding of labour force behaviour
in the European Union. The hypotheses that regional participation
rates in the EU are determined by a common structure and that labour
force participation can be encouraged by a common policy must be
strongly rejected. Policy measures that have large effects in one coun-
try may have small or even adverse effects in another country.
86 Participation: Empirical analysis
We have seen that both regional and national variables are impor-
tant in explaining regional labour participation rates. Shortcomings
observed in previous studies using space-time data have been tackled,
such as serial dependence between observations over time, spatial de-
pendence between observations at each point in time and endogenous
explanatory variables. We therefore expect that this type of model will
also be beneficial in the analysis of related labour market issues, such
as unemployment, employment growth, GDP per capita growth, and
the wage rate. For this reason we will also use this model to analyse
regional unemployment in chapter 6.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that eco-
nomic incentives embedded in the income tax system (income tax) have
hardly any effect, whereas economic incentives embedded in the pension
system (replacement rate, pension contribution, standard age of retire-
ment) and alternative, early retirement systems (availability, generosity
and entitlement conditions of disability benefit, unemployment-related
benefits and special early retirement systems) have significant effects on
the regional labour force participation rate of men and women. The
magnitude of different reforms has been simulated.
The catching up of the female participation rate is largely explained
by the declining birth rate, the sectoral shift to more jobs in the services
sector, and the increase in the number of part-time jobs. A one percent
decrease in the size of the population group aged under 15 was found
to explain a 1.37 percentage point increase in the female participation
rate, while the sectoral shift in employment and the shift from full-
to part-time employment were both found to explain approximately 4
percentage points of the increase in the female participation rate over
the period 1983-1997. In this respect, the call to intensify employment
growth by creating more jobs in the services sector was correct (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997). However, not every policy measure has turned
out to be a key to better performance. Although a higher percentage
of the adult population with completed higher education has a positive
and significant effect on labour force participation, it appeared that an
across-the-board increase in the educational attainment of the popula-
tion has not.
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4.A Data appendix
Both regional and national data are used. Regional data are selected
from the Eurostat file called ‘Regions.’ Eurostat uses a classification
in NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level regions, where NUTS is an
abbreviation of “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.” The
higher the NUTS level, the smaller the regions. Most regional data are
available for NUTS 2 level regions, with the exception of the UK, since
Eurostat only provides NUTS 1 data for the UK up to 1995.
The NUTS classification by Eurostat changes over time. We used
the NUTS 2 classification of 1999, except for the UK. Due to exten-
sive changes in the territorial breakdown of the UK, the old NUTS 1
classification cannot be linked to the 1999 classification, and no histor-
ical series are available for the UK in the NUTS 1 classification of 1999
(Eurostat, 2002).
The regional division we have used consists of a maximum of 157
regions. The dataset covers the period 1983-1997, but is incomplete
because in some countries or regions Eurostat began data registration
after 1983, in part because some countries became member states of the
EU after that time (in Spain registration started in 1986; in Portugal
1986, and 1988 for the Algarve; in France registration started in 1988
for Provence and Corse; registration began in the Netherlands in 1988
for Overijssel, Gelderland and Flevoland, while for all other regions data
for 1984 and 1986 are missing). Finally, one region has been left aside
(Ceuta y Melilla) and some regions are joined with others (Bremen
with Lu¨neburg and Hamburg with Schleswig-Holstein). As a result, the
number of observations is different for each year. The total number
of observations is 1825, taking into account the effect of the lagged
participation rate.
Countries included in the analysis (observation period and num-
ber of regions within parentheses) are Austria (1995-1997, 9), Belgium
(1983-1997, 9), Denmark (1983-1997, 1), France (1983-1997, 22), West
Germany (1983-1997, 29), East Germany (1991-1997, 5), Greece (1988-
1997, 13), Ireland (1983-1997, 1), Italy (1983-1997, 20), Luxembourg
(1983-1997, 1), the Netherlands (1983, 1985, 1987-1997, 12), Portugal
(1986-1997, 7), Spain (1986-1997, 17) and the UK (1983-1993, 11).
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Spatial weight matrix
The spatial weight matrices used in the estimations are symmetric in-
verse travel time matrices for passenger traffic. Travel time over land
depends on road type, urban and mountainous speed constraints, and
national car speed limits. Overseas travel time depends on embarka-
tion waiting time and the travel time by ferry. Source: Institut fu¨r
Raumplanung, see Schu¨rmann and Talaat (2000). The travel time be-
tween region A and region B in one direction sometimes differs from
the travel time in the opposite direction. The spatial weight matrix is
made symmetric by taking average travel times. The effect of taking
average travel time is limited. The difference in travel times between
both directions is less than 10 percent in 96 percent of the cases. Al-
ternatively, the difference between the travel time in one direction and
the average travel time is less than 10 percent in 99 percent of the cases.
Regional variables
Education (%): Percentage of people aged 25-59 having medium or
higher education. Medium education is defined as upper secondary ed-
ucation, International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 3,
and higher education is defined as tertiary education, ISCED 5-7. Avail-
able for the period: 1992-1997. For the period 1983-1991 the numbers
of 1992 were used. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Labour Force
Survey, Eurostat.
Industry mix (%): Calculated by the formula:







•, •] ∗ [EN, xs, j /EN, •s, j ], (A.1)
where: E = employment, s = sector (agricultural, manufacturing and
services); j = type of work (full-time or part-time); x = sex (male,
female); r = (NUTS2) region; N = country and • represents the sum
over an index.
In other words, for women/men the sectoral composition of employ-
ment is equal to the expected female/male employment as a percentage
of total employment in a region, based on the sectoral structure and
part-time/full-time structure in that region.
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The number of employed people relates to persons who are at least
15 years old. Available for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division:
NUTS2. Source of employment by sector: Regions database 1999, Table
LF2EMP, Eurostat. Source data UK and region Brabant (for the period
1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Table EFDT2EMP, Eu-
rostat.
Labour participation (%): Ratio of the economically active population
aged 15-64 years and the total population aged 15-64 years. The eco-
nomically active population is the sum of employed and unemployed
people. Available for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2.
Source: Regions database 1999, Tables LF2ACT and LF2POP, Eu-
rostat. Source data UK and region Brabant (for the period 1983-
1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Tables EFDT2ACTIV and
EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
POP<15 (%): Number of people aged below 15 as a percentage of
the total population. Available for the period: 1983-1997. Regional
Division: NUTS2. Source: Regions database 1999, Table LF2POP,
Eurostat. Source data UK and region Brabant (for the period 1983-
1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Table EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
Predicted participation rate (%): Calculated by the formula:










where: ACT = economically active population, POP = population, l
= age ranges: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-55, and 56-64 year, x = sex, r =
(NUTS 2) region; N = country; and • represents the sum over an index.
For women/men the MIXA represents the expected female/male
participation based on the age composition of the population. Available
for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Regions
database 1999, Tables LF2ACT and LF2POP, Eurostat. Source data
UK and region Brabant (for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions
database 1995, Tables EFDT2ACTIV and EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
Unemployment rate (%): Ratio of people being unemployed (harmonised
unemployment) and the active labour population. It relates to persons
who are aged at least 15 at a certain point in time. A person is consid-
ered unemployed if he/she is without work, currently available for work
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and seeking work, that is, if he/she has taken specific steps in a specified
recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment. Available
for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Regions
database 1999, Tables UN3PERS and LF2ACT, Eurostat. Source data
UK and region Brabant (for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions
database 1995, Tables CHOM3ABSOLU and EFDT2ACTIV, Eurostat.
Wage: The hourly labour costs (average hourly earnings of manual and
non-manual workers in manufacturing) are converted to 1990 Purchas-
ing Power Standards (PPS) with the help of Purchasing Power Parities
and Consumer Price Indices developed by Eurostat. The PPS is an
artificial common reference currency unit used to compare purchasing
power across countries. The PPS is constructed so that for the EU as a
whole, 1 PPS is equal to 1 EURO (ECU). Available for years 1984, 1988,
1992, and 1996. The intermediate years are computed by using national
figures, or in the event that these figures were not available by linear
interpolation. Regional Division: NUTS1. Source: Labour Costs Sur-
vey, Eurostat. The hourly labour costs are transformed into net wages
by using the total tax wedge. The total tax wedge is given by employ-
ees’ and employers’ social security contributions and personal income
tax, less transfer payments as percentage of gross labour costs, as faced
by married couples. Available for the period 1983-1997. Source: OECD.
National variables
Centralisation: Index of centralisation of wage bargaining ranging be-
tween {0-5}. The index increases by the level of wage bargaining. The
index is 1 in the case of firm/plant level bargaining, and 5 in the case
of national wage bargaining. Availability: Five year averages are avail-
able for the periods 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000.
Source: OECD (2004, Table 3.5).
Change in inflation: Absolute annual change in inflation, where infla-
tion is defined as the relative change in consumer prices. Available for
the period 1983-1997. Source: OECD, Main economic indicators.
Pension wealth accrual : Weighted average of old age pension, individual
pension, unemployment pension, and special early-retirement pension
wealth accruals. Not all countries have all four pension schemes. For
each country the separate pension wealth accruals that are available
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are weighted with the number of recipients of the different benefits to
obtain the average pension wealth accrual. Available for 1995 (for some
countries earlier or later than 1995). Source: Blo¨ndel and Scarpetta
(1999).
Tax wedge: Employees’ and employers’ social security contributions
and personal income tax, less transfer payments as percentage of gross
labour costs, as faced by married couples. Available for the periods
1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993-1997. The intermediate years
are computed by linear interpolation. Since data for France are only
available starting in 1993, the number of 1993 is used for the period
1983-1992 for France. Source: OECD.
Unemployment benefits (%): Ratio between the unemployment benefit
and the median wage. This ratio presents the average of the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rates over five years for two earnings levels
and three family situations. Available for the period 1983-1997 (only
odd years are available, even years are calculated by linear interpola-
tion). Source: OECD.
Union density (%): The number of union members as a percentage of
the number of employees. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics
Database.
Union density |centralisation ≤ 2 (%): The number of union members
as a percentage of the number of employees in countries with a cen-
tralisation index smaller than or equal to 2. Available for the period
1983-1997. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics Database.
Union density |2 < centralisation < 4 (%): The number of union mem-
bers as a percentage of the number of employees in countries with a
centralisation index between 2 and 4. Available for the period 1983-
1997. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistic Database.
Union density |centralisation ≥ 4 (%): The number of union members
as a percentage of the number of employees in countries with a cen-
tralisation index greater than or equal to 4. Available for the period






Involuntary unemployment is one of the major policy concerns in the
European Union (OECD, 2005b). Unemployment levels vary widely
between countries, but the variation in unemployment rates between
regions within countries is even larger. Unemployment differences be-
tween countries in Europe have decreased markedly in the past decade,
whereas regional unemployment differences within countries have re-
mained stable. However, in some European countries regional unem-
ployment differences have even increased (OECD, 2005a). Recent evi-
dence on the persistence of regional unemployment differentials in Eu-
ropean countries has been provided in several studies1 showing that
regional unemployment differentials persist over time and that the un-
employment ranking of regions within a country hardly changes.2
One underlying cause of the persistence of regional unemployment
disparities is the lack of regional wage flexibility due to centralised wage
setting in a large part of Continental Europe. Both the European Com-
mission (2003) and the OECD (1994, 2004, 2005a) advocate decentral-
isation of wage bargaining in order for wages to adjust more easily to
∗This chapter is based on Toolsema and Zeilstra (2007).
1See e.g., Baddeley, Martin, and Tyler (1998a); Brunello, Lupi, and Ordine
(2001); Jimeno and Bentolila (1998); Overman and Puga (2002); and Taylor and
Bradley (1997a). See Elhorst (2003a) for an overview.
2Recent evidence by the (OECD, 2005a) shows that 80% of European regions
with high unemployment in 1993 still have high unemployment rates in 2003.
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local labour market conditions. However, the wage bargaining structure
is deeply embedded in the economic and social structure of countries,
which are therefore reluctant to follow these recommendations. As a
consequence, wage bargaining remains highly centralised in large parts
of Continental Europe.3
Our aim is to analyse the effect of national institutions on regional
labour markets in an economy with centralised wage bargaining; the
framework developed in this chapter can be used to study the influ-
ence of changes in bargaining power, moving costs, and unemployment
benefits on regional labour markets under centralised wage bargaining.
Theoretical models with centralised wage bargaining and regional un-
employment are still relatively scarce and, although previous studies
usually incorporated migration, they did not include participation. We
contribute to the existing literature by specifying a model that addresses
both migration and participation.
Our theoretical framework consists of four stages encompassing two
regions and one sector within one country. Wages are determined at
the national level through wage negotiations between employer federa-
tion and union. At the regional level individual firms then decide how
many workers they want to hire, and working-age individuals determine
whether they want to participate in the labour market in their own
region, in the other region, or whether they do not want to participate.
In order to enhance our analysis, section 5.2 provides information
on wage bargaining in Continental Europe and the influence of wage
bargaining on regional labour markets. We describe the model in section
5.3 and its solution in section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the effect of
different unemployment benefits and different moving costs on regional
unemployment differences through the use of simulations. Section 5.6
concludes.
5.2 Wage bargaining
5.2.1 Wage bargaining in Continental Europe
In large areas of Continental Europe wage bargaining is highly cen-
tralised. Sectoral wages are determined at the national level rather
3Other reasons for the slow implementation of reforms are concerns for equity and
social cohesion and doubts that these reforms can effectively increase employment
(OECD, 2004).
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than at company or regional level. In Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden
wage bargaining takes place predominantly at either the sectoral or na-
tional level. Only in Italy and France are wages negotiated at both
industry and company level.4 Moreover, the sectoral wages as nego-
tiated by the union and the employer federation at the national level
apply to a large number of people working in that sector. Although
union density5 has decreased over the past decades, collective bargain-
ing coverage remains high (OECD, 2004).6 In part, due to legal and
administrative extensions of agreements, bargaining coverage in most of
the abovementioned countries has varied between 79 and 96 percent in
2000.7 An extensive overview of wage setting institutions and outcomes
in Europe can be found in the annual Employment Outlook reports of
the OECD (e.g., OECD, 2004, Chapter 3).
5.2.2 Wage bargaining and regional labour
markets
The result of the high degree of centralisation of wage bargaining in Con-
tinental Europe is that sectoral wages do not vary across regions to the
extent that they would if they reflected local labour market conditions.
Wages do differ due to skill, firm size and sectoral differences, but less so
due to varying local labour market conditions (European Commission,
2003, p. 115). As an example, consider the case of Italy. Brunello et al.
(2001) find that real wages in the high unemployment regions of Italy do
not depend on local labour market conditions, but rather on the unem-
ployment rate of the leading areas. At the end of the 1960s institutional
rules allowing for the existence of regional wage differentials in union
contracts were abolished (Brunello et al., 2001). According to Brunello
et al. (2001), the abolition of these institutional rules has sharply de-
4OECD (2004, Table 3.5) and European Commission (2003, Table 27).
5Union density is the number of union members as a percentage of the number
of employees.
6Bargaining coverage represents the real extent to which salaried workers are
subject to the union-negotiated wages and other conditions of employment.
7An exception is Portugal, with 70% coverage, according to the European Com-
mission (2003, Table 27). According to the OECD (2004, Table 3.5), however,
coverage in Portugal exceeds 80%.
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creased regional wage differentials in Italy and thereby contributed to
the increase in regional unemployment differentials.
The influence of wage-setting institutions on national labour market
performance has been given considerable attention.8 The influence of
regional unemployment on regional wages (the wage curve)9 is equally
well researched. One of the possible theoretical explanations behind this
empirical relationship involves wage bargaining at the local level (see the
seminal book by Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). On the other hand,
the influence of wage-setting institutions on regional labour markets has
received little attention in the literature. Theoretical articles combining
wage bargaining and regional labour markets are relatively scarce, but
Faini (1999) is a nice example.
Faini (1999) models the influence of regional trade unions on regional
development in a two-region dual economy with skilled and unskilled
workers. One region leads with favourable labour market conditions
and the other region is backward with less favourable labour market
conditions. Faini (1999) employs a monopoly union model10 in which
regional unions unilaterally determine the wage rate of the unskilled
workers, and firms choose employment. Moreover, he shows that the
regional unions raise unskilled wages and hamper growth (especially in
the backward region) if labour is immobile. However, if skilled workers
are allowed to migrate, regional unions moderate their wage demands
to reduce migration. In this situation, regional unions have an incentive
to coordinate their wage demands across regions. Faini argues that
this would raise unskilled wages (especially in the backward region) and
8Surveys of this literature are provided by, for example, Blau and Kahn (1999)
and Nickell and Layard (1999).
9In their book “The wage curve” Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) establish a
downward sloping relationship between individual wages and local unemployment
for a dozen countries and claim to have found a new “empirical ‘law’ of economics”
(Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994, p. 1). Moreover, they argue that the unemployment
elasticity of pay is in general -0.1 (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994, p. 5). For an
introduction to the wage curve, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) and for a critical
review, see Card (1995). The research by Blanchflower and Oswald has inspired
authors such as Nijkamp and Poot (2005), who perform a meta-analysis on a sample
of 208 elasticities derived from the literature and find an elasticity of -0.07.
10In a monopoly union model the union maximises its utility subject to a labour
demand curve. The equilibrium wage is determined by the point of tangency of the
union’s utility curve and the labour demand curve of the firm.
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decrease economic convergence of the two regions. As a result, Faini
(1999) advocates decentralised wage-setting instead of centralised wage
setting, and favours increased labour mobility in order to obtain regional
convergence.
Another study combining wage bargaining and regional labour mar-
kets is Carmeci and Mauro (2002). They include wage bargaining in
a neoclassical growth model and show that centralised wage bargain-
ing leads to higher minimum wages than decentralised wage bargaining
in regions where the levels of per capita consumption are lower than
the medium voter’s consumption. A drawback of Carmeci and Mauro’s
(2002) model is that it does not allow for regional migration. Carmeci
and Mauro defend the exclusion of migration from their model by stat-
ing that it has been developed for the Italian case and migration between
the North, and the South of Italy had ceased since the 1970s.
In Hazari and Sgro (1987) the advanced region produces a man-
ufacturing good using union labour, while in the backward region an
agricultural product is produced using non-union labour. Each region
has a geographically determined specific factor that is fixed in supply.
Wage bargaining sets wages above the competitive level in the manu-
facturing sector and causes unemployment in the advanced region. By
contrast, labour is hired beyond the point of zero marginal productivity
in the backward region.11 Consequently, there is disguised unemploy-
ment and lower average income in the backward region. These disguised
unemployed workers may stay in their own region or migrate to the ad-
vanced region where they either find work or receive a benefit. Labour
does not move from the manufacturing sector to the agricultural sector.
Unemployed manufacturing workers remain in the urban region, unless
they originally came from the rural region, then they may return. In
Hazari and Sgro’s (1987) model an increase in the specific factor in the
rural region raises welfare, but increases disguised unemployment.
Suedekum (2004) presents a two-region one-sector model with skilled
regionally mobile labour and unskilled immobile labour equally dis-
tributed across both regions. Unskilled wages are determined by cen-
tralised wage bargaining, whereas skilled labour is paid according to its
marginal product. Output is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas
11Due to the fixed amount of the specific production factor, marginal labour pro-
ductivity drops to zero after a certain point.
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technology. The aim of Suedekum’s (2004) model is to show the dise-
quilibrium effects of selective migration. Initially, high skilled labour is
equally distributed across both regions within the country, North and
South. If an asymmetric exogenous negative shock hits the North, its
demand for unskilled labour decreases, skilled labour payments decline,
and skilled labour migrates to the South. The outflow of skilled work-
ers shifts the marginal productivity curve of unskilled workers further
downwards in the North. Conversely, the inflow of skilled workers shifts
the marginal productivity curve of unskilled workers upwards in the
South. As a result, unemployment further increases in the North and
decreases in the South. An asymmetric negative shock in the North
therefore causes an upward spiral in the South and a downward spiral
in the North.
Finally, Sanner (2003) analyses the desirability of two unemployment
insurance schemes to workers and firms in two regions under different
degrees of centralisation of wage bargaining. The two regions differ only
with respect to the availability of infrastructure. The rich region is en-
dowed with more infrastructure and, as a consequence, has higher labour
productivity than the poor region. Workers are either employed or un-
employed and may migrate from the poor to the rich region to maximise
utility. Sanner’s paper compares a uniform payroll tax scheme for both
regions to a scheme where the payment depends on the systematic risk
of unemployment of a worker. Taxes are adjusted in order to balance
the unemployment insurance budget, either at the federal level (in the
case of a uniform regime) or regional level (in a differentiated regime).
Although Sanner does not focus on regional unemployment, some
findings on unemployment can nonetheless be distilled from his paper.
Under both unemployment insurance schemes, a higher degree of cen-
tralisation of wage bargaining leads to lower wages and thereby higher
employment and lower unemployment. Centralisation leads to lower
wage demands due to internalisation of the negative effect of higher
wages on aggregate employment, and consequently, on unemployment
insurance payments. Moreover, under a differentiated unemployment
insurance payment regime, an increase in centralisation has a stronger
negative effect on wages than under a uniform payment regime, because
the unemployment risk of higher wages is spread over fewer unions.
We use a Right to Manage (RTM) wage bargaining model, which is
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more general than Faini’s monopoly union model. In an RTM model
union and employer bargain on the wage rate, and the employer chooses
the number of employees he wants to hire.12 Moreover, whereas previ-
ous studies have not taken account of participation, and in some cases
also neglected migration, we include the participation behaviour of in-
dividuals in a model with both regional unemployment and migration
under centralised wage bargaining.
5.3 The model
The country in our model has one sector and two regions (r = 1, 2),13
and the two regions have different labour market conditions. Without
loss of generality, we denote the region with the less favourable labour
market conditions as region 1. Firms are identical and transport costs
of goods are zero, but migration costs are positive. The aim is to model
the influence of national institutions on regional labour markets after
a general positive demand shock hits the economy; a positive demand
shock raises output per firm and thereby raises employment. Assuming
that the relative number of firms in region 1, N1/N2 with Nr the number
of firms in region r does not change, a general positive demand shock
raises employment in both regions in the same proportion.
In the first stage wages are determined by wage bargaining at the
12An alternative model is the Efficient Bargaining(EB) model (see e.g., Teulings
& Hartog, 1998) in which the union and employer federation negotiate over both
wage and employment. However, we think that an EB model is less realistic, espe-
cially in the case of Continental Europe where wage bargaining is highly centralised.
First, in an EB bargaining model the firm has a commitment problem (Teulings &
Hartog, 1998, Section 4.2). During negotiations the union and firm can agree to
a wage-employment combination that lies north-east of the labour demand curve.
However, after the wage has been set, the firm nevertheless has an incentive to set
employment according to its own labour demand curve (and lower than that agreed
with the union). Second, reaching agreements on employment levels for all indi-
vidual firms is hardly feasible under centralised wage bargaining (see e.g., Aidt &
Tzannatos, 2002, Table 3.1). To cite an example, in the Netherlands unions and
employer federations briefly considered negotiating wages and employment simulta-
neously during the 1970s. However, this idea was short-lived, because the employers
objected to it (Teulings & Hartog, 1998, Section 4.4). Nowadays, employment is
generally not covered in centralised wage bargaining in the Netherlands (Van de
Wijngaert, 1994, Chapter 3).
13Unless stated otherwise, the subscript of a variable indicates the region.
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national level. In the second stage individual employers maximise profits
by choosing the optimal number of employees they want to hire, given
the outcome of the national wage bargaining process. In the third stage
individuals maximise their utility by deciding whether they want to
participate in the labour market in their own region, in the other region,
or whether they do not want to participate. In the fourth stage the
product market clears. In this model, depending on the parameters,
the change in participation and the level of migration determine the
distribution of unemployment over the regions. We discuss the four
stages of the model in more detail below.
5.3.1 Stage 1: Nash wage bargaining
In stage 1 after the positive demand shock, union and employer feder-
ation engage in Nash bargaining at the national level, according to a
Right To Manage wage bargaining model. The result of the wage bar-
gaining process is a nationwide wage rate (W ). We interpret W to be,
say, an annual wage, and all calculations are on an annual basis.
The union is assumed to maximise the sum of all working-age indi-
viduals’ income. The objective function of the union is V − A, where
V is the sum of all working-age individuals’ income when the union
reaches an agreement with the employer federation; and A is the sum of
all working-age individuals’ income when bargaining breaks down (i.e.
the outside option). For inactive people the financial equivalent (bI)
of the leisure they can enjoy because they do not search for a job is
interpreted as income. Thus, the union aims to maximise
V − A = E (W )W + (J − E (W )− I) b+ IbI − A, (5.1)
where E is the number of employed people, W is wage, J is the number
of working-age individuals, I is the number of inactive people, b is the
unemployment benefit, and bI is the ‘income’ of the inactive people.
We assume that the value of the union’s outside option if bargaining
breaks down is given by A = Jb. This can be interpreted as all indi-
viduals receiving a benefit b if the employer federation and the union
do not reach an agreement during the wage negotiations. Further, we
assume that from the union’s perspective there is no difference between
the utility of an individual who is unemployed and the utility of an in-
dividual who chooses to be inactive. Therefore, b = b.I Using A = Jb
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and b = b,I the union’s objective function (5.1) reduces to
V − A = E(W )(W − b). (5.2)
The objective function of the employer federation is Π¯(W )−P , where
Π¯ is the sum of all firms’ profits (
∑N
n=1Πn(W )) when the union reaches
an agreement with the employer federation, and P is the sum of all firms’
profits when bargaining breaks down (i.e. the outside option). The
employer federation’s outside option P is set to zero for simplicity. As a
result, the objective function of the employer federation is represented
by Π¯(W )− 0 = Π¯(W ).
Bargaining power is given by β for the union, and 1 − β for the




(E∗ (W ) (W − b))β (Π¯ (W )− 0)1−β . (5.3)
Note that if β = 1, the union unilaterally sets the wage rate,14 whereas
if β = 0, the employer federation has full power to impose a wage rate
on the union.15
5.3.2 Stage 2: Hiring decision
In stage 2, each employer nr in region r (nr = 1, . . . , Nr) determines
the number of employees he wants to hire (En) in order to maximise
profits (Πn), given the nationwide wage W . The total number of firms
in the country is equal to N = N1 + N2. Production is determined
by supply and demand factors, as will be discussed in more detail in
section 5.3.4. Firms are ex ante identical, and therefore in equilibrium,
each firm produces the same amount of goods and uses the same amount
of labour. Regional trade may occur and transport costs are assumed
to be zero.
Since firms are identical, total (national) employment is E = NEn
and total regional employment is Er = NrEn, for r = 1, 2. In other
words, employment in region r only depends on the number of firms in
region r and the number of jobs per firm.
14The situation in which β = 1 is known as the monopoly union model.
15The situation in which β = 0 may be called the monopoly employer federation
model, where the wage rate is equal to the outside option of the employees (b).
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We assume that total demand for labour does not exceed the number
of working-age individuals in the country. Moreover, we assume that the
increase in labour demand is small enough, the working-age population
in each region is large enough and/or moving costs are small enough,
and that preferences of individuals are such that, after migration, there
will be no unfilled vacancies. In other words, each employer is able to
hire the number of employees he demands.
5.3.3 Stage 3: Migration and participation
decisions
Before the general positive demand shock, the number of working-age
individuals in region r equals J0r , employment equals E
0
r , and the num-
ber of firms equals N0r . Where the zero superscript denotes variables on
time t = 0, i.e., before the demand shock. Since firms are identical,
each firm hires the same number of employees and regional distribution
of employees is the same as regional distribution of firms. Further-
more, because we study the effect of a general positive demand shock,
employment increases in both regions in the same proportion. As a con-
sequence, the regional distribution of previously employed people is the
same as the current regional distribution of firms (E01/E
0
2 = N1/N2).
Note that to relax this assumption implies that people may migrate,
because one region now has more firms and therefore more jobs than
before. We abstract from this, because we study the effect of a general
rise in employment and analyse the resulting migration and participa-
tion decision.
A working-age individual j0r in region r (j
0
r = 1, . . . , J
0
r ) is either
employed, unemployed, or inactive. The individuals jr who were jobless
(either unemployed or inactive) before the positive demand shock decide
whether they want to search for a job after the demand shock. We
assume that previously employed individuals are not fired and do not
quit their jobs. A previously jobless person may search for a job in
either his own region or in the other region. Due to moving costs,
a jobless individual seeks work outside his own region only if labour
market conditions are sufficiently more favourable.16 On the other hand,
he migrates only if he has already found a job in the other region. In
16We ignore e.g. dramatical differences in regional characteristics.
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other words, we do not allow for speculative migration.17
In sum, in stage 3 a jobless individual j0r maximises his expected
utility over three mutually exclusive options:
1. stay in his own region r and try to find a job there;
2. try to find a job in the other region, and move there if and only if
one is found;
3. stay in his own region r and become or remain inactive.
Formally, there will be a fourth possibility, which is to move to the other
region and be inactive there. However, an individual will never use this
option due to the costs of moving F . Note that moving costs are incurred
once, whereas the benefits of obtaining a job W ∗ are more permanent.
In order to make moving costs comparable, we define moving costs F
as the annual equivalent value of one-time moving costs.18
The migration and participation decisions depend on labour market
conditions, i.e. probability of finding a job in region r (ρr), regional
characteristics (cr), wages (W ), unemployment benefits (b), individual’s
preference for leisure (L), and costs of moving (F ).
An individual’s utility (U) is a function of his income (W or b) net
of moving costs (F ), the characteristics of his home region, and leisure
time (L), so U = U(income, cr, L). The amount of leisure an individual
can enjoy depends on whether or not he is active in the labour market.
For simplicity we assume that an individual has no leisure if he has a
job or is searching for a job and has leisure time (L) if he is inactive.
Individuals are identical in their characteristics and preferences with
the exception of their preference for leisure. Suppose that individuals
j0r = 1, ...J
0
r in region r are ordered from having a low utility of leisure
to having a high utility of leisure. Individuals with the lowest utility
of leisure will want to supply their labour first. In both regions the
individual with the highest preference for leisure obtains the same utility
17Though speculative migration is common practise in the United States, it seldom
occurs in the Netherlands (Van Dijk, Folmer, Herzog, & Schlottmann, 1989).
18Assuming that wages represent annual wages. Note that the annual equivalent
value is the net present worth expressed as an annuity of one-time moving costs over
the planning horizon, computed at the discount rate. In other words, the annual
equivalent value F represents an average annual value in current money terms, which
sums to the net present value of one-time moving costs.
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(UmaxL ) from leisure. We further assume that the utility function of
individual j0r is additively separable, and that his utility from leisure is
linearly increasing in j0r . This results in the following (expected) utility
function of an inactive individual j0r having zero income in region r




= u(0, cr) + u˜j0r (L) (5.4)




Now let Ujr |employed = U (W, cr, 0) represent the utility of an employed
person in region r receiving wage W and having no leisure. If the indi-
vidual is a migrant from the other region, moving costs F are subtracted
from W. The utility of an unemployed person receiving benefit b in re-



















The expected utility of individual j0 living in region 1 (the region
with the least favourable labour market conditions) in the event that
he searches for a job in his own region, is given by
EU1j0|stay = ρ1U (W, c1, 0) + (1− ρ1)U (b, c1, 0)
≡ ρ1U11,emp + (1− ρ1)U11,unemp, (5.5)
where in the last line we use a superscript/subscript of U to represent
the origin/destination region of the individual. If the individual searches
for a job in the other region, his expected utility is given by
EU1j0|move = ρ2U (W − F, c2, 0) + (1− ρ2)U (b, c1, 0)
≡ ρ2U12,emp + (1− ρ2)U11,unemp (5.6)
and if he does not search for a job, but instead decides to be inactive,
his expected utility is given by








Analogous to individuals living in region 1, the expected utility of an
individual j living in region 2 (the region with more favourable labour
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market conditions) if he searches for a job in his own region is given by
EU2j0|stay = ρ2U (W, c2, 0) + (1− ρ2)U (b, c2, 0)
≡ ρ2U22,emp + (1− ρ2)U22,unemp (5.8)
and in case he decides to be inactive is given by








For an individual from region 2, the expected utility of searching for
a job in his own region is always higher than the expected utility of
searching for a job in region 1; this is because the probability of finding
a job in region 2 is higher than the probability of finding a job in region 1;
and F is equal to zero if a job is found in the home region. Consequently,
individuals living in region 2 do not search for a job in region 1.
Below we use γ1,M to denote the fraction of previously jobless people
in region 1 who decide to search for a job in region 2 (and migrate if and
only if they find a job there), and γ1,A and γ2,A to denote the fraction
of previously jobless people in region 1 and 2 who decide to search for a
job (become active). As a result, the fraction of jobless people in region
1 who search for a job in region 1 equals γ1,A− γ1,M . A fraction γ2,A of
jobless people in region 2 searches for a job in region 2, supplemented
with the fraction γ1,M of jobless people from region 1 who search for a
job in region 2. Taking into account migration and participation, the
probabilities (ρr) of finding a job in region 1 and region 2 are then the
ratios of the number of vacancies in a region to the number of people
who look for a job in that region
ρ1 =
N1En − E01




γ2,A (J02 − E02) + γ1,M (J01 − E01)
(5.11)
(provided, of course, that these expressions are between 0 and 1).
In equilibrium, the marginal individual will be indifferent between
the different options. Therefore, in equilibrium, the marginal individual
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has equal expected utility for all options. For the marginal individual




= EU1k1 |inactive , and for the marginal individual k2 living in region 2,
EU2k2|stay = EU2k2|inactive. Note that the marginal individuals in the two
regions do not have the same expected utility because of moving costs.
Moreover, the probability of finding a job is not identical in both regions.
Migration does not lead to equal probabilities of finding a job in both
regions, because expected utility also depends on regional characteristics
cr and moving costs F .
5.3.4 Stage 4: Production and consumption
In stage 4 the firms engage in production. The production function of




where Yn is output of firm n, En is employment at firm n, and ϕ and
α are parameters with ϕ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Note that this is a
Cobb-Douglas production function where capital is independent of firm
n and taken as given (and incorporated in the parameter ϕ). Firm-level




where Yn is the quantity demanded, Pn is the price, θ is a parameter
(θ > 0), and ε is the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s product,
which is treated as constant and exogenous (see e.g., Layard, Nickell,
& Jackman, 1991, chapter 2; K. C. Lee & Pesaran, 1993). Note that ε
is the firm specific elasticity of demand, not the elasticity of aggregate
demand εad. ε = εad in case of monopoly or full collusion, ε = Nεad for
the symmetric Cournot case, and ε → ∞ with perfect competition. In
other words, ε increases if aggregate demand is more elastic and if firms
behave more competitively. We assume that ε > 1.
Demand and supply determine the product’s price and the quantity
demanded. The product market clears immediately.
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5.4 Solution of the model
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium of the model.
The solution of the model is split into two parts. As we have assumed
for simplicity, that parameters are such that in each region sufficient
workers (either living there, or coming from the other region) will be
available to fill all vacancies, we can initially skip the solution of the
third stage of our model. Even without solving this stage explicitly, we
are able to solve for equilibrium price (stage 4), equilibrium employment
(stage 2), and equilibrium wage (stage 1), as described in section 5.4.1.
The solution of the third stage describes equilibrium migration and
participation and is discussed in depth in section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 Wages and employment
In stage 4 the product market clears. Demand and supply determine











We use the superscript ∗ to denote equilibrium values of the variables.
In stage 2, each firm maximises its profits Πn by selecting the number


























) W) 1α(1− 1ε)−1 . (5.16)
The second-order condition requires ε > 1 (which we assume to hold).
In stage 1 the Nash bargaining between union and employer federa-
tion results in a wage W , which satisfies
max
W
(E∗ (W ) (W − b))β (Π¯ (W )− 0)1−β , (5.17)
108 Regional unemployment and centralised wage bargaining
where Π¯ (W ) is given by




























α(1− 1ε)−1 , (5.18)
where we use δ to refer to the term between square brackets, which is a
function of parameters (θ, ϕ, ε, and α) only. The first-order condition
for maximisation of (5.17) can be written as
β (E∗ (W ) (W − b))β−1
(







+ (E∗ (W ) (W − b))β (1− β) (Π¯ (W ))−β dΠ¯ (W )
dW
= 0, (5.19)
which can be simplified to
β
(






+ (1− β)E∗ (W ) (W − b) dΠ¯ (W )
dW
= 0. (5.20)
Note that by using the envelope theorem19
dΠ¯ (W )
dW
= −E∗ (W ) . (5.21)

























∂W −NE∗n(W ) = −NE∗n(W ) = −E∗(W ).
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E∗(W ) . (5.23)











) − 1)) b. (5.24)
It appears that W ∗ depends only on the parameters α, β, ε, and on
unemployment benefits b. W ∗ turns out to be a positive markup over b.
An increase of the unemployment benefits raises the equilibrium wage.
When substituting W ∗ into (5.16) we see that equilibrium employment
depends on the parameters α, β, ε, and b, as well as on N , θ and ϕ.
5.4.2 Migration and participation
Now we solve for the equilibrium of the third stage of the model, in which
working-age people decide whether they want to participate and if so
in which region they will search for a job. In equilibrium the fraction
of people who want to migrate (γ1,M) and the fractions of people who
want to become active (γ1,A and γ2,A) are such that the expected utility
of the marginal individual is equal for all options.



























(5.27) equal γ1,A and γ2,A. In order to derive the equilibrium for stage 3,
we seek a solution for the fraction of people living in region 1 who want
to search for a job in region 2 (γ1,M), and solutions for the fractions of
people who become active in region 1 (γ1,A) and region 2 (γ2,A).
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L γ1,A − U11,unemp
U12,emp − U11,unemp
(5.28)




L γ2,A − U22,unemp
U22,emp − U22,unemp
. (5.29)



















≡ d1 + d2γ1,A, (5.30)
where we use d1 and d2 to refer to the first and second term between
square brackets, respectively.
Furthermore, using (5.28) and (5.11) and the expression in (5.30)




n − E02)(U12,emp − U11,unemp)







Using (5.10) and (5.26), we can also write γ1,M as a function of γ1,A
γ1,M = γ1,A −
(N1E
∗
n − E01)(U11,emp − U11,unemp)
(U11,c + U
max
L γ1,A − U11,unemp)(J01 − E01)
. (5.32)
Finally, using (5.31) and (5.32), we obtain the (implicit) solution for
γ1,A. Using γ1,A, γ2,A and γ1,M , we have the following expressions for
participation and migration:
Participation in region 1 =N1E
∗
n+(1−ρ1)(γ1,A−γ1,M)(J01−E01)
+ (1−ρ2)γ1,M(J01 − E01),
(5.33)
Participation in region 2 =N2E
∗





where the first term in (5.33) and the first term in (5.34) represent re-
gional employment in region 1 and 2, respectively. The second and third
terms in (5.33) represent the number of unemployed individuals living
in region 1 who search for a job in regions 1 and 2, respectively. The
second term in (5.34) is equal to the number of unemployed individuals
living in region 2 who search for a job in region 2. Migration in (5.35)
is equal to the number of people from region 1 who search for a job in
region 2, γ1,M(J
0
1 − E01), multiplied by the probability, ρ2, of finding a
job in region 2.20
Note that we obtain an implicit solution for γ1,A, defined by a
quadratic equation. As a result we do not have an explicit analyti-
cal solution. Consequently, we run simulations to obtain results in the
next section.
5.5 Simulation
In this section we investigate the influence of the level of the unem-
ployment benefits and moving costs on regional labour markets in case
of a general positive demand shock. The set up of the simulation is
described in section 5.5.1, and results are discussed in section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Set up
For ease of interpretation, we have normalised our simulation with re-
spect to the unemployment benefits b, i.e. b = 1. As a result, the
economy faces a positive demand shock equal to a 10 % increase in
employment in the benchmark situation where b = 1.
We will simulate the effect of different unemployment benefits b and
different moving costs F , where b ranges between [0.93-1.03] and F
ranges from [0-0.1].
Regional labour market characteristics
Table 5.1 describes the regional labour market characteristics of our
20We multiply γ1,M (J01 − E01) with ρ2 to obtain migration, because individuals
move if and only if they find a job in the other region.
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simulation.21 The outflow region (region 1) is assumed to be relatively
small compared to the inflow region (region 2). Both the number of
firms and the number of working-age individuals are smaller in region
1. Moreover, initial employment in region 1 is lower in both absolute
and relative (jobs per inhabitant) terms than in region 2. Succinctly
put, region 1 can be seen as a small peripheral region with relatively
unfavourable labour market conditions, and region 2 can be regarded as
a large core region with relatively favourable labour market conditions.
Since we model the effect of a general positive demand shock, the
ratio of the number of firms in region 1 relative to region 2 is not allowed
to change and is equal to the ratio of previous regional employment in









Table 5.1: Regional labour market characteristics
region 1 region 2 region 1/region 2





E01 = 19.77 E
0





J01 = 40 J
0






We adopt the following utility function for an individual jr in region r.












W ∗ if individual j0r is employed,
W ∗−F if individual j0r finds a job in the other region,
b if individual j0r is unemployed,
0 if individual j0r is inactive,
D =
{
1 if individual j0r is inactive,
0 otherwise,
21The values of E01 and E
0
2 in table 5.1 must satisfy two requirements. First, we
study the effect of a general positive demand shock, therefore E01/E
0
2 should equal
N1/N2. Second, we want to study the effect of a general positive demand shock of
10% in our benchmark situation, therefore 1.1(E01 +E
0
2) should equal E
∗ for b = 1.
As a result of these requirements, E01 and E
0
2 are fractions instead of whole numbers.
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and a1, a2, a3 are the weights of income, regional characteristics, and
leisure in total utility.
Other parameter values
We simulate the model for different (F, b) combinations and find feasible
solutions for F in the interval [0, 0.1] and b in the interval [0.93, 1.03]. To
isolate the effect of differences in labour market conditions on migration,
we abstract from differences in regional characteristics by setting c1
equal to c2. We assume that individuals put more weight on income
than on leisure and put the lowest weight on regional characteristics
(a1 > a3 > a2). In line with empirical findings by Willman (2002),
we set the output-labour elasticity α equal to 0.7.22 We assume that
union and employer federation have equal bargaining power. The price
elasticity of product demand of an individual firm ε is set to 20. Finally,
the parameters θ and ϕ determine the production scale. The values of
the different parameters are reported in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Parameter values.
parameter value parameter value parameter value
b [0.93 - 1.03] ϕ 4 a1 1
F [0 - 0.1] ε 20 a2 0.5
α 0.7 c1 1 a3 0.75
β 0.5 c2 1
θ 10 L 8
5.5.2 Results
In this section we analyse the effect of different unemployment benefits
and moving costs on the national labour market and on regional em-
ployment, unemployment, participation, migration, and unemployment
differentials.
National labour market
In the benchmark situation b = 1 and the economy faces a positive
demand shock equal to a 10 % increase in total employment (E∗ = 1.1∗
22Willman (2002) estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function for the Euro area
and finds an output-labour elasticity of 0.71.
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E0). As can be seen from table 5.3, lower unemployment benefits lead to
lower wages and higher employment. By contrast, higher unemployment
benefits result in higher wages and less employment.
Table 5.3: Effect of different levels of b.
b = 0.93 b = 1 b = 1.03
W ∗ 1.17 1.25 1.29
E∗ increase (in %) 35% 10% 1%
The results in this table reflect the response of E∗ and W ∗
to different values of b given the values of all other parame-
ters. Since almost all parameter values are not empirically
observed, the results also do not have empirical meaning.
Regional labour markets
The solution of the third stage of the model consists of two different
roots for γ1,A, a low one and a high one (see section 5.4.2). Fortunately,
we can discard the low root, because it is either negative, or leads to
negative probabilities of finding a job. We are left with a unique solution
for γ1,A.
Regional employment
Similar to national employment, regional employment increases if unem-
ployment benefits decrease, because lower benefits lead to lower wages
(see figure 5.1).23 Moving costs on the other hand do not influence re-
gional employment, because regional employment depends only on the
number of firms in a region and the number of employees per firm.
Regional employment rates range between [50%-72%] in region 1 and
between [62%-81%] in region 2 (figure 5.1).
Unemployment benefits and regional participation
The influence of unemployment benefits on the regional participation
rate is somewhat more complicated to unravel than its effect on regional
23All variables (regional employment, participation, unemployment, and migra-
tion) in figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5 are presented as a percentage of the working-age
population in a region.
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employment. On the one hand, individuals are more willing to partici-
pate if unemployment benefits increase, because they receive higher ben-
efits if they fail to find a job. On the other hand, higher benefits raise
wages, lower employment, and lead to a lower probability of finding a
job. This effect lowers the expected benefit of searching for a job and
negatively affects participation. Overall, the effect of an increase in un-
employment benefits on participation turns out to be slightly negative
(figure 5.2). This is in line with the negative effect of unemployment
benefits on male labour participation we found in the empirical analysis
in chapter 4. By way of contrast, unemployment benefits had a pos-
itive effect on female labour participation in the empirical analysis of
chapter 4. Note that regional participation rates hardly change due to
changes in unemployment benefits. The regional participation rate in
region 1 lies between 73.16% and 73.68, and the regional participation
rate in region 2 ranges from 79.65% to 81.14% (figure 5.2). The effect
on participation is more visible if we take a look at the numerator of
the participation rate, i.e. the number of people who participate in re-
gion 1 and region 2. On average, the number of people who participate
increases by 3.7% in region 1, and decreases by 2.6% in region 2, if
unemployment benefits increase.
Moving costs, migration and participation in region 1
In order to understand how moving costs affect regional participation in
region 1, we first analyse how moving costs affect the fraction of jobless
people from region 1 who want to search for a job in the other region,
γ1,M , and then how moving costs affect the fraction of jobless individuals
from region 1 who choose to participate in the labour market, γ1,A.
Higher moving costs decrease the willingness to search for a job
in the other region. As a result, the fraction of jobless people living
in region 1 who search for a job in region 2, γ1,M , decreases, as does
migration (see figure 5.5 discussed thoroughly below). This has the
effect that the probability of finding a job in region 1, ρ1, decreases,
whereas the probability of finding a job in region 2, ρ2, increases. Let
us next, consider γ1,A. The decrease in the probability of finding a job
in region 1 decreases expected utility of searching for a job in region 1,
and eventually lowers the fraction of jobless individuals from region 1
who want to participate in the labour market γ1,A.


























































































































Figure 5.4: Unemploymentdifference (∆U),movingcostsF , andbenefit b.
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However, we can verify that, in our example, the decrease of γ1,M
exceeds that of γ1,A., which implies that the fraction of individuals
from region 1 who want to be active in the labour market in region
1, γ1,A − γ1,M , increases. To obtain a more precise picture of the differ-
ent components of participation in region 1, we analyse (5.33) according




increase in moving costs does not affect the first component N1E
∗
n. How-
ever, the increase in moving costs raises the second component (i.e. the
number of individuals who fail to find a job in region 1), because both
1− ρ1 and γ1,A − γ1,M increase. The third component (i.e. the number
of individuals from region 1 who fail to find a job in region 2) decreases
if moving costs increase, because both 1− ρ2 and γ1,M decrease.
In sum, there are two opposite effects of an increase in moving costs
on participation in region 1. On the one hand, an increase in moving
costs decreases the fraction of jobless individuals from region 1 who want
to search for a job, γ1,A, which has a negative effect on participation.
On the other hand, the fraction of jobless individuals from region 1
who search for a job in region 2, γ1,M , decreases. Since the probability
of finding a job is larger in region 2 than in region 1, the decrease
in γ1,M leads to an increase in the number of unemployed individuals
in region 1, as can also be seen in figure 5.3. Overall, an increase in
moving costs slightly increases participation in region 1 (see figure 5.2).
Admittedly, the effect of higher moving costs on the participation rate
in region 1 is hardly visible in figure 5.2, because both participation
and the number of working-age individuals increases if moving costs
increase. Since the participation rate is the ratio of participation and
the number of working-age individuals, the participation rate does not
increase very much. The effect on participation is more visible if we
examine the numerator of the participation rate, i.e. the number of
people who participate in region 1. On average, the number of people
who participate in region 1 increases by 4.1% in region 1 if moving costs
rise.
Moving costs, migration and participation in region 2
Now let us consider region 2. The increase in the probability of finding
a job in region 2, ρ2, resulting from higher moving costs, raises expected
utility of searching for a job for individuals from region 2. Eventually
this results in a higher fraction of jobless individuals from region 2, who
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want to participate in the labour market, γ2,A. It can be seen from (5.34)
that participation in region 2 is equal to N2E
∗
n + (1− ρ2)(J02 −E02)γ2,A.
The first component N2E
∗
n is not affected by an increase in F . The
second component (i.e. the number of individuals from region 2 who
fail to find a job) decreases, because the decrease in 1− ρ2 exceeds the
increase in γ2,A (see figure 5.3).
Therefore, the increase in moving costs also has two opposite effects
on the labour market in region 2. First, the fraction of jobless individu-
als from region 1 who search for a job in region 2 decreases; as a result,
fewer vacancies in region 2 are filled by individuals originating from re-
gion 1. This has a negative effect on participation in region 2. Second,
the fraction of jobless individuals from region 2 who want to participate
increases, which has a positive effect on participation in region 2. Over-
all an increase in moving costs slightly decreases participation in region
2 (see also figure 5.2). Again, the effect is difficult to observe in figure
5.2, because both the number of active individuals and the number of
working-age individuals in region 2 decreases. Since the participation
rate is the ratio of participation and the number of working-age indi-
viduals, the participation rate does not decrease by much. The effect
on participation is more visible if we look at the numerator of the par-
ticipation rate, i.e. the number of people who participate in region 2.
On average the number of people who participate in region 2 decreases
by 1.1% in region 2 if moving costs rise.
Moving costs, migration and regional unemployment
differentials
The variation in unemployment rates is substantial. Unemployment
rates range between [1%-24%] in region 1 and [1%-18%] in region 2,
while regional unemployment differentials range between [1%-6%]; see
figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Generally, an increase in the unemployment benefits raises regional
unemployment (see, figure 5.3) and raises regional unemployment dif-
ferences (see figure 5.4). One exception is the situation in which moving
costs are high (part A of figure 5.4); in this case unemployment ben-
efits may reduce regional unemployment differentials. The willingness
to migrate normally decreases if unemployment benefits rise, but not if
moving costs are high. The reason for this is the following. First, recall
that in equilibrium the marginal individual in region 1 has the same
expected utility of searching in his home region, of searching in region
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Figure 5.5: Migration, moving costs F , and benefit b.
2, or of becoming inactive: EU1j |stay = EU1j |move =EU1j |inactive. Using
(5.5)-(5.7) we have
EU1j0|stay = ρ1U (W ∗, c1, 0) + (1− ρ1)U (b, c1, 0) = (5.37)
EU1j0|move = ρ2U (W ∗ − F, c2, 0) + (1− ρ2)U (b, c1, 0) = (5.38)




An increase in the unemployment benefits raises equilibrium wage W ∗
as a result both U(W ∗, c1, 0) in (5.37) and U(W ∗−F, c2, 0) in (5.39) in-
crease. However, W ∗ has a stronger effect on U(W ∗−F, c2, 0) than on










ence is larger if moving costs F are high because the slope of the utility
function is much steeper at W ∗ − F than at W ∗. As a result the ef-
fect on utility of an increase in W ∗ is much higher for U (W ∗ − F, c2, 0)
than for U (W ∗, c1, 0). Finally, note that an increase in b affects the
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other terms in (5.37) and (5.39) as well. However, for high values of F
the afore-mentioned effect dominates the other effects. Searching in the
other region therefore becomes more attractive if unemployment ben-
efits increase for high values of F . More individuals will search for a
job in the other region, and migration increases. Note that this effect
disappears when active searching does not lead to benefit entitlement.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed a general framework to study the
influence of moving costs, unemployment benefits and changes in bar-
gaining power on regional labour markets under centralised wage bar-
gaining. Using this framework, the effect of the first two variables on
regional employment, unemployment, migration, and participation have
been simulated. The theoretical literature on regional labour markets
under centralised wage bargaining is relatively sparse, therefore the nov-
elty of this chapter is our inclusion of participation behaviour in a model
with regional migration and regional unemployment under centralised
wage bargaining.
We have conducted a simulation example with different unemploy-
ment benefit levels and different moving costs in which we found that
lower unemployment benefits and lower moving costs lead to smaller
regional unemployment differentials. Because the reduction of regional
unemployment differentials is a common policy goal, a first policy im-
plication is that lower unemployment benefits may result in smaller
regional unemployment differentials. However, this policy may conflict
with another policy aim, namely that to ensure equity between em-
ployed and jobless people. Furthermore, we found that, if moving costs
are high, the lowering of unemployment benefits could have adverse
effects on unemployment differentials.
A second policy implication is that regional unemployment differ-
entials may be reduced by lowering moving costs. Note that moving
costs are not limited to the costs of the physical movement of an in-
dividual from one region to another. Moving costs may also entail the
additional (search) costs an individual encounters if he searches for a
job in the other region instead of in his own region. Generally, it is
harder to obtain information on job vacancies in other regions than to
acquire information on vacancies in the own region. Italy is one exam-
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ple (Faini, 1999). According to Faini (1999), this lack of information is
caused by public sector agencies that still hold a legal monopoly on job
placement activities and do not provide information on job vacancies
in other regions. Moreover, individuals may also incur costs associated
with selling their own house and searching for and buying another house
in the destination region. In the Netherlands, for example, people have
to pay a tax of 6% of the property value if they want to buy a house,
the so-called “overdrachtsbelasting.” An elaborate overview of the in-
fluence of housing market characteristics, regulations, and institutions
on regional labour mobility can be found in the ‘Employment Outlook’
of the OECD (2005a, Chapter 2), which also discusses the influence of
both the unemployment benefit system and active labour market poli-
cies on regional labour market mobility.
In a future application of our framework we may study the effect of
differences in bargaining power. Another topic for further theoretical
research is the inclusion of location decisions of firms.
We examine in the next chapter the empirical effect of unemploy-
ment benefits and other national and regional variables on regional un-




High levels of national unemployment pose an important policy concern
for the European Union. Moreover, there is concern that unemployment
rates vary substantially across regions within countries. According to
the “Employment Guidelines” of the European Council (2005), member
states should attempt to strengthen social and territorial cohesion and
reduce regional disparities in terms of employment, unemployment and
labour productivity.
A graphical illustration of both the large dispersion of regional un-
employment rates around the national averages, and the dispersion of
national unemployment rates around the European average in the data
to be analysed in this chapter, can be found in appendix 6.A. We see
that the disparities of the unemployment rate within countries are about
as large as those between countries, indicating that both regional and
national variables are consequential in explaining unemployment rates.1
The graphs also show that regional unemployment disparities are highly
persistent over time.
Figure 6.1 depicts the geography of the unemployment rates of the
regions included in the analysis. We see that regional unemployment
rates are as high as 31.8% in Andalucia (Spain) and as low as 3.1% in
Obero¨sterreich (Austria). We can also observe a clustering of regional
unemployment rates, especially within countries. An analysis of regional
unemployment rates has to account for this spatial dependence.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with J. Paul Elhorst.
1The ratio of disparities within countries to disparities between countries is, on
average, 1.02. These disparities are measured as “within group variation” and “be-
tween group” variation.
































































































































In our view, regional unemployment rates are determined by both
regional and national factors. Regional unemployment rates are, on the
one hand, strongly influenced by the structure of the regional labour
market. On the other hand, regional labour markets operate in an
environment that is heavily influenced by national labour market insti-
tutions. In the previous chapter we analysed the effect of moving costs
and unemployment benefits on regional unemployment in a theoretical
model with centralised wage bargaining. In this chapter we use a wider
range of variables to empirically investigate regional unemployment in
countries of the EU.
Most empirical studies examine the effect of regional variables on
regional unemployment for a single country.2 The problem with this ap-
proach is that one cannot measure the effect of different national level
variables. However, regional unemployment studies that do consider
multiple countries nevertheless tend to omit national labour market in-
stitutions as explanatory variables.3 Finally, studies that investigate
the effect of labour market institutions on unemployment for several
countries usually focus on national unemployment rates.4
By using the regional econometric model developed earlier in chap-
ter 2, we are able to model the two components simultaneously and thus
to determine the relative importance of regional and national charac-
teristics.
Chapter 6 is structured as follows. In section 6.1 national and re-
gional determinants of the (regional) unemployment rate are deliber-
ated. In section 6.2 we delineate an econometric model in which the
variable to be explained is the unemployment rate at the regional level,
and in which both regional-level and national-level variables serve as ex-
planatory variables. Because we are interested in the regional distribu-
tion of the unemployment rate within countries as well as among them,
we employ a mixed model with random coefficients for the regional-
level variables and fixed coefficients for the national-level variables. The
common problems of space-time data, serial dependence, spatial depen-
dence, and heteroskedasticity are accounted for. We discuss the data in
section 6.3, present and discuss the results of our empirical analysis in
section 6.4, and recapitulate our major findings in section 6.5.
2For an overview, see Elhorst (2003a).
3See e.g., Baddeley, Martin, and Tyler (1998b) and Taylor and Bradley (1997b).
4Two fairly recent surveys of the literature on the effect of labour market institu-
tions on aggregate performance are conducted by Blau and Kahn (1999) and Nickell
and Layard (1999).
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6.1 Determinants of unemployment
Regional unemployment rates are determined by labour demand vari-
ables, labour supply variables and wage-setting variables. Some of these
variables may vary between countries, while others may also vary be-
tween regions within countries. In section 6.1.1 we examine the national
variables and in section 6.1.2 the regional variables.
6.1.1 National variables
In the past two decades several studies investigating the effect of labour
market institutions on national unemployment rates have appeared.
The general idea behind most of these studies is that institutions in-
fluence equilibrium unemployment, i.e. the unemployment level that is
consistent with stable inflation. This equilibrium level is also called the
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU ). Actual
unemployment is determined by this equilibrium level as well as devia-
tions from this equilibrium level.5 Most of these studies assume imper-
fect labour and product markets. Some studies delineate an explicit the-
oretical model, assuming imperfect labour and product markets, while
others implicitly assume imperfect labour and product markets.
Nice examples of the former are Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004),
whose theoretical models consist of a wage bargaining model where
unions and employers or employer federations bargain over wages and
employers determine the level of employment, known as a “Right to
Manage” (RTM) model. Another explicit theoretical model is a two-
period overlapping generations model in which wages are set by monop-
olistic trade unions (Daveri & Tabellini, 2000).
An example of implicitly assumed imperfections is Scarpetta (1996),
who uses a simple model with a downward sloping labour demand curve
and an upward sloping wage-setting schedule.6 The wage-setting sched-
ule reflects the negative relation between unemployment and wages, and
the positive impact of wage push factors, such as the relative wage bar-
gaining power of unions on unemployment.
The empirical literature investigating the influence of institutions
on unemployment in a cross-country perspective is expanding rapidly.
5An in-depth discussion on the NAIRU can be found in the special issue of The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 11, No.1 of 1997, pp. 1–108.
6The curves are shown in a figure with employment measured as labour supply,
minus unemployment on the x-axis and real wage on the y-axis.
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These empirical studies can be grouped into three categories.
First are studies examining the effect of institutions on unemploy-
ment independent of other institutions (Daveri, Tabellini, Bentolila, &
Huizinga, 2000; Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps, & Zoega, 2000; Nickell, 1998,
1997; Scarpetta, 1996).7
Second are analyses that also allow the effect of an institution on
unemployment to differ, depending on the value of other institutions.
In these studies the interaction effect between institutions is captured
by including the product of two institutions as an independent variable
(Belot & Van Ours, 2001, 2004; Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2005; Elmeskov,
Martin, & Scarpetta, 1998).
Third are investigations of the impact of interaction effects between
shocks and institutions on unemployment (Blanchard & Wolfers, 2000;
Nickell, Nunziata, & Ochel, 2005).8
Whereas the effect of some institutions is consistent across studies,
the effect of other institutions on unemployment is more ambiguous.
Below we discuss the theoretically expected effect of institutions on
unemployment, the empirical results found in previous studies, as well
as the way we include institutions as national level explanatory variables
in our analysis.
Wage bargaining level
According to Calmfors and Driffill (1988), the relation between the de-
gree of centralisation of wage bargaining and wages is hump-shaped.
Both low and high levels of centralisation lead to moderation of wage
demands. In the former case wage moderation is caused by market
forces. The reasoning is that if wage bargaining takes place at the firm
level, the market power of unions is limited and wage demands mod-
erate. In the latter case moderation is caused by the internalisation
of externalities. If the union and the employer federation bargain at
the national level, it is likely that they account for the effect of higher
wages on the general price level as well as unemployment. By contrast, if
wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, the union and the em-
ployer federation do not take into account that higher wages and lower
employment in the own sector hinders workers from other sectors in
7Though Fitoussi et al. (2000) examine the effect of labour market institutions
on unemployment, the primary aim of their paper is to determine the effect of stock
market valuation on unemployment.
8Nickell et al. (2005) include interactions between institutions as well.
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obtaining a job.9 Assuming a downward sloping labour demand curve,
the hump-shaped relation between centralisation and wages corresponds
to a U-shaped relation between centralisation and employment, and a
hump-shaped relation between centralisation and unemployment. In
other words, both low and high levels of centralisation cause the unem-
ployment rate to decrease.10
The empirical evidence is a mixed. Both Elmeskov et al. (1998) and
Scarpetta (1996) find evidence in favour of the hump-shaped hypothesis.
Elmeskov et al. (1998) find a positive effect on unemployment for coun-
tries with an intermediate level of centralisation and a negative effect
for countries with a high level of centralisation. In Scarpetta (1996) the
centralisation variable has a positive and its square a negative impact
on unemployment.
The regressions of Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) show a nega-
tive effect of centralisation on unemployment, but this effect becomes
insignificant if country and time period fixed effects are included.
Partly because of a lack of variability over time and across countries
(see OECD, 2004, Table 3.5), we do not use the centralisation variable as
a separate variable in our analysis, but rather combine the centralisation
variable with union density.
Union density
Since higher union density strengthens the bargaining position of the
union, we might expect higher wage demands, lower employment, and
higher unemployment if union density increases. To explain this, let
us consider a ‘Right to Manage’ (RTM) model. In an RTM model all
equilibria are on the labour demand curve, and the higher the wage
bargaining power of the union the more the equilibrium point will move
upwards along the labour demand curve (see e.g., Teulings & Hartog,
1998, Chapter 4). So if we proxy wage bargaining power in an RTM
model by union density, higher union density leads to higher wages and
lower employment.
There is some empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, see
Nickell (1997, 1998) and Scarpetta (1996), but not all studies find a sig-
nificant effect of union density on unemployment (Blanchard & Wolfers,
2000; Elmeskov et al., 1998; and Nickell et al., 2005), or on the change
9A more elaborate overview of negative wage externalities is given by Calmfors
(1993).
10Note that the effect of intermediate level wage bargaining on unemployment can
be offset by the extent to which bargaining is coordinated.
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of unemployment (Fitoussi et al., 2000).11 The reason is that the effect
of union density on wage demands may also depend on the degree of
centralisation. Belot and Van Ours (2001) expect union density to have
a larger positive effect on unemployment in countries with decentralised
and uncoordinated economies, because unions have a more favourable
bargaining position under such circumstances. Belot and Van Ours
(2001, 2004) find empirical evidence for this hypothesis, in that union
density has a positive effect on unemployment in case of decentralised
wage bargaining only.
Another hypothesis about the interaction between union density and
centralisation is that in countries with plant level bargaining, unions
may moderate wage demands compared to individual non-union work-
ers to ensure local plant employment. Similarly, in countries with cen-
tralised wage bargaining, unions may consider the macroeconomic con-
sequences of higher wages and therefore moderate their wage demands.
Conversely, in countries with intermediate wage bargaining both effects
do not occur and higher union density may lead to higher wage demands,
lower employment and higher unemployment, unless wage bargaining is
coordinated.
The OECD has constructed both a centralisation index and a coor-
dination index (OECD, 2004, Table 3.5). However, centralisation and
coordination appear to be highly correlated; in our sample the correla-
tion coefficient between these two indices is 0.83.12
The combined influence of centralisation and union density is cov-
ered in the analysis by interacting centralisation with union density.
Three variables result: union density with centralised wage bargaining,
union density with decentralised wage bargaining, and union density
with intermediate level wage bargaining.
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment benefits influence unemployment in three ways. First,
higher unemployment benefits may have a positive influence on wage de-
mands because the fear of unemployment decreases. The higher wages
in turn lead to lower employment and higher unemployment, as has
been demonstrated in chapter 5 using an RTM wage bargaining model.
Second, higher unemployment benefits make participation in the labour
11Fitoussi et al. (2000) find an insignificant effect of union density on the change
of average unemployment between the 1980s and the 1990s.
12An interesting exception is Germany, where wage bargaining usually takes place
at the intermediate level, but wages are coordinated across sectors (Soskice, 1990).
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market more attractive because of the entitlement effect, which may
result in higher labour force participation. As we have seen in sec-
tion 3.3, higher unemployment benefits increase the expected benefits
of participation in the labour market relative to the expected benefits of
being inactive. Third, in a standard search model higher unemployment
benefits lead to lower search intensities of unemployed workers, thereby
lowering the number of successful matches (see e.g., the survey article
by Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991). As a result, average unemployment
duration increases and so does the unemployment rate. In sum, all three
effects may lead to higher unemployment.
Previous studies based on cross-country data usually find a posi-
tive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment (Blanchard &
Wolfers, 2000; Daveri et al., 2000; Elmeskov et al., 1998; Fitoussi et al.,
2000; Nickell et al., 2005; Nickell, 1998, 1997; Scarpetta, 1996). How-
ever, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) do not find a significant effect
of unemployment benefits on unemployment. This also holds for Fi-
toussi et al. (2000) and Daveri et al. (2000), who analyse the effect of
unemployment benefits on unemployment change.13 Finally, Belot and
Van Ours (2001, 2004) find a negative effect of unemployment benefits,
provided that the interaction effect of unemployment benefits and taxes
is also included. The latter effect is found to be positive.
A potential problem of including unemployment benefits when ex-
plaining unemployment in a cross-country study is reverse causality,
since governments in countries with higher levels of unemployment might
be induced to install more generous unemployment benefit systems. So
higher unemployment might cause higher unemployment benefits in-
stead of the other way around. There is, however, some micro-econo-
metric evidence showing that unemployment benefits positively affect
the duration of individual unemployment in European countries, see
e.g., Røed and Zhang (2003) for Norway and Narendranathan, Nick-
ell, and Stern (1985) for the UK. The evidence for the Netherlands is
mixed. Van den Berg (1990) finds virtually no effect of unemployment
benefits on unemployment duration, whereas Abbring, Van den Berg,
and Van Ours (2005) show that punitive benefit reductions substan-
tially increase individual re-employment rates. Another form of reverse
causality is that higher unemployment rates may induce governments to
reduce unemployment benefits. This would result in a negative relation
13Fitoussi et al. (2000) find a negative though insignificant effect of the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement ratio on the change of average unemployment between the
1980s and the 1990s.
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between unemployment benefits and unemployment rates.
We include the influence of unemployment benefits by using the un-
employment benefit replacement rate from the OECD as an explanatory
variable. The unemployment benefit replacement rate is the ratio be-
tween the unemployment benefit and the median wage. For further
details, see appendix 6.B.
Tax wedge
Although an increase in payroll taxes will have no long-run effects on
unemployment in a perfectly competitive world, it might raise unem-
ployment if unions have bargaining power and product markets are not
perfectly competitive (Scarpetta, 1996). Furthermore, even if capital
is perfectly mobile between countries while labour is not, the employer
will bear the tax burden of a rise in payroll tax, provided that a worker
is already receiving the minimum wage (Nickell, 1997). This in turn
may lead to lower employment and higher unemployment.
On the other hand, the effect of an increase in the tax wedge on
employment and unemployment also depends on the tax treatment of
unemployment benefits (Daveri & Tabellini, 2000). The more an in-
crease in the tax wedge is accompanied by an equal decrease in net
unemployment benefits (i.e. the outside option of workers if unions and
employer federations bargain over wages), the less wages and unemploy-
ment will increase. In other words, the effect of an increase in the tax
wedge is partly cancelled out if it is accompanied by an increase in the
tax on unemployment benefits. In theory the effect of an increase in
the tax wedge on unemployment could be zero if the tax on unemploy-
ment benefits is equal to the tax on labour. In practise, however, this
is not the case. Daveri and Tabellini (2000, Table 3) show that labour
is more heavily taxed than unemployment benefits, and that in many
countries unemployment subsidies are (partially) exempted from social
security contributions. Consequently, we expect a positive effect of the
tax wedge on wages and unemployment.
A positive relation between a tax wedge and unemployment rates is
found by Daveri et al. (2000), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell
(1997), and Nickell (1998).14 The tax wedge also has a positive effect on
unemployment in the study by Elmeskov et al. (1998), but this effect
only persists for intermediate and low levels of centralisation and coordi-
14In the study by Nickell (1998) the effect of the tax wedge on unemployment is
positive in the short-term, while the effect of the tax wedge on unemployment is
insignificant in the long-term.
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nation if the tax wedge is interacted with a centralisation-coordination
variable.
The tax wedge has an insignificant effect on unemployment in the
analysis by Scarpetta (1996), while employment taxes have an insignif-
icant effect on unemployment in a regression by Di Tella and MacCul-
loch (2005). The effect of the employment tax rate on unemployment
is positive in Nickell et al. (2005), whereas the interaction between the
employment tax rate and coordination has a negative effect on unem-
ployment.
We use the tax wedge constructed by the OECD as an explanatory
variable to measure social security contributions and personal income
tax, less transfer payments of employees and employers as a percentage
of gross labour costs for married couples. See appendix 6.B for further
details.
Interaction between tax wedge and unemployment benefits
Belot and Van Ours (2004) show that the effects of the tax wedge and
the unemployment benefits on unemployment are co-dependent. They
develop an RTM wage bargaining model. Using this model they find a
downward-sloping labour demand curve and an upward sloping bargain-
ing curve, representing labour supply, in (w, L)-space. Next, they show
that the effect of a shift of the bargaining curve due to an increase in
benefits depends on the tax level. Whether this interaction effect is pos-
itive or negative does not follow from this theoretical model; however,
according to the empirical analysis of Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004),
the interaction between the tax wedge and unemployment benefits is
positive.
Employment protection
Stronger employment protection reduces the inflow into unemployment,
because firing an employee becomes more difficult while conversely,
stronger employment protection makes an employer more cautious about
hiring a new employee and reduces the outflow from unemployment.15
One would therefore expect lower short-term unemployment and higher
long-term unemployment if employment protection increases. The over-
all effect on unemployment can go either way, albeit it could be quite
small, because the short-run and long-run effects tend to cancel each
other out.
15 See e.g., OECD (2004, Table 2.2).
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Beginning with the seminal paper of Lazear (1990), most theoretical
studies predict a positive effect of employment protection on unemploy-
ment, with the exception of Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), who find
that severance payments can have large positive effects on employment
in a model with search costs and rigid wage contracts.
The cross-country empirical literature delivers mixed results for the
effect of employment protection on unemployment. Belot and Van Ours
(2001, 2004) find a negative effect of employment protection on unem-
ployment in the case of decentralised wage bargaining. Daveri et al.
(2000) also find a negative effect of employment protection on unem-
ployment, which becomes insignificant if a growth variable is included.
By contrast, in studies by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Elmeskov et
al. (1998) and Scarpetta (1996), employment protection has a posi-
tive effect on unemployment, while in Fitoussi et al. (2000), Nickell et
al. (2005), and Nickell (1997), the effect of employment protection on
unemployment is insignificant.16
We use the employment protection index from Nickell in our anal-
ysis, supplemented by data from the OECD Labour Market Statistics
Database.
Changes in inflation
If the actual price level exceeds the expected price level, real wages
are lower than expected during the wage bargaining process and, as
a result, employment increases and unemployment decreases (see e.g.,
Belot & Van Ours, 2001; Nickell, 1998). The opposite holds if the actual
price level is lower than the expected price level. Belot and Van Ours
(2004) use the change of inflation as the driving macroeconomic variable
that causes actual unemployment to deviate from its equilibrium value.
Similarly, Fitoussi et al. (2000) include the change of inflation to control
for “effective demand” shocks.
Both lines of reasoning lead us to expect that the change of inflation
has a negative influence on unemployment, and in fact, this expectation
is supported by empirical evidence. Both Belot and Van Ours (2001,
16Nickell (1997, 1998) find a positive effect (at a 10% significance level) of employ-
ment protection on long-term unemployment and a negative effect of employment
protection on short-term unemployment. The effect on total unemployment is in-
significant in Nickell (1997). Nickell (1998) does not regress total unemployment on
employment protection.
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2004) and (Nickell, 1998) report negative coefficients for the change of
inflation in explaining unemployment.
We incorporate price surprises (actual price level minus the expected
price level) by using the change in inflation as a proxy.
Minimum wage
Another labour market institution related to wage bargaining is the
minimum wage level. However, since many countries do not have statu-
tory minimum wages, and because minimum wages do not tend to have
much impact on employment except for young people (see e.g., Dolado
et al., 1996), we do not include this variable in our analysis.
6.1.2 Regional variables
An extensive overview of regional variables used in empirical studies
to explain regional unemployment differentials is provided by Elhorst
(2003a). Elhorst reviews 41 empirical studies in order to provide a
detailed overview of both theoretical and empirical explanations of re-
gional unemployment differentials used in the applied literature. We
have grouped the explanatory variables from Elhorst’s study into nine
categories shown in the first column of table 6.1. The regional vari-
ables included in the econometric analysis of this chapter are listed in
the second column of table 6.1. Regional variables reviewed in Elhorst
(2003a) are given in column four. The third and fifth column of table
6.1 contain the most likely sign of the explanatory variables.
It can be observed from table 6.1 that we do not include regional vari-
ables from all categories. Variables from the categories “Wage-setting”
and “Social security” are added as national rather than regional vari-
ables in our analysis because in contrast to the United States, wage-
setting institutions and social security indicators do not vary between
regions within countries in the European Union.17
Variables from the categories “Housing market” and “Amenities” are
not used because regional data are unavailable for all regions and coun-
tries in our sample. What is more, amenities commonly do not appear
17Note that, although the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining does not vary
within EU countries, union density probably does. Unfortunately, we do not have
regional data on union density and therefore we include this variable as a national
level variable.
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to have a significant influence on regional unemployment in empirical
studies (Elhorst, 2003a).18
In the remainder of this section we discuss why, through using table
6.1, we include some regional variables mentioned in Elhorst (2003a)
and exclude others.
Demographic composition
The demographic composition of the population may have the following
effects on regional unemployment rates. First, we expect a positive
effect of the percentage of younger people in a region on unemployment,
due to relatively high youth unemployment.19 Second, the effect of
the percentage of older individuals in a region can go both ways. For
instance, older workers may use the unemployment benefit system as
an early retirement scheme, thus raising unemployment.20 Conversely,
older workers may use actual early retirement schemes and exit the
labour force into retirement, which may lower unemployment.
According to Elhorst (2003a), regional unemployment tends to in-
crease if the population is relatively young and decrease if the population
is relatively old (i.e. aged 60 years and over or aged 65 years and over).
On the other hand, if the population is moderately old (i.e. age group
55-59 and age group 40-64 in the studies cited in Elhorst, 2003a), the
effect on unemployment is positive.
We include two variables to account for regional differences in the
demographic composition of the population, the percentage of the work-
ing age population aged between 15 and 24, and the percentage of the
working age population aged between 55 and 64.
Another variable representing the demographic composition of the
population is birth rate. The birth rate not only captures whether or not
a population is relatively young, but it also influences the labour force
participation rate of women, which in turn influences unemployment
(Elhorst, 2003a). However, as we already include labour participation
as an explanatory variable, it suffices to include the two population age
groups.
18In theory amenities could have an upward effect on regional unemployment by
acting as a compensating differential.
19Note that the upward effect on unemployment will be tempered if relatively
many young people are enrolled in full-time education.
20In The Netherlands, for example, workers aged 57.5 years and above who became
unemployed were exempted from the obligation to search for a job in order to collect
unemployment benefits. However, this exemption ended in 2004.
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Educational attainment
We expect that education has a negative effect on (an individual’s)
unemployment for three reasons (see Elhorst, 2003a, p. 738). First,
in an economy with continued technological progress, labour demand
tends to focus on skills presumably exhibited mainly by better educated
individuals. Second, the search behaviour of better educated individuals
is expected to be more efficient. As a result, better educated individuals
find a job more quickly than less educated individuals. Third, the higher
a person’s educational attainment the lower the probability that an
individual is laid off. This results in longer employment spells for better
educated individuals. In addition, a fourth reason may even be more
important: higher skilled workers crowd out workers with less education
by accepting jobs that require lower educational attainments than they
possess.
Elhorst (2003a) refers to two additional reasons why, on a regional
scale, regions with a better educated workforce tend to have lower un-
employment. First, regions with a low level of human capital may suffer
from an outflow of workers with the highest skill levels who seek oppor-
tunities in other regions. As a consequence, the human capital level
of a region deteriorates thus increasingly leaving the region in a low-
skill poverty trap. A second, related reason is that individuals with
low skill levels from regions with relatively high unemployment are at
a disadvantage if they search for a job in a region with higher human
capital levels. The implication is that the probability that low skilled
individuals will migrate from regions with high unemployment is small.
The aforementioned considerations are supported by the empirical
evidence surveyed by Elhorst (2003a) in which the effect of education
on unemployment is either negative or insignificant.
We chose to include the percentage of individuals having medium or
higher education to account for differences in the educational attainment
of the labour force.
Economic performance
There are several ways to measure a region’s economic performance such
as employment growth, gross regional product (GRP) per capita, mar-
ket potential, industry mix, the vacancy rate, and labour productivity
growth (table 6.1).
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High employment growth rates, high gross regional product per capita,
a favourable industry mix, high vacancy rates, large labour productivity
growth rates, and a large market potential are all considered indicators
of good economic performance of a region. The latter indicator is de-
fined as the size of the population in that region plus the weighted sum
of the population in the surrounding regions. The weights are inversely
related to the distance to these regions.
One scarcely used variable is the growth of GRP per worker, even
though this variable could be considered a more adequate measure of
labour productivity growth than GRP per capita.
There are two theoretical reasons for including labour productivity
growth as an explanatory variable. First, regions with higher labour
productivity growth will have a relatively large share of innovative in-
dustries with high growth rates and a higher level of competitiveness
resulting in lower unemployment. Second, according to standard search
theory (Pissarides, 1990, Chapter 2), an increase in labour productiv-
ity growth leads to a higher discounted value of profits from creating
new jobs. Accordingly, the number of vacancies and employed work-
ers increases and unemployment decreases; the so-called “capitalisation
effect.”
There is a counteracting effect, however, as shown by Aghion and
Howitt (1994). They include labour reallocation spurred by technolog-
ical progress in a search model. The arrival of new technologies causes
labour reallocation from production units with low labour productiv-
ity to production units with high labour productivity. Faster growth
reduces the duration of a job match by increasing the job separation
rate.21 Faster growth also reduces the life-time of a production unit,
thus discouraging firms from the creation of job vacancies. Both effects
of faster growth raise equilibrium unemployment. These positive effects
of growth on unemployment are called the “creative destruction” effect.
Whether productivity growth results in higher or lower unemployment
depends, according to Aghion and Howitt (1994), on the size of both
the “capitalisation effect” and the “creative destruction” effect.
We do not include vacancy rates, as these are not available for all
regions and countries within our dataset. The market potential is kept
out of our analysis because the number of regions and countries included
in our analysis changes over time.
21The job separation rate is the fraction of jobs destroyed between time t− 1 and
time t.
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Nor do we include industry mix variables, such as the shares of
different industries in employment. The reason is that the share of
services, for instance, may increase for two reasons. The share may
increase because employment in the service sector has increased; or the
share may increase due to a decline in employment in the manufacturing
sector. Both phenomena lead to a higher share of services in total
employment, but the expected effect on regional unemployment is quite
different. For this and other reasons the effect of employment shares
on unemployment is mixed and differs across countries and over time
(Elhorst, 2003a, Table 3).
In summarising, we have included two variables that influence the
demand for labour in a region in order to capture the economic per-
formance of a region: labour productivity growth, being the growth
of GRP per worker, and employment growth, being the average em-
ployment growth over the past two years. We expect that both labour
productivity growth and employment growth lower the unemployment
rate.
Labour supply
The effect of labour supply on regional unemployment can be measured
by several variables, such as the labour force participation rate, the net
inward migration rate, and the net inward commuting rate (Elhorst,
2003a).
The effect of labour participation on the unemployment rate can be
argued to be either positive or negative. Due to the accounting identity
it should be positive, whereas due to the fact that “people cause jobs”
(Layard, 1997), it might be negative. The accounting identity defines
unemployment as the working age population multiplied by the labour
force participation rate, plus net inward commuting, minus the level of
employment. This equation expresses the fact that higher labour supply,
ceteris paribus, leads to higher unemployment. However, Layard (1997)
argues that this ceteris paribus condition does not apply and that the
number of jobs rises proportionately to the labour force. In addition,
increased labour participation encourages local job growth.
In general, regional participation is found to have a negative effect on
unemployment in the empirical literature (Elhorst, 2003a). The empiri-
cal evidence for the effect of net inward migration rate on unemployment
is mixed, whereas the (little) empirical evidence on the inward commut-
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ing rate suggests a positive relation with the regional unemployment
rate.
Data on migration and commuting are not available for our dataset,
but to cover the effect of labour supply on unemployment we do include
the labour force participation rate. Since this variable also depends
on unemployment, it is not strictly exogenous and will therefore be
estimated using instrumental variables.
Lagged unemployment
We can take advantage of our multilevel setup by including national level
variables to account for differences between countries, which makes the
inclusion of national unemployment rates obsolete (see Elhorst, 2003a).
We do, however, include the lagged unemployment rate to deal with
serial dependence. In order to correct for spatial dependence among the
regions at each point in time, we allow for spatial autocorrelation in the
error terms. Further details are discussed in the next section.
6.2 Econometric model
In the previous section we have identified different explanatory variables
of the regional unemployment rate. Part of these variables only varies
between countries, while another part may also vary between regions
within countries. The former may be denoted as national-level vari-
ables and the latter as regional-level variables. The integration of both
types of variables enables the evaluation of labour market institutional
variables on the one hand, and regional economic explanatory variables
on the other. For this purpose, we adopt the econometric model devel-
oped in section 2.7 to model the hierarchical structure of regions (level
1 units) within countries (level 2 units). In this model the parameters
with respect to the regional-level variables may vary from one coun-
try to another, while the parameters with respect to the national level




′Zct + εrct, (6.1a)
βc=β + νc, (6.1b)
E(εrct)=0, var(εrct)=σ
2
c [(IRc− δcWc)′(IRc− δcWc)]−1=σ2cΩc, (6.1c)
E(νc)=0, var(νc) = V, (6.1d)
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where c = (1, . . . , N) refers to a level 2 unit, r refers to a country (=
1, . . . , Rc with Rc the number of regions in country c), and t (= 1, . . . , T )
refers to a given time period.
Urct is the unemployment rate in region r of country c at time t and
is defined as the number of unemployed persons divided by the active
population aged between 15-64 (i.e. the sum of the number of employed
and unemployed). Xrct is a vector of explanatory variables measured
in region r of country c at time t; and Zct is a vector of explanatory
variables in region r but only observed at the national level of country
c at time t, since these variables do not differ between regions within
a country.22 εrct is a heteroskedastic disturbance term with variance
σ2c [(IRc − δcWc)′(IRc − δcWc)]−1, where σ2c is different for different coun-
tries c and Wc (c = 1, . . . , N) is an Rc × Rc non-negative matrix with
zeros on the diagonal describing the spatial arrangement of the regions
in country c. δc is called the spatial autocorrelation coefficient and is
assumed to be fixed, but is different for different countries. To allow for
heteroskedasticity, σ2c is allowed to differ across countries.
According to Elhorst (2003a), regional studies are frequently found
to include lagged unemployment. The results from these studies show
that regional unemployment rates are highly correlated in time.23 We
include lagged unemployment as an explanatory variable to correct for
serial autocorrelation. The higher the coefficient of lagged unemploy-
ment the higher the persistence of unemployment.
To account for spatial dependence we include spatial autocorrela-
tion in the error terms (δcWc). Another option used to reckon with
spatial dependence is to include unemployment lagged in space as an
explanatory variable. However, since not one theoretical model of un-
employment poses a relationship between the unemployment rate in one
region and the unemployment rate in surrounding regions, we do not
22Recall that endogenous explanatory variables will also be classified among Zct,
even when they are observable at the regional level.
23National level studies of unemployment include lagged unemployment as well.
An example is Nickell et al. (2005), who include a lagged dependent variable for
two reasons: (i) to deal with the persistence of unemployment, and (ii) to guarantee
that estimated coefficients are not distorted by omitted trended variables or common
shocks.
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choose this option.24 βc represents a vector of random response pa-
rameters and α a vector of fixed response parameters in the regression
equation. The βc of a particular country is the outcome of a random
process with common-mean-coefficient β vector and covariance matrix
V . When the vectors β and βc (c = 1, . . . , N) are of size K, V is of size
K ×K. Variables with random coefficients are education, the percent-
age of the working population aged between 15-24 and 55-64, labour
productivity growth, and employment growth.
Variables with fixed coefficients are the labour force participation
rate, unemployment benefits, tax wedge, union density per centralisa-
tion class, the change in inflation, employment protection, lagged un-
employment, and the interaction between unemployment benefits and
the tax wedge.
The participation rate and the lagged unemployment rate are treated
as endogenous explanatory variables and are estimated with instrumen-
tal variables. We use all strictly exogenous variables lagged one or two
periods in time to instrument these endogenous explanatory variables.
Strictly exogenous variables measured as growth rates are included as
instruments with a one-year lag only.25
Time-specific effects are also added to the model in order to prevent
that trends along the observations over time, either linear or cyclical,
might bias the actual cross-section relation between regions within coun-
tries and between countries under our scrutiny. Finally, since regions
vary in size, the observations are weighted by the size of the working
age population in each region.
6.3 Data
Our primary data source for the empirical analysis is Eurostat’s regional
database, supplemented with OECD data on national institutions. We
24An example variable for which including a spatially-lagged dependent variable
as an explanatory variable is more appropriate, is innovation. Including innovation
of neighbouring regions as explanatory variable makes sense because innovation in
one region directly influences innovation in neighbouring regions through spill-over
effects.
25If the endogenous variables at time t are correlated with the random error term,
so will the endogenous variables at time t − 1, as a result of which these variables
are not suitable as instruments.
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use the regional division of Eurostat on the NUTS 2 level, with the
exception of the UK, since Eurostat only provides NUTS 1 data for
the UK. The dataset covers the period 1983-1997. The total number of
observations is 1549 divided over 143 regions across 10 countries.26 The
data set is not complete, mainly because some countries became member
states of the EU after 1983, and in some regions Eurostat began data
registration after 1983. Data registration in the former East Germany
started in 1991. Due to large differences in the data and their different
histories, East and West Germany are treated as two different level 2
units. The OECD does not collect data on all institutional variables for
Greece and Luxembourg, so these countries have been excluded from
our analysis. The regional division is shown in figure 6.1, while a more
elaborate description of the data can be found in appendix 6.B.
The results of our analysis must be interpreted with care for three
reasons: (i) Institutional variables change slowly over time. (ii) The
educational variable is available from 1992 onwards only. (iii) Reverse
causality may occur, as we have illustrated in the discussion of unem-
ployment benefits.
The spatial weight matrices used in the estimations are symmetric
inverse travel time matrices for passenger traffic. Travel time over land
depends on road type, urban and mountainous speed constraints and
national car speed limits. Overseas travel time depends on embarkation
waiting time and the travel time by ferry.27 As most clustering of re-
gional unemployment rates occurs within countries, as can be seen in
figure 6.1, cross border weights have been set to zero.
6.4 Results
The main estimation results are recorded in table 6.2, while the fixed
country-specific coefficients on which the overall estimates of the random
coefficients are based are presented in table 6.3. The coefficients of the
variables measured in percentages (POP 15-24, POP 55-64, education,
labour productivity growth, employment growth, labour participation
26Taking into account the effect of using one and two period lagged variables as
instrumental variables.
27Source: Institut fu¨r Raumplanung, see Schu¨rmann and Talaat (2000).
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rate, tax wedge, unemployment benefits, union density) present the shift
in the unemployment rate when these variables rise by one percentage
point. Note that the unemployment rate and almost all explanatory
variables are measured on the interval 0-100%, with the exception of
the variable employment protection, which ranges between 0-2.
The coefficient estimates in the first column of table 6.2 reflect short-
term effects. Long-term effects can be obtained from the short-term
estimated coefficients by multiplying the latter by 1/(1 − τˆ), where
τˆ is the coefficient estimate of lagged unemployment. The coefficient
of the lagged dependent variable equals 0.68 and is highly significant,
indicating that unemployment is highly persistent. The last column re-
ports the standard deviation of the variables with random coefficients
based on the V estimate.28 In addition to the results recorded in table
6.2, we found evidence of spatial autocorrelation and of variety in the
autocorrelation coefficients δc across countries. The average spatial au-
tocorrelation coefficient equals 0.58. The R-squared is quite high (0.93)
for a regression model based on 1549 observations.
Table 6.2 also reports the results of four diagnostics to test whether
the model is correctly specified.
In addition to our decision to regress the unemployment rate on its
serial lagged value to deal with serial dependence among the observa-
tions over time, we also tested for any additional serial dependence in
the error terms, using Breusch and Godfrey’s Lagrange Multiplier test.
This test augments the matrix of explanatory variables by an additional
column containing the serial lagged residuals. If no fit is found, the hy-
pothesis of any additional serial dependence is rejected. Given that the
test statistic is chi-squared distributed with one degree of freedom, this
appears to be the case.
For testing the heteroskedasticity assumption of the model, we de-
part from the hypothesis H0 : σ
2
1 = · · · = σ2N = σ2. The correspond-
ing Lagrange Multiplier test is chi-squared distributed with N − 1 de-
grees of freedom.29 The hypothesis must be strongly rejected, indicating
that our choice to generalize the standard two-level model with a ho-
28This is the square root of the diagonal elements of the matrix V.
29The restriction is that the variance of all countries are equal to each other and
not to a specific value. Since we treated East and West Germany as two different
level 2 units, N − 1 is equal to 12.
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moskedastic error term to a model with a heteroskedastic error term
was correct.
The third diagnostic is meant to test the joint hypothesis that the
instruments are valid and that the model is correctly specified. To
evaluate this, the instruments that do not lie in X and Z should have
no ability to explain any variation in the unemployment rate. This
test is taken from Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 232-37) and
has a chi-squared distribution. The degrees of freedom are equal to the
number of instruments that do not lie in X and Z, which in our case is
24.30 We find that the joint hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Finally, we tested whether it is necessary to account for time-specific
effects by departing from the hypothesis that they can be replaced by
one intercept for the whole observation period. As expected, this hy-
pothesis must be rejected.
Given that the fit of the equation is satisfactory, that the equation
is correctly specified, and that 13 out of 15 coefficients are statistically
significant, one of the most striking results is the considerable hetero-
geneity of the coefficients across countries. As can be seen from table
6.2, the standard deviation of the variables with random coefficients
tends to exceed the coefficient estimate of these variables. Our results
indicate that, the hypothesis that regional unemployment rates in dif-
ferent countries of the EU are determined by a common structure, must
be strongly rejected. The implication is that a common regional policy
to lower unemployment in the EU is impracticable. Policy measures
that have large effects in one country may have small or even adverse
effects in another country.
Similarly, following earlier work by Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004),
the significant interaction effects show that national institutions which
help to reduce unemployment successfully in one country may not work
in another country, because the impact of an institution depends on
other institutions.
30We use exogenous variables in X and Z measured at both time t−1 and t−2 as
instrumental variables. We also ran a regression with exogenous variables in X and
Z measured only at time t − 1 as instrumental variables. Using less instrumental
variables did not alter the estimation results very much. However, we chose to
use both instruments from t − 1 and t − 2, because otherwise the test of serial
autocorrelation would only not be rejected at a 1% significance.
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Table 6.2: Dependent variable: Unemployment rate.
Short T Long T
S.D.
term value term value
Intercept -4.57 -2.47 -14.16 -2.59 71.71
Population [15-24] 0.05 3.79 0.14 3.75 1.05
Population [55-64] 0.02 1.47 0.06 1.49 3.59
Education -0.02 -11.48 -0.07 -7.06 0.32
Labour prod. growth -0.05 -8.97 -0.15 -7.58 0.32
Employment growth -0.05 -9.95 -0.16 -9.57 1.62
Lagged unempl. rate 0.68 33.30 - -
Participation rate -0.03 -2.59 -0.10 -2.35
Tax wedge 0.44 14.90 1.35 9.57
Unempl. benefits 0.26 10.60 0.80 8.56
UnionD|centr.barg.≤ 2 -0.01 -2.80 -0.03 -2.87
UnionD|2 <centr.barg.< 4 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.47
UnionD|centr.barg.≥ 4 -0.01 -3.93 -0.03 -3.88
∆ Inflation -0.23 -11.55 -0.72 -8.71
Employment protection -2.09 -14.56 -6.48 -8.07




serial χ2(1) = 3.67 Not rejected
autocorrelation
Homoskedasticity χ2(12) = 2561.8 Rejected
Correctly
specified and χ2(24) = 5.00 Not rejected
valid instruments
No time effects χ2(12) = 750.53 Rejected
Notes: Countries (observation period and number of regions within parentheses) are
Belgium (1983-1997, 9), Denmark (1983-1997, 1), West Germany (1983-1997, 29),
East Germany (1991-1997, 5), Spain (1986-1997, 17), France (1983-1997, 22), Ire-
land (1983-1997, 1), Italy (1983-1997, 20), Netherlands (1983, 1985, 1987-1997, 12),
Austria (1995-1997, 9), Portugal (1986-1997, 7), and the UK (1983-1993, 11). Total
number of observations is 1549, taking into account the effect of using one and two
period lagged variables as instrumental variables. ‘Participation rate’ and ‘lagged
unemployment’ are treated as endogenous explanatory variables. Coefficient esti-
mates are corrected for heteroskedasticity, spatial autocorrelation and time-specific
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We first present a detailed discussion of the results for the regional vari-
ables reported in tables 6.2 and 6.3. Table 6.3 reports the fixed country-
specific coefficient on which the random coefficients of the regional vari-
ables in table 6.2 are based. The population aged between 15 and 24 has
a positive and significant effect on unemployment, which corresponds
to the theoretical notion that the youth unemployment rate generally
exceeds the overall unemployment rate.31 Moreover, the positive sign
corresponds with the empirical evidence cited in Elhorst (2003a). A one
percentage point increase in the percentage of the working age popula-
tion aged between 15 and 24 will cause the unemployment rate to rise
by 0.14 percent point. The fixed country-specific coefficients on which
this overall measure is based are also positively related to the absolute
and relative levels of youth unemployment at the country level. For
example, Italy appears to have the largest positive and significant fixed
country-specific coefficient, while Italy’s youth unemployment rate of
over 30 percent is the second largest in the sample. In addition, the
ratio of youth unemployment to total unemployment in Italy is nearly
three—and is the largest in the sample.32 An exception is the nega-
tive and significant coefficient of the population aged between 15 and
24 of Denmark, where youth unemployment is the second lowest in the
sample. This negative and significant effect may stem from the unique
institutional set-up of Denmark. Denmark has a long tradition of ap-
prenticeships and has taken several measures to prevent dropouts from
formal education (Barrell & Genre, 1999). An example of such a mea-
sure is the benefit entitlement criterion of a young person without an
employment history, who must have at least 18 months post-school ed-
ucation or training to obtain benefits (Barrell & Genre, 1999).
The population aged between 55 and 64 does not have a significant
effect on unemployment. Note that the fixed country-specific coeffi-
cients on which the overall measure is based, if significant, are mainly
positive. An exception is Denmark where the effect on unemployment is
markedly negative. This could be caused by relatively high employment
31Youth unemployment is defined as the unemployment rate of individuals aged
under 25. Source: Labour Force Survey, Eurostat.
32We calculated the youth unemployment rates per country for each year in our
sample and used the mean of these values per country to obtain the youth unem-
ployment rates mentioned in the main text.
6.4 Results 149
rates of older workers in Denmark.33 This in turn could be caused by
the possibility offered to older workers to work part-time while already
receiving partial retirement benefits.34 Overall, most notable is the large
variation in the fixed country-specific coefficients across countries.
The educational attainment of the population has a negative and
significant effect on unemployment. This negative effect corresponds
to the theoretical arguments discussed in section 6.1.2 and the empir-
ical evidence discussed in Elhorst (2003a). A one percentage point in-
crease of the population with medium or higher education causes a 0.07
percent point decrease in the unemployment rate in the long-term. It
is noteworthy that the fixed country-specific coefficients on which this
overall measure is based are also mainly negative. Exceptions are the
fixed country-specific coefficients of education for former West Germany
and Portugal, which are positive and significant. The large variation in
the fixed country-specific coefficients across countries points to differ-
ent economic structures per country. The positive effect of education
on Portuguese unemployment, for example, is in line with country level
unemployment rates per educational attainment class.35 The unemploy-
ment rate of individuals with medium education in Portugal is higher
than that of lower educated individuals (the ratio of medium to lower
level unemployment rates is 1.1, whereas across all countries this ratio
is 0.7). This is due to the relatively low unemployment level of lower ed-
ucated individuals in Portugal (5.4 percent to 12.4 percent for the EU
cross-country average). Meanwhile, higher educated Portuguese have
the lowest unemployment rate (3.2 percent). Given the large variation
in the fixed country-specific coefficients, a policy aimed at raising the ed-
ucational level of the population is only recommended if lower educated
jobs are expected to become scarce.
33In our sample country level employment rates for the age group [55-64] year
are the highest in Denmark for the whole period (Source: Labour Force Survey,
Eurostat).
34Denmark is one of few countries to offer this possibility, see Duval (2003).
35 Averages for all countries are based on data over the period 1992-1997, although
data on some years are missing for some countries. The comparison for lower and
medium education levels for Portugal is based on data over the period 1993-1997,
whereas the comparison of medium and higher levels for Portugal is based on data
over the period 1995-1996, due to data unavailability. Weighted averages are ob-
tained through weighting by the number of people aged between 25-59. Source:
Labour Force Survey, Eurostat.
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Regarding the regional structure, both employment growth and labour
productivity growth have a negative and significant influence on the un-
employment rate.
A one percentage point increase in employment growth decreases un-
employment by 0.16 percentage point in the long-term. The negative
sign of the coefficient for employment growth is in line with the theo-
retical considerations discussed above. The fixed country-specific coef-
ficients, on which the overall measure of employment growth is based,
are also mainly negative. Although the partial correlation coefficient be-
tween employment growth and unemployment is negative for Denmark,
its fixed country-specific coefficient is positive. One reason might be
that we do not have regional data for Denmark. Due to its interesting
institutional set-up, we have nonetheless decided to include Denmark in
our analysis.
A one percentage point increase in labour productivity growth de-
creases the unemployment rate by 0.15 percentage point in the long-
term. Recall that the effect of labour productivity growth on unem-
ployment could go both ways. The negative coefficient of labour pro-
ductivity growth implies that the “capitalisation effect” outweighs the
“creative destruction effect.” The fixed country-specific coefficients, on
which the overall measure of labour productivity growth is based, are
also mainly negative. The negative effect of labour productivity growth
is most pronounced for the UK. This may indicate that in the UK the
“capitalisation effect” is relatively high. In other words, discounted prof-
its increase relatively strongly in response to productivity growth in the
UK. This may be explained by a relatively low responsiveness of wages
to productivity growth because wage bargaining is most decentralised
in the UK.
Labour participation has a negative effect on unemployment, as is
found in most empirical regional studies (Elhorst, 2003a). A one per-
cent increase in labour participation decreases unemployment by 0.10
percentage point.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the results for the na-
tional variables in the analysis. The direct effects of the unemployment
benefit replacement rate and the tax rate are positive, but the interac-
tion effect of the unemployment benefit replacement rate and the tax
wedge is negative, that is the unemployment benefit replacement rate
6.4 Results 151
and the tax wedge reduce each other’s influence on unemployment.
More specifically, the total effect of the unemployment benefit re-
placement rate on unemployment is equal to 0.80− 0.03 ∗ (tax wedge).
In other words, the unemployment benefit replacement rate has the ex-
pected positive effect on unemployment for low values of the tax wedge.
This is the case for the United Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland. The
negative effect of the unemployment benefit replacement rate on unem-
ployment in other countries in our sample is at odds with the theory
and most of the empirical evidence discussed in section 6.1.1. The fact
that the unemployment benefit replacement rate is negative for higher
values of the tax wedge may be caused by the following mechanisms.
Countries with high unemployment benefits may be induced to set strict
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits thereby reducing the num-
ber of unemployed. Moreover, countries with high unemployment rates
could be forced to lower unemployment benefits to be able to finance the
total expenses on unemployment benefits, especially if these countries
already have high taxes.
The total effect of the tax wedge on unemployment is equal to 1.35−
0.03 ∗ (unemployment benefit replacement rate). Hence, the total effect
of the tax wedge is negative for high values of the unemployment benefit
replacement rate. This only occurs, however, in the case of Denmark
and the Netherlands (from 1987 to 1991). The positive relation between
the tax wedge and unemployment in most countries is in line with the
theory and empirical evidence discussed in section 6.1.1.
Our results are comparable to previous empirical studies on unem-
ployment that include both the tax wedge, the unemployment benefit
replacement rate, and their interaction as explanatory variables. The
estimation results by Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) also show a
significant interaction effect between the tax wedge and the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rate. In addition, the total effect of the benefit
replacement rate on unemployment switched between positive and neg-
ative values depending on the value of the tax wedge in their study as
well. The direct effect of the benefit replacement rate on unemployment
was negative and the interaction effect with the tax wedge was positive
in Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004).36 In other words, the total effect of
the benefit replacement rate on unemployment in Belot and Van Ours
36The direct effect of the tax wedge on unemployment was insignificant in Belot
and Van Ours (2001, 2004).
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(2001, 2004) could be both positive and negative due to different signs of
the direct effect of the unemployment benefit replacement rate, and the
interaction effect with the tax wedge. In our analysis we also find both
positive and negative values of total effect of the benefit replacement
rate due to different signs of the direct effect of the benefit replacement
rate, and the interaction effect with the tax wedge. However, in our
case the direct effect of the benefit replacement rate on unemployment
is positive, while the interaction effect is negative.
Union density has a negative effect on unemployment in the case
of decentralised and centralised wage bargaining, but an insignificant
effect in the case of intermediate wage bargaining. An increase of one
percentage point in union density decreases unemployment by 0.03 per-
cent point if wage bargaining takes place at the decentralised or cen-
tralised level. These findings support the second hypothesis postulated
in section 6.1.1, that higher union density in the case of plant level and
country level bargaining, leads to lower wage demands.
Note that the negative effect of union density on unemployment in
the case of highly centralised wage bargaining could in part be caused
by the higher degree of coordination that is generally associated with
centralised wage bargaining.37
Our result contrasts with those of Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004)
who found a positive and significant effect of union density in the case
of decentralised wage bargaining.
Employment protection has a negative effect on unemployment. As
this variable ranges between 0.3 and 2 in our sample, the negative ef-
fect of employment protection on unemployment, using the short-term
coefficient, ranges between -0.6 and -4.2 percentage point. The negative
coefficient indicates that the negative effect of higher employment pro-
tection on unemployment outweighs the positive effect in our sample.
The reduction of the inflow into unemployment outweighs the reduc-
tion in the flow out of unemployment. This finding supports some of
the empirical evidence discussed in section 6.1.1. Furthermore, this re-
sult does not reinforce fears of reverse causality, because that would
lead to a positive correlation between employment protection and un-
employment rates.
37Recall that the correlation coefficient between centralisation and coordination
in our sample is equal to 0.83.
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The change of inflation has the expected negative effect on unem-
ployment. The long-term coefficient amounts to -0.72. Note that Belot
and Van Ours (2001, 2004) find a value of approximately -0.5, which is
in between the value of our short-term coefficient and the value of our
long-term coefficient. Nickell et al. (2005) found a coefficient of -0.21,
which is smaller but closer to our short-term coefficient.
Finally, we establish the relative contribution of regional versus national
variables to the explanation of the unemployment rate in order to de-
termine whether or not it is important to include both sets of variables.
We apply the average absolute contribution method of Broersma and
Oosterhaven (2008, Table 6) to obtain the shares in table 6.4 through
the following four steps.
First, we calculate the average absolute deviation from the mean
for each explanatory variable. Second, we multiply these average ab-
solute deviations by the value of the estimated coefficients. Third, we
determine the absolute contribution of each variable (except for the tax
wedge, the unemployment benefit replacement rate, and the interac-
tion between these two variables) by taking the absolute value of the
products of the second step. The contribution of the tax wedge, the un-
employment benefit replacement rate, and their interaction is calculated
by first adding up the three products from the second step and then tak-
ing the absolute value of this sum. Otherwise we would overestimate
the effect of these three variables taken together, because the effect of
the tax wedge and the unemployment benefit replacement rate on the
unemployment rate is positive, whereas the effect of their interaction
is negative and these variables—as well as their coefficient—are corre-
lated with each other. Fourth, we determine the share of each variable
by dividing the individual contribution by the sum of the contributions.
Table 6.4 shows that the ratio of the regional versus the national
contribution using this method is 36:64.
Note that there are two problems associated with this method. First,
this method does not account for differences in the significance level of
the estimated coefficients. Second, although we corrected for the corre-
lation between the tax wedge, the unemployment benefit replacement
rate, and their interaction, other variables and their coefficient esti-
mates are also correlated, but this method does not correct for these
correlations.
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Table 6.4: Average absolute contribution.
Explanatory variable share
Population [15-24] 4 %
Population [55-64] 1 %
Education 14 %
Labour prod. growth 8 %
Employment growth 3 %
Participation rate 5 %
UnionD|centr.barg.≤ 2 5 %
UnionD|2 <centr.barg.< 4 1 %
UnionD|centr.barg.≥ 4 1 %
∆ Inflation 7 %
Employment protection 18 %
Tax wedge, Unempl. benefits, Unempl.ben.∗Tax wedge 33 %
Total 100 %
Regional contribution 36 %
National contribution 64 %
Bearing these remarks in mind, the results in table 6.4 indicate that
it is important to include both regional and national variables to anal-
yse unemployment. Previous studies on unemployment excluded either
national or regional variables and have therefore omitted an important
part of the explanatory variables.
6.5 Conclusions
The model used in this chapter is a mixed model of random coeffi-
cients for regional-level variables and fixed coefficients for national-level
variables. Including both regional and national variables at the same
time is important, since both groups of variables have appeared to be
important in their contribution to the explanation of variation in the
unemployment rate.
A second striking result is the considerable heterogeneity of the co-
efficient estimates across countries, indicating that regional unemploy-
ment rates in the EU are not determined by a common structure. This
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implies that the same policy causes different outcomes in different coun-
tries.
By looking at the fixed country-specific coefficients underlying the
common mean coefficients, further interesting results surface. A note-
worthy example is Denmark, where the effect of the demographic struc-
ture on unemployment appears to differ markedly from other countries.
This is likely due to Denmark’s unique institutional set-up. Denmark
has a long tradition of apprenticeships and several safeguards to avoid
dropouts from formal education. Denmark also offers older workers the
possibility to work part-time while already receiving partial retirement
benefits. Both features of Denmark’s institutional set-up lead to nega-
tive rather than positive effects of the population aged between 15-24
and 55-64 on unemployment.
Another interesting finding is the impact of labour productivity on
unemployment, which is highest in the UK, probably because wage bar-
gaining is the most decentralised there.
Just as the effect of regional variables on regional unemployment
varies across countries, so does the effect of national variables among
countries. Due to interaction effects between institutions, the effect of
one institution depends on the value of others, which differs between
countries. For example, whereas the effect of union density on unem-
ployment is found to be negative for countries with decentralised and
centralised wage bargaining, no significant influence of union density on
unemployment is found if wage bargaining takes place at the interme-
diate level. This outcome is probably influenced by the higher level of
coordination in countries with centralised wage bargaining.
In addition, whereas both the direct effect of the tax wedge and the
unemployment benefit replacement rate on unemployment is positive,
the total effect of these two institutions is dampened due to a negative
interaction effect.
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6.B Data appendix
Both regional and national data are used. The primary regional level
data were selected from the Eurostat file called ‘Regions.’ Eurostat
uses a classification in NUTS 1, NUTS 2, and NUTS 3 level regions,
where NUTS is an abbreviation of “Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics.” The higher the NUTS level the smaller the regions. Most
regional data are available for NUTS 2 level regions, with the exception
of the UK, for which NUTS1 level data are used, since Eurostat only
provides NUTS 1 data for the UK up to 1995.
The NUTS classification by Eurostat changes over time. The NUTS
2 classification of 1999 is used for all countries except for the UK. For the
UK the NUTS 1 classification of 1995 is used. Due to extensive changes
in the territorial breakdown of the UK, the old NUTS 1 classification
cannot be linked to the 1999 classification, and no historical series are
available for the UK in the NUTS 1 classification of 1999 (Eurostat,
2002).
The regional division we have used consists of a maximum of 143
regions. The dataset covers the period 1983-1997, but is incomplete
because in some countries or regions Eurostat started data registration
after 1983, in part because some countries became member states of
the EU after that time (in Spain and Portugal registration began in
1986 and in 1988 for the Algarve; in France registration started in 1988
for Provence and Corse; and in the Netherlands registration started in
1988 for Overijssel, Gelderland and Flevoland, while for all other regions
data for 1984 and 1986 are missing). Finally, one region has been left
aside (Ceuta y Melilla) and some regions are joined with others (Bremen
with Lu¨neburg and Hamburg with Schleswig-Holstein). As a result, the
number of observations is different for each year. The total number
of observations is 1549, taking into account the effect of the lagged
unemployment rate.
Countries included in the analysis (observation period and number of
regions within parentheses) are Belgium (1983-1997, 9), Denmark (1983-
1997, 1), West Germany (1983-1997, 29), East Germany (1991-1997, 5),
Spain (1986-1997, 17), France (1983-1997, 22), Ireland (1983-1997, 1),
Italy (1983-1997, 20), Netherlands (1983, 1985, 1987-1997, 12), Austria
(1995-1997, 9), Portugal (1986-1997, 7) and the UK (1983-1993, 11).
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Spatial weight matrix
The spatial weight matrices used in the estimations are symmetric in-
verse travel time matrices for passenger traffic. Travel time over land
depends on road type, urban and mountainous speed constraints, and
national car speed limits. Overseas travel time depends on embarka-
tion waiting time and the travel time by ferry. Source: Institut fu¨r
Raumplanung, see Schu¨rmann and Talaat (2000). The travel time be-
tween region A and region B in one direction sometimes differs from
the travel time in the opposite direction. The spatial weight matrix is
made symmetric by taking average travel times. The effect of taking
average travel time is limited. The difference in travel time between
both directions is less than 10 percent in 96 percent of the cases. Al-
ternatively, the difference between the travel time in one direction and
the average travel time is less than 10 percent in 99 percent of the cases.
Regional variables
Education (%): Percentage of people aged 25-59 having medium or
higher education. Medium education is defined as upper secondary ed-
ucation, International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 3,
and higher education is defined as tertiary education, ISCED 5-7. Avail-
able for the period: 1992-1997. For the period 1983-1991 the numbers
of 1992 were used. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Labour Force
Survey, Eurostat.
Employment growth (%): Average employment growth over the last
two years. The number of employed people relates to persons who
are aged at least 15 at a certain point in time. Available for the pe-
riod: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Regions database
1999, Table LF2EMP, Eurostat. Source data UK and region Brabant
(for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Table
EFDT2EMP, Eurostat.
Participation rate (%): Ratio of the economically active population
aged between 15-64 years, and the total population aged between 15-64
years. The economically active population is the sum of employed and
unemployed people. Available for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Di-
vision: NUTS2. Source: Regions database 1999, Tables LF2ACT and
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LF2POP, Eurostat. Source data UK and region Brabant (for the period
1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Tables EFDT2ACTIV
and EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
Population [15-24] (%): Number of people aged between 15-24 as a per-
centage of the total working age population aged between 15-64. Avail-
able for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source:
Regions database 1999, Table LF2POP, Eurostat. Source data UK and
region Brabant (for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database
1995, Table EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
Population [55-64] (%): Number of people aged between 55-64 as a per-
centage of the total working age population aged between 15-64. Avail-
able for the period: 1983-1997. Regional Division: NUTS2. Source:
Regions database 1999, Table LF2POP, Eurostat. Source data UK and
region Brabant (for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database
1995, Table EFDT2POP, Eurostat.
Labour Productivity growth (%): Average labour productivity growth
over the last two years, defined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) di-
vided by employment. Available for the period: 1983-1997. Regional
Division: NUTS2. GDP is converted to 1990 Purchasing Power Stan-
dards (PPS) with the help of Purchasing Power Parities and GDP defla-
tors. Source employment data: Regions database 1999, Table LF2EMP,
Eurostat. Source employment data UK and region Brabant (for the pe-
riod 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995, Table EFDT2EMP,
Eurostat. Source GDP data: Regions database 1999, Table E2GDP,
Eurostat. Source GDP data for the UK: Regions database 1995, Table
ECON2PIB, Eurostat.
Unemployment rate (%): Ratio of people being unemployed (harmonised
unemployment) and the active labour population. It relates to persons
aged at least 15 at a certain point in time. A person is considered un-
employed if he/she is without work, currently available for work and
seeking work, that is, if he/she has taken specific steps in a speci-
fied recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment. The
active labour population is equal to the sum of the number of em-
ployed and unemployed people. Available for the period: 1983-1997.
Regional Division: NUTS2. Source: Regions database 1999, Tables
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UN3PERS and LF2EMP, Eurostat. Source data UK and region Bra-
bant (for the period 1983-1992) in Belgium: Regions database 1995,
Tables CHOM3ABSOLU and EFDT2EMP, Eurostat.
National variables
Centralisation: Index of centralisation of wage bargaining ranging be-
tween {0-5}. The index increases with the level of wage bargaining. The
index is 1 in the case of firm/plant level bargaining, and 5 in the case
of national wage bargaining. Availability: Five year averages are avail-
able for the periods 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000.
Source: OECD (2004, Table 3.5).
∆ Inflation: Annual change in inflation, where inflation is defined as the
percentage change in consumer prices. Available for the period 1983-
1997. Source: OECD, Main economic indicators.
Employment protection: Index of employment protection which increases
with the strictness of employment protection and ranges between {0-2}.
Available for the period 1983-1995. Source: Labour Market Institu-
tions Database (LMIDB) by S.Nickell. Also available for the year 1998.
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics Database. The 1998 data from
the OECD are made comparable to Nickell’s data by using 1990 data
from both the LMIDB database and the OECD Labour Market Statis-
tics Database. The intermediate years (1996 and 1997) are computed
by linear interpolation.
Tax wedge (%): Employees’ and employers’ social security contributions
and personal income tax less transfer payments as percentage of gross
labour costs as faced by married couples. Available for the period 1983,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993-1997. The intermediate years are com-
puted by linear interpolation. Since data for France are only available
starting in 1993, the number of 1993 is used for the period 1983-1992
for France. Source: OECD.
Unemployment Benefits (%): Ratio between the unemployment benefit
and the median wage. This ratio represents the average of the gross
unemployment benefit replacement rates for a worker with a full record
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of employment at two earnings levels (APW38 and two-thirds of APW),
three family situations (single, married with dependent spouse, married
with spouse in work), and three unemployment spell durations (first
year; second and third year; fourth and fifth year). APW (the wage
of an average production worker). Available for the period 1983-1997
(only odd years are available, even years are calculated by linear inter-
polation). Source: OECD.
Union density (%): The number of union members as a percentage
of the number of employees. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistic
Database.
UnionD |centr.barg. ≤ 2 (%): The number of union members as a per-
centage of the number of employees, in countries with a centralisation
index of 2 or less. Available for the period 1983-1997. Source: OECD
Labour Market Statistics Database.
UnionD |2 < centr.barg. < 4 (%): The number of union members as
a percentage of the number of employees, in countries with a central-
isation index of between 2 and 4. Available for the period 1983-1997.
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics Database.
UnionD |centr.barg. ≥ 4 (%): The number of union members as a per-
centage of the number of employees, in countries with a centralisation
index of at least 4. Available for the period 1983-1997. Source: OECD
Labour Market Statistics Database.
The correlation coefficients between the variables are shown in B.1. Note
that although the correlation between the benefit replacement rate and
the interaction of the benefit replacement rate and the tax wedge is
very high (0.96), this does not pose a problem for our analysis. The
reason is that high levels of collinearity between a product term and its
component parts is generally not problematic (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).
According to Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, p. 28), such a collinearity might
only pose a problem if the level is so high that it disrupts the computer
algorithm of a statistical package.
38APW is an acronym for the wage of an average production worker.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Involuntary unemployment has been and continues to be one of the
major policy concerns in the European Union (EU). The rise in unem-
ployment rates, first in the early 1980s, and later in the 1990s, created
both economic and social challenges for European countries.
Another challenge for European countries is to reach an acceptable
level of employment in relation to their potential labour force. This is
becoming increasingly important, as the ageing of Europe’s population
will test European budgets to the limit. Looming ahead is a major rise
in spending, not only on pensions, but also on health and long-term
care.
Finally, there exist marked differences in unemployment rates and
participation rates, not only between European countries, but also within
them.
Most international studies on unemployment rates and participation
rates, however, are only limited to national data. For that reason they
cannot do justice to regional disparities within countries. Most regional
studies, in turn, are restricted to one single country, and thereby cannot
analyse the effect of different national institutions on unemployment
rates and labour participation rates. Finally, regional studies that do
cover multiple countries generally do not include national explanatory
variables other than country dummies.
We use both regional and national data of several European coun-
tries to provide a more balanced analysis of unemployment rates and
participation rates. In this thesis we answer the following three ques-
tions: (i) What is the effect of both regional and national variables
on regional participation rates and regional unemployment rates in the
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EU? (ii) Is the effect of explanatory variables on regional labour market
outcomes the same for all countries, or does it differ across countries?
(iii) As wage-setting is highly centralised in Continental Europe, what
is the effect of national institutions on regional labour markets under
centralised wage bargaining?
7.1 Summary
Since we analyse regional unemployment rates and regional participa-
tion rates of several EU countries, we have a hierarchical dataset. In
this dataset regions are lower level units and countries are higher level
units. Ignoring this hierarchical structure of the data and working at
a single level either by estimating a macroeconomic equation based on
macro data or a regional economic equation based on regional data, is
likely to lead to a distorted representation of reality. To account for the
variability on both levels and to allow for nationally different relations
between the regional explanatory variables and regional unemployment
and participation rates, we adopt a multilevel model.
In chapter 2 we discuss problems that occur when using hierarchical
data and explain how a multilevel model may solve these problems.
We also give a brief overview of the use of multilevel models in previous
regional labour market studies. Up to now, most regional labour market
studies use multilevel models to analyse micro data and regional data,
where the lower level units are individuals and the higher level units are
regions.
As we want to analyse regional unemployment rates and regional
participation rates for several countries over time, we encounter ad-
ditional problems such as explanatory variables that are not strictly
exogenous, heteroskedasticity, spatial correlation, and correlation over
time. Although each of these problems has been dealt with separately in
the multilevel literature, the combination of them has not. We develop
an econometric model to account for both the hierarchical structure of
the data and the problems associated with analysing regional data of
multiple countries over time.
Prior to estimating the model of regional participation rates, we
discuss the theory behind the individual participation decision and the
participation rate at the regional level in chapter 3. We first explain
the differences between the participation decision and the hours of work
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decision at the individual level. At the individual level, participation
is a binary decision variable, while hours of work is a continuous de-
cision variable. Consequently, the participation decision depends on a
comparison of utility levels, while the hours of work decision involves
marginal utilities. Hence, even though many of the explanatory vari-
ables are the same, their influence on the hours of work decision may
differ from their influence on the participation decision in terms of both
sign and magnitude.
At the regional level, participation rates can be interpreted as either
the proportion of time an individual wants to devote to working, or
as the proportion of individuals who want to participate in the labour
market. Since the former interpretation only holds under very stringent
assumptions and is not very common, we adopt the second interpre-
tation. More specifically, we define the regional participation rate as
the number of employed individuals, plus the number of unemployed
individuals, divided by the working age population of a region.
We develop a theoretical framework for the individual participation
decisions in section 3.3 and then aggregate individual labour participa-
tion decisions for homogeneous groups. We also illustrate how labour
participation decisions vary across groups and show how this variation
affects regional participation rates. In section 3.4 we view regional
labour participation from a wider perspective. We discuss interactions
that occur at the regional level and briefly discuss some national in-
stitutions that influence regional participation rates. An interaction
irrelevant at the individual level, but important at the regional level,
is the interaction between the unemployment rate and the labour force
participation rate. At the regional level the unemployment rate and the
labour participation rate are mutually dependent. On the one hand,
higher unemployment rates may discourage individuals from participat-
ing in the labour market, because the probability of finding a job is
lower. On the other hand, an increase in the number of individuals
who want to participate in the labour market may increase the regional
unemployment rate.
In chapter 4 we estimate the econometric model discussed in chapter
2 to investigate the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3.
We estimate our model for men and women, because the participa-
tion behaviour of men is different from the participation behaviour of
women.
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Male labour participation rates appear to be positively related to
previous labour participation, pension wealth accrual, and education.
Unemployment benefits and the percentage of people aged under 15 in
a region appear to have a negative impact on male labour participation
rates.
Female labour participation rates are positively related to previous
labour participation, unemployment benefits, pension wealth accrual,
education, and industry mix. The industry mix represents to what
extent the sectoral composition and the part-time/full-time structure
in a region is favourable to women. The percentage of people aged
under 15 in a region negatively affects female labour participation.
The variable with the largest positive effect on male labour participa-
tion is the educational attainment of the population. A one percentage
point increase in the number of people having higher education raises
male labour participation by 0.24 percentage point in the long-term.
The effect of this increase on female labour participation is even higher
(0.29 percentage point). However, the variable with the largest posi-
tive effect on long-term female labour participation is the industry mix.
A one percentage point increase of the industry mix variable increases
female labour participation by 0.76 percentage point.
Both regional and national variables appear to be important in ex-
plaining labour participation rates: regional variables appear slightly
more important in the case of female labour participation rates, while
national variables appear slightly more important in the case of male
labour participation rates.
Another striking result is the large variation in the random coeffi-
cients of the regional variables. The standard deviation of the random
coefficients exceeds the coefficient estimates of the regional variables.
This result indicates that the regional participation rates in different
countries of the EU are not determined by a common structure and
that labour force participation in the EU cannot be encouraged by a
common policy.
In chapter 5 we develop a one-sector model of two regional labour
markets under centralised wage bargaining. We contribute to the ex-
isting literature by including and endogenising labour participation in
a model with centralised wage bargaining and regional migration. Al-
though previous studies usually incorporated migration, they did not
include participation. Firms are identical and produce for the national
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market; the transport costs of goods within the country are zero. The
migration costs are generally positive and individuals only migrate if
they succeed in finding a job in the other region (i.e. we do not allow
for speculative migration).
The model consist of four stages. In the first stage the union and
the employer federation engage in wage bargaining at the national level.
In the second stage the employers determine how many employees they
want to hire at the negotiated wage. In the third stage individuals
maximise their utility by deciding whether they want to participate in
the labour market in their own region, in the other region, or whether
they do not want to participate. In the fourth stage the product market
clears.
Using this model we analyse the effect of unemployment benefits and
moving costs on employment, migration, regional participation, regional
unemployment, and regional unemployment differences.
As part of the model is not analytically solvable, we run numerical
simulations to obtain results. In these simulations, region 1 is assumed
to be smaller than region 2 and to have less favourable labour market
conditions.
An increase in unemployment benefits leads to higher wages and
lower employment, whereas moving costs do not affect wages and em-
ployment.
Participation in both regions decreases marginally if unemployment
benefits increase. An increase in moving costs is shown to have a small
but different effect on participation per region. In region 1 the effect is
positive and in region 2 the effect is negative. Regional unemployment
differentials generally become larger if unemployment benefits rise.
An exception is the situation in which moving costs are high. If
moving costs are high, an increase in unemployment benefits increases
migration and thereby lowers unemployment differences. By contrast,
an increase in moving costs always decreases migration and increases
unemployment differentials.
In chapter 6 we analyse regional unemployment rates for EU coun-
tries using both regional and national variables, by applying the same
econometric model as in chapter 4.
The regional explanatory variables are selected based on the exten-
sive overview of empirical regional unemployment studies by Elhorst
(2003a). We use the percentage of the working age population between
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15 and 24 and the percentage between 55 and 64 to capture the demo-
graphic composition of the population in different regions. The percent-
age of people having medium or higher education is used to account for
differences in the educational attainment of the labour force. Employ-
ment growth and labour productivity growth are included as measures
of the economic performance of regions and labour participation is used
to incorporate the effect of labour supply on unemployment.
National explanatory variables are selected based on studies of the
influence of labour market institutions on national unemployment rates.
The wage bargaining structure is accounted for by including interaction
variables between union density and the level of centralisation of wage
bargaining. Other variables being accounted for are employment pro-
tection, the change in inflation, the unemployment benefit replacement
rate, the tax wedge, and the interaction between the benefit replacement
rate and the tax wedge.
Regional unemployment rates appear to be positively related to the
percentage of the working age population aged between 15 and 24,
lagged unemployment, the tax wedge, and unemployment benefits, and
to be negatively related to education, labour productivity growth, em-
ployment growth, the participation rate, the change in inflation, em-
ployment protection, and the interaction between unemployment bene-
fits and the tax wedge. Union density has a negative impact on regional
unemployment, provided that wage bargaining takes place at either the
centralised or the decentralised level, whereas it has no impact if wage
bargaining takes place at the intermediate level. The influence of the
percentage of the working age population aged between 55 and 64 on
regional unemployment is not significant either.
Both regional and national variables appear to be important in their
contribution to the explanation of the unemployment rate.
Another striking result is again the large variation in the random
coefficients of the regional variables, which indicates that regional un-
employment rates in different countries of the EU, just as regional par-
ticipation rates are not determined by a common structure.
A final noteworthy result is that the effect of national variables is
not constant across countries. Due to interaction effects between in-




We can now recapture the results as answers to the three questions
raised at the beginning of this chapter. First, we see that both regional
and national variables are important in explaining regional participation
and unemployment rates. In other words, ignoring either regional or
national variables leads to a distorted representation of reality.
Second, we see that the effects of regional variables on regional par-
ticipation and unemployment rates vary markedly across countries. This
implies that the same policy causes different outcomes in different coun-
tries, and that there is no common cure for all countries.
A striking illustration is presented by Denmark, where the institu-
tional set-up leads, contrary to other countries, to a negative rather
than a positive effect of the population aged between 15-24 and 55-64
on unemployment. This is probably due to Denmark’s long tradition
of apprenticeships, its safeguards to prevent dropouts from formal ed-
ucation, and its opportunity for older workers to work part-time while
already receiving partial retirement benefits.
In addition, we see that the effect of national variables on unemploy-
ment is also different for different countries. The effect of one labour
market institution depends on the value of others. The effect of union
density on unemployment depends on the degree of centralisation of
wage bargaining, while the tax wedge and the unemployment benefit
replacement rate dampen each other’s effect on unemployment. Con-
sequently, the overall institutional framework has to be considered in
order to design effective policies aimed at reducing unemployment.
Third, using our theoretical model for employment, unemployment,
migration, and participation we can identify the effects of unemploy-
ment benefits and moving costs on regional labour markets under cen-
tralised wage bargaining. In general, higher benefits lead to higher
unemployment and greater regional differences in unemployment rates.
Only if moving costs are high may an increase in benefits lower regional
unemployment differences. By contrast, higher moving costs always lead
to higher regional unemployment differences.

References
Abbring, J. H., Van den Berg, G. J., & Van Ours, J. C. (2005). The
effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate
from unemployment to employment. The Economic Journal, 115,
602–630.
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1994). Growth and unemployment. The
Review of Economic Studies, 61, 477–494.
Aidt, T., & Tzannatos, Z. (2002). Unions and collective bargaining:
Economic effects in a global environment. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
Alvarez, F., & Veracierto, M. (2001). Severance payments in an economy
with frictions. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47, 477–498.
Amemiya, T. (1985). Advanced econometrics. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press.
Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial econometrics: Methods and models. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
Ashenfelter, O., & Heckman, J. J. (1974). The estimation of income
and substitution effects in a model of family labor supply. Econo-
metrica, 42, 73–85.
Atkinson, A. B., & Micklewright, J. (1991). Unemployment compensa-
tion and labor market transitions: A critical review. Journal of
Economic Literature, 29, 1679–1727.
Baddeley, M., Martin, R., & Tyler, P. (1998a). European regional
unemployment disparities: Convergence or persistence? European
Urban and Regional Studies, 5, 195–215.
Baddeley, M., Martin, R., & Tyler, P. (1998b). European regional
unemployment disparities: Convergence or persistence? European
Urban and Regional Studies, 5, 195–215.
Balestra, P., & Negassi, S. (1992). A random coefficient simultaneous
equation system with an application to direct foreign investment
176 References
by French firms. Empirical Economics, 17, 205–220.
Barrell, R., & Genre, V. (1999). Employment strategies for Europe:
Lessons from Denmark and the Netherlands. National Institute
Economic Review, 168, 82–98.
Bauman, J., Fischer, M. M., & Schubert, U. (1988). A choice-theoretical
labour-market model: Empirical tests at the mesolevel. Environ-
ment and Planning A, 20, 1085–1102.
Becker, G. (1965). A theory of the allocation of time. Economic Journal,
75, 493–517.
Bellmann, L., & Blien, U. (1996). Die Lohnkurve in den neun-
ziger Jahren: Der Zusammenhang zwischen regionalen Durch-
schnittslo¨hnen und regionaler Arbeitslosigkeit in einer Mehrebe-
nenanalyse mit dem IAB-betriebspanel. Mitteilungen-aus-der-
Arbeitsmarkt-und-Berufsforschung, 29, 467–470.
Bellmann, L., & Blien, U. (2001). Wage curve analyses of establish-
ment data from Western Germany. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 54, 851–863.
Belot, M., & Van Ours, J. C. (2001). Unemployment and labor market
institutions: An empirical analysis. Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, 15, 403–418.
Belot, M., & Van Ours, J. C. (2004). Does the recent success of some
OECD countries in lowering their unemployment rates lie in the
clever design of their labor market reforms? Oxford Economic
Papers, 56, 621–642.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1973). Labor-force participation rates and the supply
of labor. The Journal of Political Economy, 81, 697–704.
Berg, G. J. Van der. (1990). Search behaviour, transitions to non-
participation and the duration of unemployment. The Economic
Journal, 100 (402), 842–865.
Blanchard, O., & Wolfers, J. (2000). The role of shocks and institutions
in the rise of European unemployment: the aggregate evidence.
The Economic Journal, 110, C1–C33.
Blanchflower, D. G., & Oswald, A. J. (1994). The wage curve. London:
MIT Press.
Blanchflower, D. G., & Oswald, A. J. (1995). An introduction to the
wage curve. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 153–167.
Blau, F., & Kahn, L. (1999). Institutions and laws in the labor market.
In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics
References 177
(Vol. 3A, pp. 1399–1461). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers
BV.
Blien, U. (1995). Die Lohnkurve von 1989: Eine Mehrebenenanalyse
zum Zusammenhang von regionalen Durchschnittslo¨hnen und der
regionalen Arbeitslosenquote. Mitteilungen-aus-der-Arbeitsmarkt-
und-Berufsforschung, 28, 155–170.
Blien, U. (1996). Die Lohnkurve in den achtziger Jahren: Eine Mehrebe-
nenanalyse mit der IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe. Mitteilungen-
aus-der-Arbeitsmarkt-und-Berufsforschung, 29, 471–474.
Blo¨ndel, S., & Scarpetta, S. (1997). Early retirement in OECD coun-
tries: The role of social security systems. OECD Economic Stud-
ies, 29, 7–54.
Blo¨ndel, S., & Scarpetta, S. (1999). The retirement decision in OECD
countries. Paris: OECD.
Bosworth, D., Dawkins, P., & Stromback, T. (1996). The economics of
the labour market. Harlow: Longman.
Bowden, R. J., & Turkington, D. A. (1984). Instrumental variables.
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Bowen, W. G., & Finegan, T. A. (1969). The economics of labor force
participation. United States: Princeton University Press.
Boyle, P., & Shen, J. (1997). Public housing and migration: A multi-
level modelling approach. International Journal of Population Ge-
ography, 3, 227–242.
Broersma, L., & Oosterhaven, J. (2008). Regional labour productivity
in the Netherlands: Agglomeration and congestion effects. Forth-
coming in the Journal of Regional Science.
Brunello, G., Lupi, C., & Ordine, P. (2001). Widening differences in
Italian regional unemployment. Labour Economics, 8, 103–129.
Bryk, A. S., & Raudenbush, S. W. (1992). Hierarchical linear models:
Applications and data analysis methods. Newbury Park: CA: Sage.
Busing, F. M. T. A., Meijer, E., & Van der Leeden, R. (2005). MLA.
Software for multilevel analysis of data with two levels. User’s
guide for version 4.1. The Netherlands: Leiden University, De-
partment of Psychology.
Calmfors, L. (1993). Centralisation of wage bargaining and macroe-
conomic performance: A survey. OECD Economic Studies, 21,
161–191.
Calmfors, L., & Driffill, J. (1988). Bargaining structure, corporatism
178 References
and macroeconomic performance. Economic Policy, 6, 13–61.
Card, D. (1995). The wage curve: A review. Journal of Economic
Literature, 33, 785–799.
Carmeci, G., & Mauro, L. (2002). The convergence of Italian regions
and unemployment: Theory and evidence. Journal of Regional
Science, 42, 509–532.
Cigno, A. (1990). Home-production and the allocation of time. In
D. Sapsford (Ed.), Current issues in labour economics (pp. 7–32).
London: MacMillan.
Daveri, F., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Unemployment, growth and taxation
in industrial countries. Economic Policy, 30, 47–104.
Daveri, F., Tabellini, G., Bentolila, S., & Huizinga, H. (2000). Unem-
ployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries. Economic
Policy, 15, 47–88.
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (1993). Estimation and inference in
econometrics. New York: Oxford University Press.
De Leeuw, J., & Kreft, I. G. G. (1995). Questioning multilevel models.
Journal of Educational and Behavioural Statistics, 20, 171–189.
Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M., & Rubin, D. B. (1977). Maximum
likelihood from incomplete data via the EM algorithm. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 39, 1–38.
Dempster, A. P., Rubin, D. B., & Tsutakawa, R. K. (1981). Estima-
tion in covariance components models. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 76, 341–353.
Di Tella, R., & MacCulloch, R. (2005). The consequences of labor
market flexibility: Panel data evidence based on survey data. Eu-
ropean Economic Review, 49, 1225–1259.
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Manning, A., Margolis, D., Teul-
ings, C., et al. (1996). The economic impact of minimum wages
in Europe. Economic Policy, 11, 317–372.
Draper, D. (1995). Inference and hierarchical modeling in the social
sciences. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 20,
115–147.
Duncan, C., Jones, K., & Moon, G. (1998). Context, composition and
heterogeneity: Using multilevel models in health research. Social
Science and Medicine, 46, 97–117.
Duval, R. (2003). Retirement behaviour in OECD countries: Impact
of old-age pension schemes and other social transfer programmes.
References 179
OECD Economic Studies, 37, 7–50.
Elhorst, J. P. (1993). Regional economic research on labour force partici-
pation (Research Memorandum No. 542). Groningen, The Nether-
lands: University of Groningen, Institute of Economic Research.
Elhorst, J. P. (1996). Regional labour market research on participation
rates. Journal of Economic and Social Geography, 87, 209–221.
Elhorst, J. P. (2001). Dynamic models in space and time. Geographical
Analysis, 33, 119–140.
Elhorst, J. P. (2003a). The mystery of regional unemployment differ-
entials: Theoretical and empirical explanations. Journal of Eco-
nomic Surveys, 17, 709–748.
Elhorst, J. P. (2003b). Specification and estimation of spatial panel
data models. International Regional Science Review, 26, 244–268.
Elhorst, J. P., & Zeilstra, A. S. (2007). Labour force participation rates
at the regional and national levels of the European Union: An
integrated analysis. Papers in Regional Science, 86, 525–549.
Elman, C. (1996). Pensions, households, and local labor markets: The
shaping of old-age economic activity in 1910. Social Science Re-
search, 25, 308–334.
Elmeskov, J., Martin, J. P., & Scarpetta, S. (1998). Key lessons for
labour market reforms: evidence from OECD countries’ experi-
ences. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 5, 205–252.
European Commission. (1997). Employment in Europe. Brus-
sel/Luxembourg.
European Commission. (2000). Employment in Europe 2000. Brus-
sel/Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities.
European Commission. (2003). Employment in Europe 2003. Luxem-
bourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communi-
ties.
European Council. (2005). Council decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines
for the employment policies of the Member States. Official Journal
of the European Union, (2005/600/EC), L205/21–27.
Eurostat. (2002). European regional statistics changes in the NUTS
classification 1981–1999. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Faini, R. (1999). Trade unions and regional development. European
Economic Review, 43, 457–474.
Fair, R. C., & Dominguez, K. M. (1991). Effects of the changing
180 References
U.S. age distribution on macroeconomic equations. The American
Economic Review, 81, 1276–1294.
Ferron, J. (1997). Moving between hierarchical modeling notations.
Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 22 (1), 119–123.
Fitoussi, J. P., Jestaz, D., Phelps, E. S., & Zoega, G. (2000). Roots
of the recent recoveries: Labor reforms or private sector forces?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 237–291.
Fleisher, B. M., & Rhodes, G. (1976). Unemployment and the labor
force participation of married men and women: A simultaneous
model. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 58 (4), 398–406.
Frees, E. W. (2004). Longitudinal and panel data. United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press.
Goldstein, H. (1986). Multilevel mixed linear model analysis using
iterative generalized least squares. Biometrika, 73 (1), 43–56.
Goldstein, H. (1989). Restricted unbiased iterative generalized least-
squares estimation. Biometrika, 76 (3), 622–623.
Goldstein, H. (1995). Multilevel statistical models, second edition. Lon-
don: Edward Arnold.
Goldstein, H. (2003). Multilevel statistical models, third edition. New
York: Arnold/Oxford University Press.
Goldstein, H., Browne, W., & Rasbash, J. (2002). Tutorial in biostatis-
tics: Multilevel modelling of medical data. Statistics in Medicine,
21, 3291–3315.
Goldstein, H., Healy, M. J. R., & Rasbash, J. (1994). Multilevel time
series models with applications to repeated measures data. Statis-
tics in Medicine, 13, 1643–1655.
Goldstein, H., & Rasbash, J. (1992). Efficient computational proce-
dures for the estimation of parameters in multilevel models based
on iterative generalised least squares. Computational Statistics &
Data Analysis, 13, 63–71.
Gould, M. I., & Fieldhouse, E. (1997). Using the 1991 census SAR
in a multilevel analysis of male unemployment. Environment and
Planning A, 29, 611–628.
Graham, J. W., & Green, C. A. (1984). Estimating the parameters of
a household production function with joint products. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 66, 277–282.
Greene, W. H. (1997). Econometric analysis, third edition. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
References 181
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis, fifth edition. New Jersey:
Prenctice Hall.
Gustman, A. L., & Steinmeier, T. L. (1986). A structural retirement
model. Econometrica, 54 (3), 555–584.
Hartley, M. J., & Revankar, N. S. (1974). Labor supply under uncer-
tainty and the rate of unemployment. The American Economic
Review, 64 (1), 170–175.
Hazari, B. R., & Sgro, P. M. (1987). Disguised, urban unemployment
and welfare in a general equilibrium model with segmented labor
markets. Journal of Regional Science, 27, 461–475.
Heckman, J. J. (1978). A partial survey of recent research on the
labor supply of women. The American Economic Review, 68 (2),
200–207.
Hox, J. J. (1995). Applied multilevel analysis. Amsterdam: TT-
Publikaties.
Hox, J. J. (1998). Multilevel modeling: When and why. In R. M.
Balderjahn I. & M. Schader (Eds.), Classification, data analysis
and data highways (pp. 147–154). New York: Springer Verlag.
Hox, J. J. (2002). Multilevel analysis. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Hsiao, C., & Tahmiscioglu, A. K. (1997). A panel analysis of liquidity
constraints and firm investment. Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association, 92 (438), 455–465.
Isserman, A., Taylor, C., Gerking, S., & Schubert, U. (1986). Institu-
tions and laws in the labor market. In P. Nijkamp (Ed.), Handbook
of regional and urban economics (Vol. I, pp. 543–580). Amster-
dam: Elsevier Science Publishers BV.
Jaccard, J., & Turrisi, R. (2003). Interaction effects in multiple regres-
sion. In Quantitative applications in the social sciences (2nd ed.).
London: Sage Publications.
Jimeno, J. F., & Bentolila, S. (1998). Regional unemployment persis-
tence: Spain, 1976-1994. Labour Economics, 5, 25–51.
Jones, K. (1991). Multi-level models for geographical research. Concepts
and Techniques in Modern Geography, 54.
Kelejian, H. H. (1974). Random parameters in simultaneous equation
framework: Identification and estimation. Econometrica, 42, 517–
527.
Kerkhofs, M., & Kooreman, P. (2003). Identification and estimation
182 References
of a class of household production models. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 18, 337–369.
Killingsworth, M. R. (1983). Labor supply. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Killingsworth, M. R., & Heckman, J. J. (1986). Female labor supply:
A survey. In O. C. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (Eds.), Handbook
of labor economics (Vol. I, pp. 103–204). Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science Publishers BV.
Kreft, I. G. G. (1996). Are multilevel techniques necessary? An overview
including simulation studies. (Unpublished manuscript). Los An-
geles, United States: California State University.
Kreft, I. G. G., & Leeuw, J. D. (1998). Introducing multilevel modeling.
London: Sage Publications.
Kulu, H., & Billari, F. C. (2004). Multilevel analysis of internal mi-
gration in a transitional country: The case of Estonia. Regional
Studies, 38, 679–696.
Kwaak, A. (1985). REGAMBEV: Een model voor de provinciale on-
twikkeling van arbeidsmarkt en bevolking in Nederland. Den Haag:
Centraal Planbureau.
Langford, I. H., Leyland, A. H., Rasbash, J., & Goldstein, H. (1999).
Multilevel modelling of the geographical distributions of diseases.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series C, 48 (2), 253–268.
Layard, R. (1997). Preventing long-term unemployment: An economic
analysis. In D. Snower & G. de la Dehesa (Eds.), Unemployment
policy: Government options for the labour market (pp. 333–349).
Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
Layard, R., Nickell, S., & Jackman, R. (1991). Unemployment: Macroe-
conomic performance and the labour market. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Lazear, P. (1990). Job security provisions and employment. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 105, 699–726.
Lee, K. C., & Pesaran, M. H. (1993). The role of sectoral interactions in
wage determination in the UK economy. The Economic Journal,
103, 21–55.
Lee, Y., & Nelder, J. A. (1996). Hierarchical generalized linear models.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B, 58 (4), 619–678.
Lewis, H. G. (1972). Income and substitution effects in labor force
participation and hours of work (Discussion Paper No. 18). Min-
References 183
neapolis, United States: University of Minnesota, Department of
Economics, Center for Economic Research.
Liang, K.-Y., & Zeger, S. L. (1986). Longitudinal data analysis using
generalized linear models. Biometrika, 73 (1), 13–22.
Lindstrom, M. J., & Bates, D. M. (1988). Newton-Raphson and EM
algorithms for linear mixed-effects models for repeated-measures
data. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83 (404),
1014–1022.
Longford, N. T. (1987). A fast scoring algorithm for maximum likelihood
estimation in unbalanced mixed models with nested random effect.
Biometrika, 74 (4), 817–827.
MacRea, C. D., & Yezer, A. M. J. (1976). The personal income tax and
family labor supply. Southern Economic Journal, 43 (1), 783–792.
McCall, L. (1998). Spatial routes to gender wage (in)equality: Regional
restructuring and wage differentials by gender and education. Eco-
nomic Geography, 74, 379–404.
McCulloch, C. E., & Searle, S. R. (2001). Generalized, linear, and mixed
models. New York: Wiley.
McKenna, C. J. (1985). Uncertainty and the labour market: Recent
developments in job search theory. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
McLean, R. A., Sanders, W. L., & Stroup, W. W. (1991). A unified ap-
proach to mixed linear models. The American Statistician, 45 (1),
54–64.
Mincer, J. (1962). Labor force participation of married women: A study
of labor supply. In G. H. Lewis (Ed.), Aspects of labor economics
(pp. 63–97). United States: Princeton University Press.
Moulton, B. R. (1990). An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the
effects of aggregate variables on micro units. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 72, 334–338.
Narendranathan, W., Nickell, S., & Stern, J. (1985). Unemployment
benefits revisited. The Economic Journal, 95, 307–329.
Nickell, S. (1997). Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe
versus North America. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 55–
74.
Nickell, S. (1998). Unemployment: Questions and some answers. The
Economic Journal, 108, 802–816.
Nickell, S., & Layard, R. (1999). Labour market institutions and eco-
nomic performance. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Hand-
184 References
book of labor economics (Vol. 3C, pp. 3029–3084). Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science Publishers BV.
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., & Ochel, W. (2005). Unemployment in the
OECD since the 1960s. what do we know? The Economic Journal,
115, 1–27.
Nijkamp, P., & Poot, J. (2005). The last word on the wage curve?
Journal of Economic Surveys, 19, 421–450.
Nord, S. (1989). The relationships among labor-force participation,
service-sector employment, and underemployment. Journal of Re-
gional Science, 29 (3), 407–421.
OECD. (1994). The OECD jobs study: Facts, analysis, strategies. Paris:
OECD.
OECD. (2004). Employment outlook. Paris: OECD.
OECD. (2005a). Employment outlook. Paris: OECD.
OECD. (2005b). Regions at a glance. Paris: OECD.
Oosterhaven, J., & Dewhurst, J. H. L. (1990). A prototype demo-
economic model with an application to Queensland. International
Regional Science Review, 13, 51–64.
Oosterhaven, J., & Folmer, H. (1985). An interregional labour market
model incorporating vacancy chains and social security. Papers of
the Regional Science Association, 58, 141–155.
Ord, K. (1975). Estimation methods for models of spatial interaction.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 70, 120–126.
Overman, H. G., & Puga, D. (2002). Regional unemployment clusters.
Economic Policy, 17, 117–147.
Pencavel, J. (1986). Labor supply of men: A survey. In O. C. Ashenfelter
& R. Layard (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. I, pp. 3–
102). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers BV.
Pissarides, C. A. (1990). Equilibrium unemployment theory. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Rasbash, J., Steele, F., Browne, W., & Prosser, B. (2005). A user’s guide
to MLwiN: Version 2.0. Bristol: Centre for Multilevel Modelling,
University of Bristol.
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models:
Applications and data analysis methods (2nd ed.). London: CA:
Sage.
Raudenbush, S. W., Bryk, A. S., Cheong, Y. F., & Congdon, R. (2004).
HLM 6: Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling. Lincolnwood,
References 185
IL: Scientific Software International.
Rice, N., Jones, A., & Goldstein, H. (1998). Multilevel models where
the random effects are correlated with the fixed predictors: A
conditioned iterative generalised least squares estimator (CIGLS).
Multilevel Modelling Newsletter, 10 (1), 10–14.
Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological correlations and the behavior of
individuals. American Sociological Review, 15, 351–357.
Rodr´ıguez, G., & Goldman, N. (1995). An assessment of estimation
procedures for multilevel models with binary responses. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 158 (1), 73–89.
Røed, K., & Zhang, T. (2003). Does unemployment compensation affect
unemployment duration? The Economic Journal, 113, 190–206.
Sampson, R. J., Morenoff, J. D., & Earls, F. (1999). Beyond social cap-
ital: Spatial dynamics of collective efficacy for children. American
Sociological Review, 64, 633–660.
Sanner, H. (2003). Self-financing unemployment insurance and bargain-
ing structure. Labour, 17, 229–246.
Scarpetta, S. (1996). Assessing the role of labour market policies and
institutional settings on unemployment: A cross-country study.
OECD Economic Studies, 26, 43–98.
Schu¨rmann, C., & Talaat, A. (2000). Towards a European peripherality
index: Final report (Berichte aus dem Institut fu¨r Raumplanung
No. 53). Dortmund, Germany: Universita¨t Dortmund, Institut
fu¨r Raumplanung.
Schwanen, T., Dieleman, F. M., & Dijst, M. (2004). The impact of
metropolitan structure on commute behavior in the Netherlands:
A multilevel approach. Growth and Change, 35, 304–333.
Searle, S. R., Casella, G., & McCulloch, C. E. (1992). Variance com-
ponents. New York: Wiley.
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to fit multilevel models,
hierarchical models, and individual growth models. Journal of
Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 24 (4), 323–355.
Sjoquist, D. L. (1976). Labor supply under uncertainty: Note. The
American Economic Review, 66 (5), 929–930.
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. (1999). Multilevel analysis: An introduction
to basic and advanced multilevel modeling. London: CA: Sage.
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. J. (1993). Standard errors and sample sizes
for two-level research. Journal of Educational Statistics, 18 (3),
186 References
237–259.
Soskice, D. (1990). Wage determination: The changing role of insti-
tutions in advanced industrialized countries. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 6, 36–61.
Spencer, N. H., & Fielding, A. (2000). An instrumental variable consis-
tent estimation procedure to overcome the problem of endogenous
variables in multilevel models. Multilevel Modelling Newsletter,
12 (1), 4–7.
Suedekum, J. (2004). Selective migration, union wage setting and un-
employment in West Germany. International Economic Journal,
18, 33–48.
Swamy, P. A. V. B. (1970). Efficient inference in a random coefficient
regression model. Econometrica, 38 (2), 311–323.
Taylor, J., & Bradley, S. (1997a). Unemployment in Europe: A com-
parative analysis of regional disparities in Germany, Italy and the
UK. Kyklos, 50, 221–245.
Taylor, J., & Bradley, S. (1997b). Unemployment in Europe: A com-
parative analysis of regional disparities in Germany, Italy and the
UK. Kyklos, 50, 221–245.
Teulings, C., & Hartog, J. (1998). Corporatism or competition? Labour
contracts, institutions and wage structures in international com-
parison. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Toolsema, L. A., & Zeilstra, A. S. (2007). Centralised wage bargaining
and regional unemployment (Unpublished manuscript). Gronin-
gen, The Netherlands: University of Groningen.
Tripier, F. (2003). Can the labor market search model explain the
fluctuations of allocations of time? Economic Modelling, 21, 131–
146.
Van de Wijngaert, R. (1994). Trade unions and collective bargaining
in the Netherlands. Tinbergen Institute Research Series No. 78.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
Van den Berg, G. J. (1990). Search behaviour, transitions to non-
participation and the duration of unemployment. The Economic
Journal, 100, 842–865.
Van der Leeden, R. (1998). Multilevel analysis of repeated measures
data. Quality & Quantity, 32, 15–29.
Van Dijk, J., Folmer, H., Herzog, H. W., & Schlottmann, A. M. (1989).
Labor market institutions and the efficiency of interregional mi-
References 187
gration: A cross-nation comparison. In J. Van Dijk, H. Folmer,
H. Herzog, & A. Schlottmann (Eds.), Migration and labor market
adjustment (pp. 61–83). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Wang, J. (1997). Using SAS PROC MIXED to demystify the hierarchi-
cal linear model. The Journal of Experimental Education, 66 (1),
84–93.
Ward, C., & Dale, A. (1992). Geographical variation in female labour
force participation: An application of multilevel modelling. Re-
gional Studies, 26, 243–255.
Willman, A. (2002). Euro area production function and potential output:
A supply side system approach (European Central Bank Working
Paper Series No. 153). Frankfurt am Main: European Central
Bank.
Xie, Y., & Hannum, E. (1996). Regional variation in earnings inequality
in reform-era urban China. American Journal of Sociology, 101,
950–992.
Yang, M., & Goldstein, H. (1996). Multilevel models for longitudinal
data. In U. Engel & J. Reinecke (Eds.), Analysis of change: Ad-
vanced techniques in panel data analysis (pp. 191–220). Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Yaniv, G. (1979). Labor supply under uncertainty: Note. The American
Economic Review, 69 (1), 203–205.
Zeger, S. L., & Liang, K.-Y. (1986). Longitudinal data analysis for
discrete and continuous outcomes. Biometrics, 42, 121–130.
Author Index
Abbring, J. H., 130, 175
Aghion, P., 138, 175
Aidt, T., 99, 175
Alvarez, F., 133, 175
Amemiya, T., 34, 175
Anselin, L., 34, 175
Ashenfelter, O., 50, 175
Atkinson, A. B., 130, 175
Baddeley, M., 93, 125, 175
Balestra, P., 31, 175
Barrell, R., 148, 176
Bates, D. M., 32, 183
Bauman, J., 56, 176
Becker, G., 55, 176
Bellmann, L., 28, 176
Belot, M., 126–130, 132, 133, 145,
151–153, 176
Ben-Porath, Y., 50, 51, 176
Bentolila, S., 93, 127, 178, 181
Berg, G. J. Van der, 49, 176
Billari, F. C., 25, 26, 182
Blanchard, O., 127, 128, 130, 131,
133, 176
Blanchflower, D. G., 96, 176
Blau, F., 96, 125, 176
Blien, U., 28, 176, 177
Blo¨ndel, S., 52, 57, 69, 91, 177
Bosker, R., 17, 19, 20, 22, 23,
185
Bosker, R. J., 21, 185
Bosworth, D., 47, 177
Bowden, R. J., 34, 177
Bowen, W. G., 68, 177
Boyle, P., 25, 26, 177
Bradley, S., 93, 125, 186
Broersma, L., 84, 153, 177
Browne, W., 14, 18, 180, 184
Brunello, G., 93, 95, 177
Bryk, A. S., 13, 14, 18, 20–23,
177, 184
Busing, F. M. T. A., 21, 177
Calmfors, L., 60, 127, 128, 177
Card, D., 66, 96, 178
Carmeci, G., 97, 178
Casella, G., 14, 185
Cheong, Y. F., 14, 184
Cigno, A., 55, 178
Congdon, R., 14, 184
Dale, A., 25–27, 187
Daveri, F., 126, 127, 130, 131,
133, 178
Davidson, R., 80, 145, 178
Dawkins, P., 47, 177
De Leeuw, J., 13, 21, 178
Dempster, A. P., 18, 178
Dewhurst, J. H. L., 61, 184
Di Tella, R., 127, 130, 132, 178
Dieleman, F. M., 28, 185
Author Index 189
Dijst, M., 28, 185
Dolado, J., 134, 178
Dominguez, K. M., 58, 179
Draper, D., 21, 178
Driffill, J., 60, 127, 177
Duncan, C., 12, 21, 178
Duval, R., 149, 178
Earls, F., 24, 185
Elhorst, J. P., 24, 29, 30, 33, 51,
54, 58, 63, 72, 74, 80, 82,
93, 125, 134, 135, 137,
139–141, 148–150, 171, 179,
198
Elman, C., 25, 26, 179
Elmeskov, J., 127, 128, 130, 131,
133, 179
European Commission, 2, 63, 76,
82, 86, 93, 95, 179
European Council, 123, 179
Eurostat, 87, 161, 179
Faini, R., 96, 97, 99, 122, 179
Fair, R. C., 58, 179
Ferron, J., 14, 15, 180
Fieldhouse, E., 25, 27, 180
Fielding, A., 24, 186
Finegan, T. A., 68, 177
Fischer, M. M., 56, 176
Fitoussi, J. P., 127, 129, 130, 133,
180
Fleisher, B. M., 60, 68, 180
Folmer, H., 61, 103, 184, 186
Frees, E. W., 31, 32, 180
Genre, V., 148, 176
Gerking, S., 47, 181
Goldman, N., 18, 185
Goldstein, H., 14, 17, 18, 22–24,
72, 180, 182, 185, 187
Gould, M. I., 25, 27, 180
Graham, J. W., 56, 180
Green, C. A., 56, 180
Greene, W. H., 33, 37, 180, 181
Gustman, A. L., 57, 181
Hannum, E., 27, 187
Hartley, M. J., 44, 46, 181
Hartog, J., 99, 128, 186
Hazari, B. R., 97, 181
Healy, M. J. R., 23, 180
Heckman, J. J., 47, 50, 51, 54,
56, 80, 81, 175, 181, 182
Herzog, H. W., 103, 186
Howitt, P., 138, 175
Hox, J. J., 11, 18, 19, 22, 24, 181
Hsiao, C., 32, 33, 181
Huizinga, H., 127, 178
Isserman, A., 47, 49, 181
Jaccard, J., 165, 181
Jackman, R., 106, 182
Jestaz, D., 127, 180
Jimeno, J. F., 93, 181
Jones, A., 24, 185
Jones, K., 25, 178, 181
Kahn, L., 96, 125, 176
Kelejian, H. H., 31, 181
Kerkhofs, M., 56, 181
Killingsworth, M. R., 42, 47, 54,
56, 80, 81, 182
Kooreman, P., 56, 181
Kramarz, F., 178
Kreft, I. G. G., 13, 19–21, 178,
182
190 Author Index
Kulu, H., 25, 26, 182
Kwaak, A., 60, 182
Laird, N. M., 18, 178
Langford, I. H., 24, 182
Layard, R., 96, 106, 125, 139,
182, 183
Lazear, P., 133, 182
Lee, K. C., 106, 182
Lee, Y., 19, 182
Leeuw, J. D., 13, 20, 182
Lewis, H. G., 40, 61, 182
Leyland, A. H., 24, 182
Liang, K.-Y., 19, 183, 187
Lindstrom, M. J., 32, 183
Longford, N. T., 18, 183
Lupi, C., 93, 177
MacCulloch, R., 127, 130, 132,
178
Machin, S., 178
MacKinnon, J. G., 80, 145, 178
MacRea, C. D., 48, 183
Manning, A., 178
Margolis, D., 178
Martin, J. P., 127, 179
Martin, R., 93, 125, 175
Mauro, L., 97, 178
McCall, L., 25, 27, 183
McCulloch, C. E., 14, 18, 183,
185
McKenna, C. J., 49, 183
McLean, R. A., 14, 183
Meijer, E., 21, 177
Micklewright, J., 130, 175
Mincer, J., 50, 51, 183
Moon, G., 178
Morenoff, J. D., 24, 185
Moulton, B. R., 66, 183
Narendranathan, W., 130, 183
Negassi, S., 31, 175
Nelder, J. A., 19, 182
Nickell, S., 96, 106, 125, 127, 128,
130–134, 141, 153, 182–
184
Nijkamp, P., 96, 184
Nord, S., 60, 184
Nunziata, L., 127, 184
Ochel, W., 127, 184
OECD, 1, 82, 90, 93–95, 122,
128, 129, 132, 164, 184
Oosterhaven, J., 61, 84, 153, 177,
184
Ord, K., 34, 184
Ordine, P., 93, 177
Oswald, A. J., 96, 176
Overman, H. G., 93, 184
Pencavel, J., 41, 42, 50, 54, 56,
57, 80, 81, 184
Pesaran, M. H., 106, 182
Phelps, E. S., 127, 180
Pissarides, C. A., 138, 184
Poot, J., 96, 184
Prosser, B., 14, 184
Puga, D., 93, 184
Rasbash, J., 14, 18, 23, 24, 180,
182, 184
Raudenbush, S. W., 13, 14, 18,
20–23, 177, 184
Revankar, N. S., 44, 46, 181
Rhodes, G., 60, 68, 180
Rice, N., 24, 185
Robinson, W. S., 13, 185
Rodr´ıguez, G., 18, 185
Røed, K., 130, 185
Author Index 191
Rubin, D. B., 18, 178
Sampson, R. J., 24, 185
Sanders, W. L., 14, 183
Sanner, H., 98, 185
Scarpetta, S., 52, 57, 69, 91, 126–
128, 130–133, 177, 179,
185
Schlottmann, A. M., 103, 186
Schubert, U., 47, 56, 176, 181
Schu¨rmann, C., 77, 88, 143, 162,
185
Schwanen, T., 28, 185
Searle, S. R., 14, 18, 183, 185
Sgro, P. M., 97, 181
Shen, J., 25, 26, 177
Singer, J. D., 15, 185
Sjoquist, D. L., 46, 47, 185
Snijders, T., 17, 19–23, 185
Soskice, D., 129, 186
Spencer, N. H., 24, 186
Steele, F., 14, 184
Steinmeier, T. L., 57, 181
Stern, J., 130, 183
Stromback, T., 47, 177
Stroup, W. W., 14, 183
Suedekum, J., 97, 98, 186
Swamy, P. A. V. B., 33, 34, 186
Tabellini, G., 126, 127, 131, 178
Tahmiscioglu, A. K., 32, 33, 181
Talaat, A., 77, 88, 143, 162, 185
Taylor, C., 47, 181
Taylor, J., 93, 125, 186
Teulings, C., 99, 128, 178, 186
Toolsema, L. A., 93, 186
Tripier, F., 49, 186
Tsutakawa, R. K., 18, 178
Turkington, D. A., 34, 177
Turrisi, R., 165, 181
Tyler, P., 93, 125, 175
Tzannatos, Z., 99, 175
Van de Wijngaert, R., 99, 186
Van den Berg, G. J., 130, 175,
186
Van der Leeden, R., 21, 23, 177,
186
Van Dijk, J., 103, 186
Van Ours, J. C., 126–130, 132,
133, 145, 151–153, 175,
176
Veracierto, M., 133, 175
Wang, J., 15, 187
Ward, C., 25–27, 187
Willman, A., 113, 187
Wolfers, J., 127, 128, 130, 131,
133, 176
Xie, Y., 27, 187
Yang, M., 24, 187
Yaniv, G., 46, 47, 187
Yezer, A. M. J., 48, 183
Zeger, S. L., 19, 183, 187
Zeilstra, A. S., 29, 63, 93, 179,
186
Zhang, T., 130, 185
Zoega, G., 127, 180

Samenvatting
Het terugdringen van de werkloosheid is e´e´n van de belangrijkste beleids-
vraagstukken in de Europese Unie (EU). Daarnaast is een mate van
arbeidsparticipatie nodig die de betaalbaarheid van de gezondheidszorg
en het pensioenstelsel waarborgt.
In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we regionale werkloosheid en arbeids-
participatie in meerdere landen behorend tot de EU. Hoewel reeds vele
onderzoeken zijn gedaan naar werkloosheid en arbeidsparticipatie in
verschillende landen in de EU, beperken deze onderzoeken zich over het
algemeen tot nationale data. Hierdoor wordt geen recht gedaan aan de
regionale verschillen binnen deze landen. Aan de andere kant bestu-
deren de meeste regionale onderzoeken slechts de arbeidsparticipatie of
werkloosheid binnen e´e´n land. Deze regionale onderzoeken kunnen dus
niet de invloed bepalen van variabelen die voor alle regio’s binnen een
land hetzelfde zijn en alleen per land verschillen. De regionale onder-
zoeken die wel meerdere landen bestuderen, nemen over het algemeen
alleen dummy-variabelen op voor de verschillende landen. Een dummy-
variabele heeft slechts twee waarden (1 en 0) en geeft aan of een regio
wel of niet tot een bepaald land behoort. Door een dummy-variabele op
te nemen voor een land kan worden gezien hoeveel de regionale werk-
loosheid (of arbeidsparticipatie) van dat land afwijkt van die van andere
landen. De invloed van de onderliggende nationale variabelen waar het
echt om gaat, wordt met dummies niet onderzocht.
In dit proefschrift gebruiken we zowel regionale als nationale data
van verschillende EU-landen om een meer uitgebalanceerd beeld te krij-
gen van regionale werkloosheid en regionale arbeidsparticipatie.
De drie vragen die we in dit proefschrift willen beantwoorden zijn:
1. “Wat is het effect van zowel regionale als nationale variabelen op
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de regionale arbeidsparticipatie en werkloosheid in de EU?” Een
voorbeeld van een regionale variabele die de regionale arbeidspar-
ticipatie en werkloosheid be¨ınvloedt, is het opleidingsniveau van
de beroepsbevolking. Een nationale variabele die de regionale ar-
beidsparticipatie en werkloosheid be¨ınvloedt, is de hoogte van de
werkloosheidsuitkeringen.
2. “Is het effect van de regionale en nationale variabelen op de ar-
beidsparticipatie en werkloosheid hetzelfde voor alle landen, of
verschilt deze tussen landen?”
3. “Wat is het effect van nationale instituties op regionale arbeids-
markten als de loononderhandelingen op landelijk niveau plaats-
vinden?” We kijken hierbij alleen naar een situatie met gecen-
traliseerde loononderhandelingen, omdat de loononderhandelingen
in het grootste deel van het Europese continent sterk gecentrali-
seerd zijn. De loononderhandelingen vinden daar niet op bedrijfs-
niveau plaats, maar op sector- of landsniveau.
Onderzoeksmethode
Het onderzoeken van regionale werkloosheid en regionale arbeidsparti-
cipatie voor meerdere landen brengt verschillende complicaties met zich
mee. Deze complicaties zijn ieder afzonderlijk al wel bestudeerd, maar
een aanpak voor een analyse waarin ze gezamelijk optreden, ontbreekt
nog.
Allereerst moet worden gecorrigeerd voor het feit dat enkele ver-
klarende variabelen niet alleen invloed hebben op, maar ook worden
be¨ınvloed door de regionale werkloosheid of arbeidsparticipatie (endo-
geniteit). Een voorbeeld hiervan zijn de regionale werkloosheid en de
regionale arbeidsparticipatie. Deze variabelen be¨ınvloeden elkaar we-
derzijds. Hierdoor kan het effect van de ene variabele op de andere
niet zonder meer worden vastgesteld. Eerst moet voor deze wederzijdse
afhankelijkheid worden gecorrigeerd (met behulp van instrumentele va-
riabelen).
Daarnaast moet rekening worden gehouden met het feit dat re-
gio’s die dichter bij elkaar liggen eerder te maken hebben met dezelfde
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achtergrondkenmerken dan regio’s die verder van elkaar gelegen zijn
(ruimtelijke autocorrelatie).
Tevens moet het model de gelaagdheid van de data weergeven: re-
gio’s liggen immers binnen landen (multilevel-model). Hierdoor kunnen
de effecten van regionale variabelen verschillen per land (random ef-
fecten), terwijl ook de variatie in de storingen per land kan verschillen
(heteroscedasticiteit).
Tot slot moet worden gecorrigeerd voor het feit dat de hoogte van
zowel het werkloosheids- als het arbeidsparticipatiepercentage in het ene
jaar afhangt van de hoogte in het voorgaande jaar (vertraagde endogene
variabele).
In hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelen we een econometrisch model dat met
alle bovenstaande complicaties rekening houdt. Dit model wordt in het
vervolg van het proefschrift toegepast bij de empirische analyses.
Regionale arbeidsparticipatie
Regionale arbeidsparticipatie kan op twee manieren worden ge¨ınterpre-
teerd: (i) als het deel van de tijd dat een individu aan werk wil besteden;
(ii) als het deel van de mensen dat wil participeren in de arbeidsmarkt.
De eerste interpretatie is alleen houdbaar onder zeer stringente aan-
names en is weinig gangbaar. Wij gaan dan ook uit van de tweede
interpretatie.
Hoofdstuk 3 is een theoretisch hoofdstuk over arbeidsparticipatie. In
dit hoofdstuk ontwikkelen we allereerst een theoretisch raamwerk voor
de individuele arbeidsparticipatiebeslissing. Vervolgens aggregeren wij
deze beslissing van het individuele niveau naar het groepsniveau voor
homogene groepen. Daarna laten we zien hoe de arbeidsparticipatie van
de verschillende homogene groepen optelt tot de regionale arbeidsparti-
cipatie. Tot slot plaatsen wij in paragraaf 3.4 de regionale arbeidsparti-
cipatie in een breder perspectief. Dit doen we door de interacties te laten
zien die met name op regionaal niveau plaatsvinden en door de invloed
van nationale instituties (zoals bijvoorbeeld werkloosheidsuitkeringen)
te bespreken. Een voorbeeld van een interactie die wel op regionaal
maar nauwelijks op individueel niveau een rol speelt, is die tussen ar-
beidsparticipatie en werkloosheid. Enerzijds kan een hogere regionale
werkloosheid mensen afschrikken om toe te treden tot de arbeidsmarkt,
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omdat de kans op het vinden van een baan lager is. Anderzijds kan een
stijging van het aantal mensen dat wil participeren op de arbeidsmarkt
leiden tot hogere regionale werkloosheid.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt met behulp van het theoretische raamwerk van
hoofdstuk 3 en het econometrische model van hoofdstuk 2 de arbeidspar-
ticipatiegraad van respectievelijk mannen en vrouwen geanalyseerd. De
arbeidsparticipatiegraad is hierbij gedefinieerd als de verhouding tussen
het aantal mensen dat actief is op de arbeidsmarkt (dit zijn de wer-
kenden plus de werkzoekenden, ofwel werklozen) en de omvang van de
beroepsbevolking (het aantal mensen tussen 15 en 65 jaar oud). In de
analyse worden zowel regionale als nationale variabelen opgenomen.
De arbeidsparticipatiegraad van mannen blijkt positief af te hangen
van opleiding, arbeidsparticipatie in de voorgaande periode en het effect
van langer werken op de pensioenopbouw (gecorrigeerd voor de extra
afdrachten gedurende de tijd dat langer wordt gewerkt). De hoogte
van de werkloosheidsuitkeringen en het gedeelte van de bevolking in
een regio dat jonger is dan 15 jaar hebben een negatieve invloed op de
arbeidsparticipatie van mannen.
De arbeidsparticipatiegraad van vrouwen is positief gerelateerd aan
opleiding, arbeidsparticipatie in de voorgaande periode, de hoogte van
de werkloosheidsuitkeringen en het effect van langer werken op de pen-
sioenopbouw (weer gecorrigeerd voor de extra afdrachten gedurende de
tijd dat langer wordt gewerkt) en de sectormix. De sectormix geeft aan
in hoeverre de sectorstructuur (de verdeling van de werkgelegenheid
over de verschillende sectoren) en de verhouding part-time/full-time
werkgelegenheid van een regio gunstig zijn voor de arbeidsparticipa-
tie van vrouwen (gemeten aan dezelfde structuren op landelijk niveau).
Het aandeel van de bevolking in een regio dat jonger is dan 15 jaar heeft
een negatieve invloed op de participatiegraad van vrouwen.
De variabele met het grootste positieve effect op de regionale ar-
beidsparticipatie van mannen is opleiding. Een stijging van het aan-
tal mensen met een hogere opleiding met 1 procentpunt vergroot de
arbeidsparticipatiegraad van mannen met 0,24 procentpunt op de lange
termijn. Het effect van deze stijging is voor vrouwen zelfs nog groter
(0,29 procentpunt). De variabele met het grootste positieve effect op
de participatie van vrouwen is echter de sectormix. Wanneer de sector-
mixvariabele stijgt met 1 procentpunt neemt de participatiegraad van
vrouwen toe met 0,76 procentpunt.
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 197
Zowel regionale als nationale variabelen blijken bij te dragen aan
het verklaren van de regionale arbeidsparticipatiegraden. Regionale va-
riabelen dragen ten opzichte van de nationale variabelen iets meer bij
aan de verklaring van de arbeidsparticipatiegraden van vrouwen. Bij
mannen is het omgekeerd, hier dragen nationale variabelen relatief iets
meer bij aan de verklaring van de arbeidsparticipatiegraden.
Een tweede in het oog vallend resultaat is dat de effecten van re-
gionale variabelen op de arbeidsparticipatiegraden van mannen en vrou-
wen sterk varie¨ren tussen landen. Dit resultaat duidt erop dat de re-
gionale arbeidsparticipatiegraden in verschillende landen niet bepaald
zijn door een gemeenschappelijke structuur en dat de arbeidsparticipa-
tie in verschillende landen van de EU niet door e´e´n gemeenschappelijk
beleid kan worden bevorderd.
Regionale werkloosheid
In hoofdstuk 5 ontwikkelen we een theoretisch model waarmee het ef-
fect van nationale instituties op regionale arbeidsmarkten kan worden
onderzocht. Onze toevoeging aan de bestaande literatuur is dat wij
zowel arbeidsparticipatie als migratie verklaren in een model met loon-
onderhandelingen op landelijk niveau. Sommige eerdere studies namen
al wel migratie op, maar de toevoeging van participatie is nieuw.
In het model in hoofdstuk 5 gaan we uit van een land met e´e´n sector
en twee regio’s, met identieke bedrijven die produceren voor de nationale
markt. Het transporteren van goederen tussen de regio’s is kostenloos.
Daarnaast nemen we aan dat verhuiskosten voor individuen positief of
nul zijn en dat individuen alleen migreren als zij een baan in de andere
regio hebben gevonden.
Het model kent vier fases. In de eerste fase vinden landelijke onder-
handelingen plaats tussen de werkgeversorganisatie en de vakbond. In
de tweede fase bepalen de individuele werkgevers hoeveel werknemers
zij in dienst willen nemen tegen het loon dat uit de onderhandelingen
in de eerste fase is gekomen. In de derde fase kiezen werknemers of ze
willen participeren in de eigen arbeidsmarkt, in de arbeidsmarkt van
de andere regio, of dat ze niet willen participeren. In de vierde fase
wordt de marktprijs van de producten bepaald en worden de producten
geproduceerd en verkocht.
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Met behulp van het model worden de effecten van werkloosheids-
uitkeringen en verhuiskosten op werkgelegenheid, migratie, regionale
arbeidsparticipatie, en regionale werkloosheid onderzocht. Aangezien
een deel van het model niet analytisch is op te lossen, gebruiken wij
hiervoor numerieke simulaties. Bij deze simulaties wordt aangenomen
dat regio 1 minder inwoners en een minder gunstige arbeidsmarkt heeft
dan regio 2.
De simulaties van het model leveren de volgende uitkomsten op. Een
stijging van de werkloosheidsuitkeringen leidt tot hogere lonen en een
lagere werkgelegenheid. Verhuiskosten hebben daarentegen nagenoeg
geen invloed op de lonen en de werkgelegenheid.
De participatiegraden in beide regio’s dalen slechts weinig wanneer
de werkloosheidsuitkeringen toenemen. Een stijging van de verhuiskos-
ten heeft een kleine, maar per regio verschillende, invloed op de arbeids-
participatiegraad: de participatiegraad stijgt in regio 1 en daalt in re-
gio 2. Regionale werkloosheidsverschillen nemen over het algemeen toe
wanneer de werkloosheidsuitkeringen stijgen. Een uitzondering geldt
wanneer de verhuiskosten zeer hoog zijn. In dat geval leidt een stijging
van werkloosheidsuitkeringen tot een stijging van de regionale migratie
waardoor de regionale werkloosheidsverschillen afnemen. Hogere ver-
huiskosten leiden altijd, dat wil zeggen voor alle mogelijke waarden van
de werkloosheidsuitkeringen, tot lagere regionale migratie en hogere re-
gionale werkloosheidsverschillen.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de invloed van zowel regionale als nationale va-
riabelen op de regionale werkloosheid in verschillende landen in de EU
bepaald met behulp van het econometrische model uit hoofdstuk 2.
Bij de keuze van de regionale variabelen is gebruik gemaakt van het
overzicht van empirische regionale werkloosheidsartikelen van Elhorst
(2003a). We gebuiken de aandelen van de beroepsbevolking tussen 14
en 24 en tussen 55 en 64 jaar oud als verklarende variabelen, zodat
regionale verschillen in de demografische compositie van de bevolking
worden weerspiegeld. We nemen percentages van de bevolking met een
middelbare of hogere opleiding op als maatstaf voor het opleidingsni-
veau van de regionale beroepsbevolking. Werkgelegenheidsgroei en ar-
beidsproductiviteitsgroei worden opgenomen als weergave van de econo-
mische sterkte van een regio, terwijl de arbeidsparticipatiegraad wordt
opgenomen als arbeidsaanbodmaatstaf. Aangezien de werkloosheid in
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het ene jaar afhangt van de werkloosheid in het voorgaande jaar nemen
we tot slot de vertraagde werkloosheid op als verklarende variabele.
De nationale variabelen zijn geselecteerd op basis van verschillende
onderzoeken naar de invloed van arbeidsmarktinstituties op nationale
werkloosheidspercentages. Als maatstaf voor de structuur van de loon-
onderhandelingen nemen we de interactie op tussen de mate waarin de
loononderhandelingen zijn gecentraliseerd en de organisatiegraad (ofwel
het percentage van de loon- en salarisontvangers dat lid is van een
vakbond). Dit levert drie variabelen op: organisatiegraad bij gecen-
traliseerde loononderhandelingen, organisatiegraad bij gedecentraliseer-
de loononderhandelingen, en organisatiegraad bij loononderhandelingen
die op het intermediaire niveau plaatsvinden. Decentrale loononder-
handelingen vinden plaats op bedrijfsniveau, terwijl gecentraliseerde
loononderhandelingen op nationaal niveau plaatsvinden. Bij gecen-
traliseerde onderhandelingen kan naast de werkgevers- en werknemers-
organisaties de overheid een partij zijn. De overheid kan bijvoorbeeld
toezeggingen doen om de belastingen en sociale premies minder te laten
stijgen, mits de overige partijen aan loonmatiging doen. In het inter-
mediaire geval vinden de loononderhandelingen op sectorniveau plaats.
Verder nemen we de mate van ontslagbescherming, de verandering
van de inflatie, de hoogte van de werkloosheidsuitkeringen, de belas-
tingwig (het verschil tussen wat de werknemer de werkgever kost en
het netto loon dat de werknemer ontvangt), en de interactie tussen de
werkloosheidsuitkeringen en de belastingwig op.
De regionale werkloosheid blijkt positief af te hangen van (d.w.z.
stijgt door vergroting van) het percentage van de beroepsbevolking
tussen 14 en 24 jaar, de vertraagde werkloosheid, de belastingwig en
de hoogte van de werkloosheidsuitkeringen. De regionale werkloosheid
hangt negatief samen met opleiding, arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei, werk-
gelegenheidsgroei, de arbeidsparticipatiegraad, de verandering van de
inflatie, ontslagbescherming en de interactie tussen de werkloosheids-
uitkeringen en de belastingwig. De organisatiegraad heeft een negatieve
invloed op de werkloosheid mits de loononderhandelingen centraal of
decentraal plaatshebben. De organisatiegraad heeft geen invloed op
de werkloosheid wanneer de loononderhandelingen op het intermediaire
niveau plaatsvinden.
Zowel regionale als nationale variabelen blijken een belangrijke bij-
drage te leveren aan de verklaring van de regionale werkloosheid.
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Een tweede in het oog springend resultaat is dat de variatie van de
effecten van de regionale variabelen op de werkloosheid tussen landen
erg groot is. Dit resultaat komt overeen met het resultaat in hoofdstuk
4 over de regionale arbeidsparticipatie. De conclusie is vergelijkbaar:
regionale werkloosheidspercentages in verschillende landen worden niet
bepaald door een gemeenschappelijke structuur.
Verder valt op dat het effect van nationale variabelen niet hetzelfde
is voor verschillende landen. De interactie-effecten tonen aan dat het
effect van de ene institutie afhankelijk is van de waarde van een andere
institutie.
Conclusies
Met behulp van de bovenstaande resultaten kunnen we de belangrijkste
conclusies kort samenvatten.
Ten eerste zien we dat zowel regionale als nationale variabelen be-
langrijk zijn bij het verklaren van de regionale arbeidsparticipatiegraden
en werkloosheidspercentages. Met andere woorden, het niet opnemen
van regionale dan wel nationale variabelen levert een vertekend beeld
van de werkelijkheid op.
Ten tweede zien we dat het effect van de regionale variabelen op
de arbeidsparticipatiegraden en werkloosheidspercentages sterk varieert
tussen de verschillende landen. Dit duidt erop dat eenzelfde beleid ver-
schillende uitkomsten zal hebben in verschillende landen en dat er geen
standaardaanpak bestaat die de problemen van alle landen oplost.
Dit kan worden ge¨ıllustreerd aan de hand van Denemarken, waar
de institutionele setting ertoe leidt dat anders dan in andere landen de
bevolking tussen 15 en 24 en tussen 55 en 64 jaar oud een negatief (ver-
lagend) in plaats van een positief (verhogend) effect heeft op de werk-
loosheid. Dit komt vermoedelijk doordat Denemarken een lange traditie
kent van stageplaatsen, programma’s ter voorkoming van schooluitval
en mogelijkheden voor pensioengerechtigde werknemers om part-time
te werken onder behoud van inkomen uit pensioen.
Daarnaast zien we dat het effect van nationale variabelen op werk-
loosheid verschilt voor de verschillende landen. Dit komt doordat het
effect van de ene arbeidsmarktinstitutie afhangt van de waarde van een
andere arbeidsmarktinstitutie. Het effect van organisatiegraad op werk-
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loosheid hangt af van de mate waarin de loononderhandelingen zijn
gecentraliseerd, terwijl de belastingwig en de werkloosheidsuitkeringen
elkaars effect op de werkloosheid verminderen. Als gevolg hiervan is
het voor het ontwikkelen van effectief beleid noodzakelijk het volledige
institutionele raamwerk in ogenschouw te nemen.
Ten derde kan met behulp van ons theoretisch model uit hoofdstuk
5 het effect van werkloosheidsuitkeringen en verhuiskosten op regionale
arbeidsmarkten in geval van gecentraliseerde loononderhandelingen wor-
den getoond. Het model bevat de variabelen werkgelegenheid, werkloos-
heid, migratie, en arbeidsparticipatie. Over het algemeen leiden hogere
werkloosheidsuitkeringen tot hogere werkloosheid en grotere regionale
werkloosheidsverschillen. Alleen in geval van zeer hoge verhuiskosten lei-
den hogere werkloosheidsuitkeringen tot lagere regionale werkloosheids-
verschillen. Hogere verhuiskosten daarentegen leiden altijd tot grotere
regionale werkloosheidsverschillen.

